

རྗེ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་སློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པའི་དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྟོང་པོ་

THE GREAT
ESSENCE OF TRUE ELOQUENCE,
DISTINGUISHING THE INTERPRETABLE
AND THE DEFINITIVE MEANINGS OF
ALL THE SCRIPTURES OF THE VICTOR
(Translated by Robert A.F. Thurman)

PROLOGUE

Reverence to the Guru, Manjughosha!

Shambhu, Meghavahana, Hiranyagarbha,
Anangapati, Damodara, and the other (gods),
All puffed up with self-infatuation,
They roar their lordship o'er the worlds;
And yet, before the vision of His Body,
They pale like fireflies in the sun!
Then down they bow their sparkling diadems
In reverence to the lotuses of His feet!
I pay homage to that Lord of Sages,
The God of all the gods!

I bow devoted to Maitreya and Manjughosha,
Vast oceans, treasuries of jewels of eloquence,
Rippling with mighty waves of enlightened deeds,
Hard to fathom in their depths of wisdom,
Hard to measure in their great expanse of love!

I bow my head to the feet of Nagarjuna and Asanga,
Who pioneered the ways for Champions of philosophy,
With two interpretations of Sugata's sacred discourse,
And made that superb Doctrine of that Victor,
Shine like sunlight throughout the triple world!
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Respectfully I bow to those Master Scholars,
Best heralds of the non-decline of Buddha's Teaching,
Who upheld the two systems of the Champions,
And opened the eyes of millions of geniuses
To the ornaments of the Holy Land of India,
Aryadeva, brave Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, Chandrakirti,
Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti!

There have been many who did not realize That Place
Although they strived, were not lowly in accomplishments
From direct experience, and were learned in the Doctrine,
And even dedicated themselves to the path of philosophy.

But I have seen It quite precisely,

རྗེ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་སློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པའི་དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སློང་པོ་

By the grace of my Guru, Savior Manjughosha,
And I am going to explain it from great love.
You who aspire to Peerless Philosophy,
Listen with reverence,
With the critical discrimination that realizes
The Thatness of the Teaching!

(The Lord said), in the Questions of Rashtrapala Scripture:

The way is empty, peaceful, and uncreated.
Not knowing that, the living beings wander.
Moved by compassion, he introduces them
With hundreds of reasons and technical procedures.

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Having seen the extreme difficulty of realizing the actuality of things, without which there is no liberation from the world, the compassionate Teacher introduced living beings to that realization through the many doors of reasoning and technical procedures. Thus, the discriminating should exert themselves in the techniques for realizing Thatness. This depends on the discrimination between the interpretable meaning and the definitive meaning of the teachings of the Victor.

It is not possible to discriminate between these two on scriptural authority alone, on some statement such as "This is interpretable meaning, and this definitive meaning." Otherwise, the Champions' elaboration of explanations of the problem of discrimination between interpretable and definitive would have been pointless. Further, many different interpretations of interpretable and definitive have been declared in the scriptures themselves. Finally, since it cannot be established in general by referring to scriptural statements alone, as no such statement would be valid in every case, neither can it be established by a mere (scriptural) statement in any particular case.

The Champions of Philosophy, foretold to discern the interpretable and the definitive in the teachings, elucidated their inner meaning. Hence, we must seek that meaning by following their determinations (established) by reasonings that fault alternative interpretations of definitive meaning scriptures, proving their definiteness as uninterpretable meaning. Thus, ultimately, we must discriminate with impeccable reasoning. Should we accept theories violating reason, their teacher could not become the personification of validating cognition. For, even the ultimate reality of things includes means of proof through logically established reasoning.

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Seeing the ramifications of this, the Lord (declared):

O Bhikshus, just as a goldsmith gets his gold,
First testing by melting, cutting, and rubbing,
Sages accept my teachings after full examination

And not just out of devotion (to me).

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Chapter I

STATEMENTS FROM THE ELUCIDATION OF INTENTION SCRIPTURE

1. INQUIRY TO RESOLVE CONTRADICTIONS

(Paramarthasamudgata) states, in the Elucidation of Intention Scripture: The Lord proclaims in many discourses the intrinsic identity! of the aggregates, their characteristics of production and destruction, their abandonment, and full understanding. As with the aggregates, so does he proclaim the twelve media, the dependent origination, and the four foods. Thus does he proclaim the intrinsic identity, the thorough knowledge, the abandonment, the realization, and the meditation of the four holy truths; the intrinsic identity, variety, plurality, abandonment and full understanding of the elements; and the intrinsic identities, resistances, remedies, initial productions, maintenances, preservations, developments, and increases of the thirty-seven accessories of enlightenment. On the other hand, the Lord also proclaims the intrinsic unreality, non-production, non-cessation, primordial peace, and natural total liberation of all things. I wonder about this and earnestly inquire of the Lord the actual meaning of his proclamation of the intrinsic unreality, non-production, non-cessation, primordial peace, and natural, total liberation of all things.

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There is verbal contradiction between the statements in some scriptures that all things are devoid of intrinsic reality and those of others that proclaim the intrinsic identity, and so on, of the aggregates, and so on. Yet the scriptures should be free of contradictions. Hence (Paramarthasamudgata) inquires into the intended meaning of the declarations of intrinsic unreality, thereby also inquiring by implication into the intended meaning of the declarations of intrinsic identity, and so on. Here, it is not correct to interpret "intrinsic identity" as the Great Chinese Commentary³ does, as "distinctive characteristic." The scripture itself, in the section on the imagined nature," clearly explains it to refer to "intrinsically identifiable status." Furthermore, (if it were "distinctive characteristic"), it would entail the logical fallacy that the explanation of the imagined nature as "identity-unreality" would be invalid, since there are distinctive characteristics even in things of imagined nature. Although other commentaries explain the "variety" and "plurality" of elements otherwise, we may take them to refer to the eighteen elements and the six elements, respectively, considering their subsequent occurrence in the scripture. "Preservation" means not forgetting.

2. ANSWER RESOLVING THE CONTRADICTION; THE INTERPRETATION OF UNREALITY INTENDED BY SUCH DECLARATIONS; BRIEF STATEMENT

In the Elucidation of Intention, (the Buddha) teaches intrinsic unreality intending the three unrealities:

Paramarthasamudgata! I teach the intrinsic unreality of all things intending the following three types of such unreality: identity-unreality, production-unreality, and ultimate unreality.

In the Compendium, (Asanga) states:
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With what intention does the Lord declare the unreality of all things? He declares it wherever necessary to train (disciples), intending the three types of such unreality.

Also, in the Thirty, (Vasubandhu) states:

The intrinsic unreality of all things is taught intending the three types of unreality of the three types of reality.

Therefore, anyone who maintains that the statements of the intrinsic unreality of all things in scriptures such as the Transcendent Wisdom intend all superficial things and do not intend the absolute, contradicts the Elucidation and the treatises of Aryasanga and Vasubandhu, and also departs from the system of the Holy Father and Son.

DETAILED EXPLANATION

The inquiry into the intention of the statement of intrinsic unreality asks both the intention in declaring unreality and the actual mode of unreality, and the answer deals with both in order. To explain the first, (the Buddha) collected all the statements of unreality or identitylessness with regard to all different categories of things, from form to omniscience, into three unrealities, intending that the explanation of their mode of unreality be easy to understand, since all superficial and ultimate things are contained within these three. However, though (the Buddha) needed to use such a technique, who is there in his right mind who would say that the ultimate was not included among the things declared to be unreal, when the
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Mother Scripture, etc., declared that all things, such as the five aggregates, the twelve media, and the eighteen elements, are non-existent, identityless, unreal; and particularly mentions the intrinsic unreality of all the synonyms of the absolute, such as "emptiness," the "ultimate element," and "reality," etc.?

To answer the second aspect of the question, that is, the mode of unreality-as one might wonder what are the three unrealities that contain all things, said to be intrinsically unreal, and what is their mode of unreality-let us explain the first. In the Elucidation, (the Buddha) declares:

What is the identity-unreality of things? It is the imaginatively constructed nature. Why? It is a nature established by names and symbolisms, and is not substantiated by intrinsic identity. Therefore, it is called "identity-unreality."

The first question and answer equates the imagined nature with identity-unreality. Giving reasons for that, he states the affirmative reason that it is established by names and conventions, and the negative reason that it is not established by means of any intrinsic identity. The following two unrealities should be understood by a similar breakdown into affirmative and negative reasons.

The identity-reality which does not exist in the imagined is interpreted as establishment or existence by intrinsic identity. Here, the criterion for existence or non-existence with intrinsic identity (respectively) is whether (something) is established independent of, or dependent upon names and symbolic conventions. This system of interpretation, wherein (nominal) establishment is not concomitant with existence, is in radical disagreement with the (system) of the Dialecticist Centrists, wherein existents are established (precisely) on the strength of nominal conventions. Thus, the (194)

two systems disagree also on the meaning of existence and non-existence with intrinsic identity. Nevertheless, when we hold to the existence with intrinsic identity of this (system), we also hold to the establishment with intrinsic identity of the Dialecticists; and there are some cases wherein it is not so held according to the former, and yet it is so held according to the latter,

In regard to the second unreality, in the Elucidation, (the Buddha) declares:

What is the production-unreality of things? It is the relative nature of things. Why so? Production (of something) occurs by force of other conditions, and not by that thing's own nature. Therefore, it is called production-unreality."

Actual production, or real production, being nonexistent in the relative, is production (of a thing) by itself, mentioned in the phrase "not by that thing's own nature." It is equivalent to independent production. As (A-sanga) states in the Compendium: "Because created things are dependently originated, they are produced by influence of conditions, and not from themselves. This is called 'production-unreality.

Thus, this system declares the unreality of such real production in the relative, yet does not declare its unreality to be due to non-establishment

with intrinsic identity.

There are two interpretations of the third unreality, the first of which establishes ultimate-unreality in the relative. The Elucidation statement (is):

What is the ultimate unreality of things? (It is) those dependently originated things which are unreal because of ultimate-unreality. Why (195)

so? Paramarthasamudgata! I teach that, among things, the ultimate is the pure object and, since the relative nature is not the pure object, it is called "ultimate-unreality."

The relative is called "ultimate-unreality" because it does not exist in the ultimate reality. For, if we objectify the ultimate and meditate on it, defilements will come to an end, but if we objectify the relative and meditate on it, we cannot purify ourselves of the defilements.

In that case, why not interpret the imagined also as ultimate unreality? Although this would be appropriate, insofar as the imagined is not the pure object either, still, only the relative is established as ultimate-unreality and not the imagined, because of the power of the relative when objectified to stop erroneous constructive thought. -

Why? Although there is no such doubt with regard to the imagined, the following doubt is liable to arise (with regard to the relative): «"If it is acknowledged that defilements are purified through meditation that objectifies the relative as being empty of the imagined, then, as we take the so-qualified relative as object, it becomes the 'pure object' and hence becomes the ultimate."

Furthermore, the suspected fallacy (of relative amounting to the ultimate) has no bearing, just as there is no contradiction between the fact that the conviction of sound's impermanence abolishes the holding of sound as permanent and the fact that the contemplation of sound itself does not abolish the sense of permanence. Also, although the relative is not established as the ultimate when the ultimate is taken to be the pure object, the question of its establishment as another sort of ultimate will be explained below.

In regard to the second interpretation of the ultimate unreality, the Elucidation statement is:

Furthermore, the perfect nature of things is called "ultimate-unreality." Why? Paramarthasamudgata! The objective selflessness of things is called their "unreality." It is the ultimate, manifest by the fact of the intrinsic unreality of all things. Therefore, it is called "ultimate-unreality."

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The perfect, the objective selflessness of things, is the pure object, and hence also the ultimate. It is manifest in the unreality of the selves of things, and, because it is established by that fact alone, it is called "the

intrinsic unreality of things," and hence the "ultimate-unreality."

(The Buddha) also declares, (elsewhere) in the Elucidation: "If the nature of the conditional and the nature of the ultimate were different, then the mere selflessness and the mere unreality of conditional (things) would not be the nature of the ultimate."

Furthermore, in the section on the examples in (the Elucidation), (Buddha) states that (the ultimate) is established as (mere) selflessness, just as space is established as mere formlessness. Hence, it is extremely clear that the perfect, the objective selflessness, is established as the absolute negation of mental fabrication, which is just the negation of the objective self in the case of conditional (things). Therefore, the belief that this scripture's teaching of the import of reality is definitive in meaning is contradictory to the belief in the independent status, that is, reached without exclusion of a mentally objectified negatee, of an immutable perfect, which is not interpreted as an exclusive negative, a mere exclusion of negatee.

This system calls the perfect the "ultimate-unreality of things," because it is the mere negation of the self-actuality of things, and does not believe it to be unreal because of a lack of intrinsically identifiable status of the actual negation itself.

EXPOSITION OF EXAMPLES

In regard to the examples illustrating the three unrealities, the Elucidation statement is:

The identity-unreality should be regarded as being like a sky-flower. Paramarthasamudgata! Production-unreality should be regarded as being like a magical creation, as should the first of the two ultimate-unreal-
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ities. Paramarthasamudgata! Just as space is manifest through the mere absence of form and is all-pervasive, so the other ultimate-unreality should be regarded as manifest through objective selflessness and as all-pervasive.

The likening of the imagined to a flower of the sky illustrates the fact that it is merely an imaginative construction, and does not illustrate its non-existence among objects of knowledge. The way in which the relative is like illusion will be explained below, and the meaning of the simile for the perfect is self-evident.

Thus the mode of unreality intended by such statements is explained. If unreality is explained otherwise, that is as the non-establishment with intrinsic identity of all three natures, it is (a case of) insistence on the literal meaning of the scriptures declaring unreality. Thereby we adopt either nihilism or annihilism, since repudiation of all three natures brings us to the view of meaninglessness. Thus, in this system, if the relative were not established with intrinsic identity, it would be repudiated, since

production and cessation would be impossible, and if the perfect were not established with intrinsic identity, it could not serve as the ground of things.

Here, we might suppose that, although the view of lack of intrinsically identifiable status might be allowed to represent repudiation of the latter two natures, how could it involve repudiation of the imagined?

The reason is that the latter two natures would become non-existent if not established with intrinsic identity, hence the imagined also would become totally non-existent, deprived of its basis of designation and designative conventions (themselves partaking of the relative nature). Furthermore, (the Buddha also declares) in the Elucidation:

They do not understand correctly the profound authenticity of my intentional instructions: "All these things are only unreal. All these things are only unproduced. All these things are only unceased, only primordially peaceful, only naturally liberated!" Although they admire that teaching, they are obsessed with its literal meaning only, and from that basis, they arrive at the view of nothingness and meaninglessness in all things. Having gotten these views of nothingness and meaninglessness, they repudiate all the natures in all things. They repudiate the imagined nature of things, as well as their relative and perfect natures. Why? Paramarthasamudgata! The imagined nature can be known when the relative and perfect natures exist. But those who see identitylessness (198)

in the relative and perfect natures repudiate the imagined nature also. Therefore, they are said to repudiate all three natures.

This system holds that "literal insistence" means to accept as taught the statements from the scriptures that teach intrinsic unreality, such as All things are ultimately devoid of reality, devoid of essential nature, and devoid of intrinsic identity."

"To see identitylessness in the relative and perfect natures" means to view them both as not established with intrinsic identity, and from "why" on, he teaches the reason this becomes repudiation of all three natures. If one takes literally the declaration of non-existence of production and cessation with intrinsic identity, then the relative is repudiated; and it can be seen (easily) how this becomes repudiation of the other two natures as well. For in this system, production and cessation, if they are not established with intrinsic identity, must therefore be non-existent.

THE INTENTION OF THE DECLARATION OF PRODUCTLESSNESS

If such is the mode of unreality, with what intention does he declare non-production, etc.? This is declared intending the first and last unreality. In regard to the first, the Elucidation statement is:

I teach all things to be unproduced, unceased, primordially peaceful,

and naturally liberated, intending the fact of identity-unreality. Why? Paramarthasamudgata! What does not exist with intrinsic identity is not produced. What is not produced does not cease. What is not produced and does not cease, that is originally peaceful. What is originally peaceful, that is naturally liberated. And, as for the naturally liberated, there is not the slightest thing to be done for its liberation.

By setting forth lack of intrinsically identifiable status as the reason for the non-existence of production and cessation in the imagined, he teaches that for production and cessation to exist they must be established with intrinsic identity, and hence that production and cessation are established with intrinsic identity in the relative. Because freedom from production and cessation, being the uncreated, cannot possibly belong to the totally addictive realm, he teaches "primordial peace" and "natural liberation," since it is (free from) addiction, here same as sorrow. In regard to the final unreality, the Elucidation statement is:

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Again, I teach all things to be unproduced, unceased, primordially peaceful, and naturally liberated, intending the fact of ultimate unreality as manifest through objective selflessness. Why? This ultimate unreality manifest through objective selflessness subsists alone, eternally and permanently. It is the uncreated essence of things, free of all emotional addictions. And because it is free of all addictions, it is originally peaceful and naturally liberated.

The Great Chinese Commentary explains that "eternally" refers to the infinite past, and that "permanently" refers to the infinite future. Here, one might well wonder about the meaning of thus neglecting to take the middle unreality as the basis of non-production, etc., since all three (natures) have already been taken as the basis of unreality. Furthermore, what does (Asanga) mean by explaining non-production, et., in terms of all three natures, in the Abhidharma Synthesis?

Because of the identity-unreality of the imagined nature, the production-unreality of the relative, and the ultimate-unreality of the perfect, things are said to be unproduced, unceased, originally peaceful, and naturally liberated. With what intention? (The intention is that) without intrinsic reality, there is no production, without production, there is no cessation, and without cessation and production, there is original peace, and natural, total liberation.

The Great Chinese Commentary explains that the scripture does not declare the relative as the intended basis of productionlessness, etc., in order to show that dependent origination is not without purpose. And the Abhidharma Synthesis explanation (of non-production in the relative) is in terms of the non-existence of production from self and of production without cause. Since there are production and cessation established with intrinsic identity in the relative, the declaration of the non-existence of

production and cessation does not intend the relative. And since most of the relative is included in the totally addicted, it is the intention of this scripture not to make it the basis of the latter two expressions. Thus the Synthesis explanation intends that, as there is no intrinsic reality, interpreted as the types of reality excluded in each of the three natures, (200)

so there is no production and no cessation, and so also there is primordial peace and natural liberation.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE NATURES

Granted that the imagined nature is equivalent to identity-unreality, what is it in itself? The Elucidation statement is:

The imaginatively constructed nature is the establishment by names and conventions of substantive natures such as "form-aggregate," etc., and qualitative natures, such as "production of the form-aggregate, or "cessation of the form-aggregate," or "the form-aggregate is abandoned and fully known," etc., in conditional processes, which are the ground of the imagined nature, and the object of constructive thought.

The last three expressions, from "conditional" to "thought," refer to the designative base of the imagined, and the rest (of the quotation) describes the process of imaginative construction. The processes of "substantive" (or ascriptive) designation, such as "this is the form-aggregate," and of "qualitative," or descriptive designation, such as "the form-aggregate is produced," will be explained in detail (below).

Granted the relative is equivalent to production-unreality, what is it (201)

in itself? The Elucidation statement is: "The relative nature consists of conditional processes, which are the ground of the imagined nature, and the object of imaginative construction. The first phrase shows its own actuality, the second, that it is the designative base of the imagined, and the third, of what it is the object.

Granted the perfect is ultimate unreality, what is it in itself? The Elucidation statement is:

The perfect nature is that very same conditional process, the ground of the imagined nature and object of imaginative construction, as it intrinsically lacks precisely the reality (attributed to it) in the imagined nature, which is not established therein, which is the objective selflessness, the ultimate reality, and the pure object.

Here, the perfect is described as the "objective selflessness," or "ultimate reality," which, when objectified and meditated upon, will purify defilements. What is "objective selflessness?" It is the fact of intrinsic

unreality, also called "actuality." Of what is the reality non-existent? Precisely the reality" indicates the above-mentioned imagined nature, the word "precisely" excluding anything else. Hence, this means that the perfect is not taken as the unreality of the other two natures, but precisely as the unreality of the imagined nature alone.

The first part of the quotation, from "conditional process" to "construction," indicates the relative as that which is empty, and "the imagined nature not established therein" makes it very clear that the perfect is the emptiness of the relative with respect to the imagined. Hence, the belief that this scripture's teachings are definitive in meaning is contradictory to the belief that the perfect is the emptiness of the last reality with respect to the first two realities.

In regard to the mode of emptiness, the existence of something possibly existent elsewhere is not negated, as in the case of an area devoid of a pot, but the relative is empty of the establishment of the imagined, as in the case of a person's being empty of substantial existence. Thus, the scripture declares, "the imagined nature, which is not established therein. (202)

In regard to the "imagined" which is negated, the reason why this scripture does not mention any imagined other than that of ascriptive and descriptive designation, on both occasions of description of the imagined, will be explained below.

Just as they are applied to the form-aggregate, the three natures are stated to apply to each of the other four aggregates, the twelve media, the twelve links of dependent origination, the four foods, the six elements and the eighteen elements. As for the holy truth of suffering, its designative base is the same as above, its imagined nature is established by names and symbolic conventions, ascriptively as "truth of suffering," and descriptively as "realization of the truth of suffering," its relative nature is as above, and its perfect nature is as above, with the statement that is is "unreality with respect to the (imagined) reality only." Likewise, (the three natures) apply to the other holy truths. Also, they are applied to the seven divisions of the accessories of enlightenment, the designative base as before, the imagined being ascriptive (designations), such as "perfect concentration," and descriptive (designations), such as "its resistance," "its remedy," etc., and their other two realities being stated as in the case of the truth of suffering. All of these are recited by Paramarthasamudgata to the Teacher to affirm his understanding of the explanation of the three unrealities that intends the method of presenting the three natures of each thing, from the form-aggregate to the components of the path, mentioned in the inquiry resolving contradictions above.

4. INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING THUS ESTABLISHED; EXPOSITION OF THE ELUCIDATION OF INTENTION

There are three types of scriptures: those that teach that things are existent by intrinsic identity; those that teach that things are not established by

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intrinsic identity; and those that show fine discrimination between establishment and non-establishment by intrinsic identity. Thus, there are two types according to whether or not they discriminate between existence and non-existence of intrinsic reality. The discriminating (scriptures) are definitive in meaning, as they cannot be interpreted otherwise, and the non-discriminating are interpretable in meaning, since they must be interpreted otherwise. Thus, by implication from the above explanations, we can understand that two types of scriptures are interpretable in meaning, and one type is definitive in meaning.

(Now), Paramarthasamudgata asks the Teacher, how this implicit result should be applied to determine the interpretable and the definitive among the three wheels (of Dharma) in the context of their temporal sequentiality. The Elucidation statement is:

First of all, the Lord, in the Deer Park at Rshipatana in Varanasi, for the sake of those involved in the disciple-vehicle, turned a wondrous, amazing wheel of Dharma, such as had never before been turned in the world by men or gods, by showing the aspects of the four holy truths. Nevertheless, even that wheel of Dharma turned by the Lord was surpassable, provisory, interpretable in meaning, and disputable. Then, the Lord, for the sake of those involved in the Universal Vehicle, turned a second wheel of Dharma, even more wondrous and amazing, by proclaiming emptiness, starting from the fact of the unreality, productionlessness, ceaselessness, primordial peace, and natural liberation of all things. Nevertheless, even this wheel of Dharma was surpassable, provisory, interpretable, and disputable. Then, the Lord, for the sake of those involved in all vehicles, turned the third wheel of Dharma, using the finest discrimination, starting from the fact of the unreality, productionlessness, ceaselessness, primordial peace, and natural liberation of all things. And this turning of the wheel of Dharma by the Lord is unsurpassed, not provisory, definitive in meaning, and leaves no grounds for dispute.

PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF ITS MEANING; VERBAL MEANING

Yuan Tsho explains:

In regard to the turning of the first wheel, the first phrase indicates its location, the second, its disciples, and from "turned" to "truths" describes the wheel itself. "Aspects of the four holy truths" indicates the principal subject. "Wondrous" is praise. "Nevertheless" indicates

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it is not definitive. "Surpassable" indicates a specific teaching above it. "Provisory" indicates that it is a teaching valid for specific occasions.

It is "interpretable," because it deals with existence and not with emptiness. "Disputable" indicates its rebuttal by other (teachings), and its serving as basis for the arguments between the sectarians of the Disciple Vehicle.

That is, the scripture means: by "surpassable," that beyond it there is another definitive meaning; by "provisory," that if its meaning is taken literally as taught, it gives rise to criticism from others, such a meaning further indicated by the alternate translation, "with inherent opposition," given by the Chinese Commentary; by "interpretable," that the meaning must be otherwise interpreted; and by "disputable," that there are contrary arguments, since the Teacher did not explicate the meaning as "it is thus."

In regard to the second wheel, from "starting..." to "things" shows the principal subject. "For the sake...," etc., shows the disciples for whom the wheel was turned. Some commentaries explain "by proclaiming emptiness" as meaning the teaching of objective selflessness, but the Chinese Commentary gives also an alternative reading, "by unmanifested aspects," the meaning of which is stated to be "hidden." This alternative translation is also correct, as the two latter wheels are shown to be similar in having realitylessness as their principal subject and different in their teaching procedures. The middle wheel does not discriminate between existence and non-existence of realities, hence "by unmanifest aspect," and the final wheel does so discriminate, hence "using the finest discrimination." Taking this (middle) wheel in comparison with the third wheel, the Tripitaka Master Yuan Tsho explains no more than "surpassable," and, although he cites the explanation of the Indian master, Paramartha, I do not quote it, since it does not seem apt. My interpretation is like the former (master's, that is, Yuan Tsho).

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Yuan Tsho explains:

In regard to the third wheel, its principal subject is the same as that of the middle wheel. The disciples of the first two wheels were those of the Individual Vehicle and Universal Vehicle, respectively, and both were included in the final wheel, hence, "for the sake of those involved in all vehicles." "Finest discrimination" refers to the previously explained application of the three natures to each thing such as form, etc., and to the according differentiation of three modes of unreality. The "this" in "this turning.." refers to the just-mentioned wheel of fine discrimination, that is, the Elucidation of Intention and other scriptures of equally fine discrimination, and does not refer to (the other wheels), whose scriptures do not thus discriminate between the intrinsically real and unreal. "Unsurpassed," etc., indicates the greatness of this wheel, it being supremely wonderful, none other excelling it. "Not provisory" means that there is no later occasion when it is refuted. "Definitive in meaning" means that it shows accurately what exists and what does not, and hence it does not "leave any grounds

for dispute."

Yuan Tsho's explanation here agrees with mine, being just the reverse of my previous explanations of the (opposite terms) such as "surpassable," except in the case of (our explanations of "provisory") and "not provisory" (respectively).⁵² (I understand this qualification as referring to the fact that) the discourses of the former two (wheels) give occasion to the criticism of their literal meanings, and the final wheel does not, because their literal meanings (respectively) do and do not require interpretation. (Finally), as to the question of "disputability," ("indisputable") means that there are no grounds for analytical dispute by experts as to whether or not the meaning of a scripture (of the wheel in question) is determined according to its teaching of (either) intrinsic reality (or) lack of intrinsic reality; it does not indicate that other sorts of disputes are impossible.

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PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF THE RULE OF INTERPRETABLE-DEFINITIVE

The Chinese Commentary calls the first wheel "the wheel of Dharma of the four holy truths," the second, "the wheel of Dharma of identitylessness," and the third, "the wheel of Dharma of determination of the ultimate," or else, to accord with this very scripture, "the wheel of Dharma of fine discrimination."

According to the way in which this scripture formulates interpretable and definitive, there are two categories of teachings, discriminating and indiscriminating, and the grounds on which a scripture is classified (as one or the other) is whether it states invariably that things have intrinsically identifiable reality, whether it states that there is nowhere such a reality, or whether it discriminates explicitly between existence and non-existence of such a reality (in particular things). According to the above explanation, this is made very clear in the "inquiry resolving contradictions" in the scripture, the answer given, the statement of the way of explanation of intrinsic unreality that intends the application of the three natures to each of all things, and the statement of the interpretable and definitive among the scriptures taught at different times.

Thus, the first wheel is shown to be interpretable in its statement of the existence of intrinsic identity in things, beginning with the four truths, and not merely in its being taught among the Buddha's earliest teachings. For example, there is no need to clear up any doubts about the (status) of such precepts as that first stated to the ascetics at Benares: ""Make your lower robe circular!"

Similarly, the second wheel consists of the statements of intrinsic realitylessness. There is no need to demonstrate the interpretability of other scriptures of that time-period which are not concerned with realitylessness, as the doubt mentioned in the inquiry resolving contradictions does not arise from them.

The third wheel, while explained to be definitive in meaning, consists

of statements of explicit discrimination as explained above, and not of every teaching given during that time-period. This is abundantly clear from the scripture itself. For example, the brief Discipline taught at the Parinirvana was declared at the very end (of the Buddha's life), yet is not classified as definitive in meaning by this scripture.

What does this scripture seek to establish by thus differentiating between interpretable and definitive? It seeks to teach disciples not to take literally teachings that do not specifically discriminate between things, but (categorically declare them all) either to be established by intrinsic identity, or not to be so established. For, although the imaginatively constructed is not established by intrinsic identity, the other two realities (207)

are indeed so established. Thus the scripture seeks to teach the disciples that emptiness, which is the relative devoid of the imagined, is the final ultimate and the goal of the path. Therefore, the first two wheels (of Dharma) are stated to be interpretable in meaning, and the final wheel to be definitive.

Some people believe, relying on this scripture, that, as all scriptures promulgated in the third time-period must be definitive in meaning, certain statements (about the "Buddha-essence") made to educate the heterodox who were fascinated by soul-theories, must be taken literally. Thus, they believe that the above-mentioned "fine discrimination" means the discrimination between the truth-status of the ultimate nature and the truthlessness of all things possessing that nature, which are not intrinsically real in the slightest, merely being postulated by the erroneous intellect.

There are still others who imagine that, if discrimination between interpretable and definitive were determined by this scripture, the implication (advocated by those) above would follow. Hence, they refute this scripture, saying that its rule of interpretable-definitive is not to be taken literally. Both of these (types of scholars) appear to be arguing from a merely casual discrimination between interpretable and definitive, without examining in detail the inquiry resolving contradictions, the way the Teacher answers it, and the formulation of the interpretable-definitive (rule) that is based upon them.

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Chapter II

EXPLANATIONS OF THE SCRIPTURES STATEMENTS

MASTER ASANGA'S CHIEF RELIANCE ON THE ELUCIDATION OF INTENTION

In the Compendium, Aryasanga commends the "ultimate" chapter of the Elucidation: "Know the ultimate, with its five characteristics, as described in the Elucidation of Intention!" He commends the "nature" chapter

as teaching the three natures: "View the nature of things as described in the Elucidation of Intention!" He also quotes from the scripture the inquiry resolving contradictions, and commends the "realitylessness" chapter as teaching interpretable-definitive: "View the nature of the realitylessness of things as described in the Elucidation of Intention! Also he cites the Elucidation statements about the eightfold group of consciousnesses and about final genealogical determinism. In the "reality" chapter of the Bodhisattva Stages, in its commentaries, and in the Universal Vehicle Compendium, he determines, with a variety of explanations, the Elucidation statement (set forth in Chapter I above) that the relative being empty of the imaginatively constructed, which is ascriptive and descriptive designation, is the perfect. Finally, the explanations of the meaning of reality in the Ornament of Universal Vehicle Scriptures and the Center and Extremes, etc., and the essential points taught in their commentaries, are very much in agreement with the meaning of (209)

this scripture. Therefore, the determination of the meaning of this scripture appears to be fundamental to his system.

PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE REALITY ON THAT BASIS

1. GENERAL PROCEDURE TO ELIMINATE TWO EXTREMES

EXPLANATION IN THE BODHISATTVA STAGES; PATTERNS OF VIEWS WHICH REIFY AND REPUDIATE

(Asanga) states, in the Bodhisattva Stages: "How is (reality) discovered? It is discovered by the avoidance of the misapprehension which reifies what does not exist and the misapprehension which repudiates what does exist." What are "reification" and "repudiation," as mentioned here? The Bodhisattva Stages gives their definitions:

(Reification) is the habitual conviction arising from the reification of an intrinsic identity, (actually) inexistent, which is a reality posed by verbal designation of substances such as the formful and of things such as form.

(Repudiation) is the repudiation of authentic actuality, saying "it does not exist at all, anywhere," although it exists ultimately with an inexpressible nature, and serves as support and basis of designative verbal signs.

It should be recognized that these two ruinous activities are utterly destructive of our religious discipline!

The first two parts of this quotation describe the two (mental patterns), and from "it should be recognized" on, it shows how they ruin the profound Universal Vehicle teaching. From "actuality" to "signs" indicates the designative base of the imaginatively constructed. "Reality

posed by verbal designation" is the "reality" verbally designated, and not the designative word itself, as the Compendium clearly explains. Other passages in the Bodhisattva Stages are to be understood in the (210)

same way; that "reification" is the conviction that the verbally designated reality has intrinsic identity, when in fact it does not exist by intrinsic identity; that the basis of designative verbal signs, that is, their support, is the designative base of the imagined; and that "repudiation" is the notion that this same (relative), which is ultimately existent in an inexpressible way, does not exist at all anywhere. Thus, "reification" is the notion that the imagined exists ultimately, "repudiation" is the notion that the other two natures do not exist ultimately. For, the first (reality) exists (only) superficially, and the other two do exist ultimately.

While, in order to parallel the explanation of "repudiation" as the view of the inexistence of the ultimately existent, "reification" should be explained as the view of existence of the ultimately inexistent, here it is not made verbally explicit that the notion of ultimate existence of the (imagined) is the notion of its intrinsically identifiable existence, said to be "reification." Nevertheless, since the meaning of the treatise is that where there is intrinsically identifiable existence, there also is ultimate existence, ("reification" here) is tantamount to the reification of an ultimate existence of the imaginatively constructed.

Although in the Elucidation, the relative is called "processes which are the ground of the imagined reality, and the basis of ascriptive and descriptive designation," and in this text, (Asanga) refers obviously to the relative by the statement (that repudiation is the notion of) "the non-existence of the ultimately existent basis of designative verbal signs," it is not wrong to explain it as both (the latter two realities), since, if the relative were ultimately inexistent, the perfect would also become ultimately inexistent.

In the Bodhisattva Stages (Asanga) declares: "Upon repudiation of the mere actuality of things such as form, etc., there is neither reality nor designation, and both together have no validity." Therefore, repudiation of relative actuality does not take the form "it does not exist conventionally," nor the form "generally, it does not exist," but, as stated previously, takes the form "the ultimately existent is non-existent."

PROCEDURES TO NEGATE BOTH EXTREMISMS

If such is the pattern of reification and repudiation, how are they to be abandoned? As will be explained below in detail, the extreme of reification is negated by showing that everything is ultimately empty with respect to ascriptive and descriptive designations. Immediately after the last quotation, (Asanga) negates repudiation thus:

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Thus, for example, if the aggregates, such as form, exist, it is possible

to designate "person." If held as non-existent, there being no actuality, there is no designation "person." Likewise, if the simple actuality of things such as form exists, it is possible to ascribe words designative of things such as form to them. If they are held to be non-existent, with no actuality, there is no ascription by designative words. If the designative base is held to be non-existent, designation becomes non-existent, since it becomes unfounded.

The antagonist whose position is negated as being "repudiation" is not likely to be found among the heterodox. And, among the orthodox of the Individual Vehicle, there is no theory that things such as form, which are the designative base of verbal and conventional expressions, are non-existent with respect to intrinsic identity. Therefore, as the Compendium explains, (the antagonist) is a Universal Vehicle philosopher, an advocate of realitylessness who maintains that things are not established by intrinsic identity. His position is definitely not that things such as the relative are generally inexistent, or conventionally inexistent, but is that they are not established in the ultimate. Therefore, the negation, "if the simple actuality does not exist," refutes the position that an ultimately existent, real actuality (of things) is inexistent, as explained above.

According to this (Idealistic) system, it is not necessary that the imagined be non-existent, if not established by intrinsic identity, or not existent ultimately. However, if the other two realities are not established by intrinsic identity, or in the ultimate, they do not exist at all. (This system) holds that the relative, which consists of mind and mental functions arising dependent on their own causes and conditions, has ultimate production through intrinsically identifiable production, and that otherwise, if it were no more than the mere designation "production," an intellectual supposition, then there would be no such thing as production in the actuality of mind and mental functions.

Therefore, (this system) is not satisfied with the answer that "there is no repudiation of relative process, since such process does exist superficially, according to the mere adherence to production and cessation by erroneous cognition."^o It considers that one who adopts the position that "although relative causality is causality according to the error of the
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truth-habit about causality, the relative itself is not (ultimately) established as causality, just as a rope is a snake according to the erroneous cognition supposing a snake in a rope, but is not generally experienced as having snake-status"-such a one cannot abandon repudiation, as he has no foundation on which to establish the effects of actions, that is, happiness and suffering from virtue and vice; and that if one admits any other sort of causality, it has to be causality established by intrinsic identity, thus equivalent to ultimately existent (causality). Hence, they explain that (such a position) becomes the chief form of nihilism, since there is no designation without a designative base, and since it is impossible for all things to be mere designations and still to have real

functional efficiency. In the Bodhisattva Stages, (Asanga) declares:

Thus, some people hear the exposition of the intended meaning of the scriptures that are hard to understand with their Universal Vehicle (spirit) and their profound emptiness, and do not understand correctly the meaning of the explanations. Their view (distorted) by mere mental constructions springing from the irrationality of incorrect analysis, they proclaim: "All this is mere designation. This is reality. Who sees it thus, truly sees!" According to them, as there is no simple actuality of a designative base, designation itself becomes entirely inexistent. How then could "mere designation" be a reality? Therefore, by that formula, they repudiate both reality and designation. And, since they repudiate both reality and designation, they should be known as the chief nihilists!

(Aryasanga) further declares, in the same text:

So intending, (Buddha) said, "The view of person (as real) is harmless, but not the misapprehension of emptiness!" The former is merely ignorance with regard to an object, and does not repudiate all objects of knowledge, and hence, on that basis, one is not reborn in hell. One still believes other teachings, does not deviate from the basic precepts, and thus one does not come to ruin. The latter is just the opposite.

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That being so, (Asanga quotes the scriptural formula): "When one thing does not exist in another, that other is empty of the one, but what remains (of that other) does exist. Such insight is the accurate penetration of emptiness."

He then comments that the meaning of the first phrase refers to things such as form, etc., being empty of the entities verbally designated in them, and the "existent remainder" means the existence of the pure actuality which is the designative base, and of the simple designation itself. The emptied out" is the imagined, the "empty" is the relative, and the emptiness of the latter with respect to the former is the perfect. The relevance of their existence and non-existence is as explained above. Thus, abandoning the extreme of reification eliminates absolutism, and abandoning the extreme of repudiation eliminates nihilism, and hence non-duality is manifested. Such emptiness is explained to be the final ultimate. (Still) in the Bodhisattva Stages, (Asanga) states:

The actuality implicit in the nature of the teaching that liberates from existence and non-existence with respect to the above things and nothingness, is non-duality. And non-duality is the central way, the avoidance of the two extremes, which is called "unexcelled."

EXPLANATION IN THE COMPENDIUM; THE ANTAGONIST'S OPINION AND INQUIRY INTO ITS MEANING

In the Compendium, (Asanga) states: "Some followers of the Universal Vehicle say, through their own misapprehension, that all things exist superficially, and nothing exists ultimately."

The Centrists express the differentiation of existence and non-existence of things thus: "all things exist conventionally, though they are non-existent in the ultimate." (The Compendium continues):

At that, we must say, "Sir! What is the ultimate? And what is the superficial?" Thus interrogated, if they answer, "The ultimate is the (214)

realitylessness of all things. The superficial is the apprehension of realities in things without intrinsic reality. Why? Because those things which do not exist, are perceived as superficial, as designations, as mental formulations, and as conventions."

Thus, the answer given to the question about the two realities is taken as the antagonist's position. In asking 'what is the ultimate?' he asks for exemplification of ultimate truth, and does not ask for the locus of the non-existence that is ultimate non-existence, that is, what sort of inexistence is called "ultimate inexistence." Otherwise, the answer that the realitylessness of all things is the ultimate" would be incorrect, because the Centrist does not posit any ultimate existence by virtue of any existence of the objective selflessness accepted as ultimate. Likewise, in asking "what is the superficial?" he asks for that according to which the superficial is established as reality, as in the expression, "superficial reality," and does not ask what is the convention that is the locus of the existence which is conventional existence. Otherwise, the answer that the apprehension of reality in realityless things is the superficial" would be incorrect; because the Centrist believes that such (false apprehension) is the truth-habit, and hence its supposed object does not exist even conventionally, and also because the ""reality" negated in the expression "realitylessness" must be taken as reality which is truth.

REFUTATION OF THE ANTAGONIST'S OPINION; EXHIBITION OF CONTRADICTION IN HIS THEORY

First of all, to refute the (antagonist's) description of the superficial, the Compendium statement is:

At that, you must explain yourself; do you believe that the apprehension of reality occurs from a verbal and superficial cause? Or do you believe that it is merely verbal formulation and superficiality? If it (215)

occurs from a verbal and superficial cause, then it cannot be said to be non-existent. If it is merely verbal formulation and superficiality,

རྗེ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་སློབ་བཟང་གྲགས་པའི་དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སློབ་པོ་

then it is impossible to call it "formulation" and "superficial," as (these terms) will have no basis.

This means that the superficial, which is the notion of a reality where there is no reality in the ultimate, is an internal verbalization, which is either produced by a homogeneous previous cause, or else is a sheer designation by superficial verbalizing mental construction. In the first case, "it cannot be said to be inexistent, if causally produced" means "it cannot be said to be ultimately inexistent," because the context is the argument about ultimate existence and inexistence, and because the antagonist asserts ultimate non-existence, and not general non-existence. In the second case, it is impossible for it to be sheer imagined designation, because there is no designative base, and because if verbalization and superficiality were merely mentally constructed designations, then other things (that is, the ultimate) also would be just the same. As for the negation of the (antagonist's) description of the ultimate, the Compendium statement is:

At that, you must explain yourself: Sir! Why is it that what is apprehended is non-existent? Thus questioned, if you answer: "Because it is a false thing," then you must say if that falseness exists or not. If it exists, then it is incorrect to say that the realitylessness of all things is itself the ultimate. And if it does not exist, then it is incorrect to say that what is apprehended is without reality because it is a false thing.

This means that it is not correct to say that the intrinsically identifiable intrinsic identity apprehended in things does not exist, because that (statement) is faulted by the evidence of such apprehension. And if one objects that it is not faulted by the cognition that apprehends such, because that cognition is itself a false thing, it is not correct; because, if that falsity existed with intrinsic identity, realitylessness could not possibly be ultimate, and if it did not (so) exist, as it would also be an error, its apprehension would not exist. Although here also the analysis should be in terms of ultimate existence and non-existence, the above analysis (in terms of intrinsic identity) is employed as similar in meaning and as easier to understand.

Thus, here, without demonstrating the flaw in (the assertion of) ultimate non-existence and conventional existence of both imagined and **(216)**

perfect, he indicates discrepancies through analysis of ultimate existence and non-existence of superficial consciousness and false consciousness, thereby negating (the assertion of) ultimate non-existence and superficial existence of the relative. The relative is the subject (qualified by) the perfect, and the means of designation and the designative base of the imagined, therefore, these experts chiefly debate the ultimate existence and non-existence of the relative.

Furthermore, in the Compendium, (Asanga) declares:

The insistence on the imagined reality in the relative and the perfect should be recognized as the extreme of reification. The extreme of repudiation is the repudiation of intrinsic identity in asserting that the existent relative and perfect realities do not exist. The pattern of the import of reality should be realized by means of the procedure avoiding these two extremes.

Thus, the assertion that there is no intrinsically identifiable status in the latter two realities, which do exist by intrinsic identity, repudiates intrinsic identity. Hence, this text agrees with the Bodhisattva Stages about the two extremes and the procedure to avoid them.

The imagined is non-existent in the ultimate, and not non-existent in the conventional. The Compendium statement is:

Those suppositions established by names and internal formulations, are they or are they not the (imagined) reality? Conventionally, they should be stated to be that reality. Ultimately, they should be stated not to be that reality. The imagined reality, which is the object of consciousness based on names habitual in internal verbalization... is designatively existent, and is non-existent ultimately.

Therefore, simply by the fact that such as the imagined (reality) of the two selves is inexistent among knowable objects, all of the imaginatively constructed is not inexistent. Hence, its substantial existence and ultimate existence are negated, but its designative existence and conventional existence are affirmed.

Therefore, (we should explain the following) statement from a certain great commentary of the Elucidation:

The imagined is non-existent in both realities; the dependent origination, which is the relative with its subject-object duality, is super-
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ficially existent, and the perfect, which is also ultimate, exists in the mode of realitylessness, existing ultimately.

This is not the intended meaning of that scripture. Furthermore, it shows a serious lack of discrimination to claim that this work was composed by Aryasanga, since it contradicts the explanation of the Universal Vehicle Compendium that internal and external subject and object are the imagined; it contradicts the Bodhisattva Stages and the Compendium by proving the non-existence of externals citing the Elucidation; it quotes the Determination of Validating Cognition, and so forth. Finally, the Compendium quotes most of the chapters of the Elucidation, except for the preface, and settles the difficult questions thoroughly, so it does not appear that this master need have composed an extra commentary. Also, some recent authors have departed from this system by explaining the intention of Aryasanga and Vasubandhu as being the non-existence

of the imagined, even conventionally, the conventional existence and the ultimate inexistence of the relative, and the ultimate existence of the perfect. Especially their belief that, since the meaning of conventional existence of the relative is that the erroneous intellect merely supposes the existence of production and cessation therein, production and cessation do not exist in things is the ultimate repudiation of things. Since thereby the other two realities are repudiated as well, this is the chief nihilism repudiating all three natures, as explained above in the Bodhisattva Stages, and should also be recognized as irreconcilably contradictory to the position that the Elucidation is definitive in meaning.

ELIMINATION OF CONTRADICTION IN (ASANGA'S) THEORY

Here, one may object, "if it is true, as the Bodhisattva Stages and the Compendium declare, that the relative is ultimately existent, how can it fail to contradict the (following statements)? The Elucidation statement is:

If the reality, the ultimate, and the objective selflessness of things were each to be different in character, as, for example, the branches of the holy path are different in character from each other, then reality, the ultimate, and objective selflessness would each have a cause. Were they (218)

to arise from causes, they would be created. Were they to be created, they could not be ultimate.

"Thus, what is created is not ultimate. The Center and Extremes states that 'the ultimate is unique,' and its commentary states that 'the ultimate reality should be known as the sole perfect reality. Further, the Scripture Ornament states: "The nature of the ultimate is that which purifies. It is not existent, not non-existent, not the same, and not other, not produced and not ceased, not decreased and not increased, nor even is it to be purified. Here, in the passage on the five characteristics of the ultimate, it is declared to be without production and cessation, etc., the commentary stating that 'it is not existent' with regard to the imagined and the relative, and 'not non-existent' with regard to the perfect. Finally, the Compendium also states: "Should causality be said to exist superficially, or to exist ultimately? It should be said to exist superficially.... Should imagination be said to exist superficially, or to exist ultimately? It should be said to exist superficially.' *"

To explain how these statements do not contradict (the ultimate existence of the relative), there are two modes of establishment (of something) as superficially existent or as ultimately existent. First conventional existence is presented as existence established on the strength of conventional expressions, and ultimate existence is presented as existence by intrinsic identity not established on the strength of conventional expressions. This (first mode) is exemplified by many statements in scriptures,

such as "that is on the strength of mundane conventions, and not in the ultimate." This (mode of establishment) is the basis of the arguments about ultimate and conventional existence and non-existence between the Centrists and the Realists, both heterodox and orthodox. And the Bodhisattva Stages and the Compendium make the above statements of the conventional existence and ultimate non-existence of the first reality, and of the ultimate existence and the conventional non-existence of the latter two realities, in terms of this (mode of establishment). Furthermore, the Compendium states:

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The object of that consciousness that is based on names habitual in internal formulation does not exist either substantially or ultimately insofar as its existence would be by intrinsic identity of things such as form, etc., which have names such as "form," etc. Therefore, that which is imaginatively constructed from what is not existent as the reality of those things having names such as "form," etc., should be known as designatively existent. (However), the things that have names such as "form," being objects of that consciousness of nominal things which excludes habitual internal formulations, which (objects) exist by their inexpressible nature, should be understood as existent both substantially and ultimately.

In regard to substantial existence and designative existence, the Compendium statement is:

It is proper that designated intrinsic identity, which does not require or depend on other things, should be known as substantially existent. And it is proper that designated intrinsic identity, which requires and depends on other things, should be known as designatively existent, and not substantially existent.

Here, the latter is exemplified by the designation of "self" or "living being" depending upon the aggregates. In this system, there is no contradiction between the designative existence that cannot be apprehended out of relationship with other things and must be subject to dependence, and intrinsically identifiable status not established on strength of convention. Hence, although such as the instincts of the fundamental consciousness are declared to be designatively existent, this does not preclude their ultimate existence, (according to the first mode above). However, such ultimate existence would be precluded by the designative existence resulting (merely) from verbal and conceptual designation.

In regard to the second mode of establishment (of superficial and ultimate existences), the Center and Extremes states: "The ultimate is considered threefold: as object, attainment, and practice."

In comment, (Vasubandhu) declares that the "object-ultimate is reality, because it is the object of the holy wisdom," where "holy" specifies the wisdom which is immaculate equipoise. As it is an object, it is called ultimate-object," or "ultimate." It is reality, equivalent to selflessness,

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and is also the ultimate which is the pure object. It is stated thus, since it is only the perfect, the other two realities being non-existent therein. The Center and Extremes further states: "the pure object is twofold, proclaimed to be one alone," and the commentary adds, "it is declared to be the perfect reality, the other two realities not being objects of both kinds of pure wisdom," the two wisdoms being the wisdoms that purify the two obscurations.

Here, we might suspect that such wisdom would itself also become an object, since this system asserts that that wisdom is apperceptively self-conscious. There is no such fault (in the system), however, since, regarding whatever object, (the system) intends it to be an object for the realization of the meaning of ultimate reality.

Therefore, such an ultimate is uncreated. However, in this system, non-establishment in this sort of ultimate does not preclude establishment in an ultimate which is existent by intrinsic identity, not established on the strength of convention. The Synthesis of the Essence of Intuition states, intending the first mode of ultimate existence: "Liberated from subject and object, consciousness exists in the ultimate. It is celebrated in the scriptures of the experientialist yogi, who crosses the ocean of the mind."

It is necessary to differentiate accurately these two sorts of ultimates, since many of the Centrist treatises argue against the Experientialists about the existence and non-existence of the relative, not in terms of convention, but in terms of ultimate existence and non-existence. And there are many occasions in the treatises of the Brother-Masters on which they depend on the second mode of establishment of the ultimate. About the mode of the superficial existence of the first two realities, the Compendium statement is: ""Causal process and imaginative construction exist superficially by reason that they motivate the addictions and are the basis of designations."

It is first stated herein, in agreement with the Abhidharma Synthesis, that that which motivates addictions when apprehended is established as superficially existent, which (statement) complements the Elucidation explanation of the ultimate as the pure object. Second, it states that the (221)

reality designated by verbal and symbolic conventions, which becomes the basis of conventionally designative signs, is said to be existent conventionally. "Causal process" is explained to be that on which the words of formulations are based.

Again, in the Principles of Elucidation (Vasubandhu) states:

The superficial reality and the ultimate reality were declared intending the objects that deceive common consciousness and the object of transcendent consciousness. Since verbalization is superficial, the reality known thereby is the superficial reality, that is, that to which verbalizations apply. For example, a ford crossed by foot is called a "foot ford," and a ford crossed by boat is called a "boat-ford."

The Compendium states that the holy wisdom, which is the equipoise of realization of ultimate reality, exists in the ultimate, intending the absence of the above two reasons for establishing its superficial existence. And it states the aftermath wisdom exists both superficially and ultimately, asserting its conventional existence from the point of view of its apprehension of conventional signs.

Superficial existence, as the cause of perceptions motivating addictions and as the signification-process that is designative base for conventional expressions, does not preclude ultimate existence which is establishment by intrinsic identity. As the Principles of Elucidation states, (some things) exist in both the first mode of the ultimate, and in the latter mode of the superficial:

Concerning the argument of the Individual Vehicle sectarians regarding the statement of the Scripture on Ultimate Emptiness that action and retribution exist, but the agent is not apprehended, "if (such existence and non-existence) are in the ultimate, it cannot be said that all things are realityless, and if they are in the superficial, then the agent would exist, and it could not be said that it is not apprehended;"* we answer that if it is known what are the superficial and the ultimate, existence in them both is known. What are they? The superficial consists of names, verbalizations, designations, and conventions, and the ultimate is the intrinsic identity of things. Thus, action and retribution exist both as names and as intrinsic identities, and hence they must be admitted as existent whatever one's belief.

In regard to the belief in their existence in the ultimate, it is not precluded in this system, as it does not accept literally the declaration of the (222)

realitylessness of all things. The person, (or agent), exists superficially, but not substantially. Action and retribution exist superficially, and also substantially, but they do not exist in the second mode of ultimate establishment, as they are objects of common consciousness and not the objects of transcendent consciousness, because its object is the inexpressible general nature (of all things). Finally, the explanation of the Principles of Elucidation is very clear (on the point) that the above (Individualist) argument applies to the position of some other Universalists, that all things exist superficially, and not by intrinsic identity.

The Center and Extremes divides the superficial reality, the vague reality, into three: "The vague (reality) consists of designations, cognitions, and intimations. Thus, (of the) three, the designative superficial, the cognitive superficial, and the intimative superficial, it is necessary to know the latter, which is connected with the third reality (that is, the perfect), to explain the intention of the statements from other scriptures that suchness, etc., are superficially existent.

Thus, if we differentiate precisely the modes of existence, substantial and designative, superficial and ultimate, of the lower and higher theories,

as well as the various interpretations of them within one philosophical school, we are able to master fully the important theories and we may come to understand the many designatively and superficially existent (things), asserted (dogmatically) by the Realists, that the Centrist must prove to them are non-existent in the ultimate. Otherwise, the differentiation of the lower and higher philosophies is just for fun.

1. GENERAL PROCEDURE TO ELIMINATE TWO EXTREMES (CONTD); EXPLANATIONS IN OTHER TREATISES

EXPLANATION IN THE ORNAMENT OF UNIVERSAL VEHICLE SCRIPTURES

The Scripture Ornament explains that the declaration of realitylessness intends the non-existence of the reality supposed by the naive and of the three characteristics of created things: "Realitylessness is admitted, be- (223)

cause (things) do not exist as selves, or with intrinsic identities, do not endure in intrinsic objectivity, and do not exist as they are perceived." The Synthesis also explains that the Hundred Thousand declares realitylessness intending the realitylessness of these two as well as of the three unrealities. Things are realityless since they are not independent, but depend on conditions. This means that they are not born from their own selves, as the Central Way Illumination explains.. Things are realityless since they do not exist by their intrinsic natures, and, once ceased, are not born again with the same natures. And they are realityless since they do not endure another second in any intrinsic objectivity, as their production and non-cessation is (merely) instantaneous. In short, things are explained as realityless in the three times: the future sprout not born by its own power, the past sprout not born again with the nature of the sprout, and the present sprout not remaining a second instant established as itself.

Vasubandhu explains that there is no reality because the realities otherwise insisted upon by the naive, such as the imagined reality, or purity, happiness, permanence, and self, do not exist. "Otherwise" means they persist in their convictions through (the misapprehension of) substantial difference of subject and object.

As there is no reality, there is no production; as no production, no cessation, etc.; each subsequent condition is established by reason of each preceding condition. The Scripture Ornament states: "Realitylessness is established since each (thing) is the basis of each subsequent one, and hence (are established) non-production, non-cessation, primordial peace, and natural liberation." Further: "Tolerance of non-production of things is recommended, in the light of their beginning, sameness, otherness, intrinsic identity, self, transformation, addiction, and excellence."

This explains the mode of non-production of things referred to in such statements as "tolerance of non-production of things is attained." *Beginning," as the commentary explains, refers to the non-existence of an

original production in worldly life; "sameness" to the fact that a past thing previously produced is not reproduced in its own nature; "other-
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ness" to the non-existence of production at a future time of what did not exist previously. This means, as the Central Way Illumination explains, that nothing is produced without precedent, and no living being is produced for the first time in the cyclic world, because they are produced alike in type to what came to an end (previously). "Intrinsic identity" refers to the imagined, which is never produced. "Self-"production does not exist in the relative. Production that is "transformation" does not exist in the perfect. Non-production of "addiction" lies in attainment of the knowledge of (its) extermination. And the "excellence" of non-production lies in the Truth Body of the Buddha.

Such explanation of the interpretation of realitylessness and of the way of non-production constitutes the system that does not accept literally the exposition of all things as ultimately devoid of reality and that of created things as ultimately unproduced. It shares with the two Individual Vehicle schools the interpretation of the realitylessness (of happiness, purity, permanence, and self), which is insisted upon (as reality) by the naive, and of the realitylessness of the phenomena of past, present, and future. The present is excepted by the Analysts, who assert it to be the basis of the durative function after production, and of the destructive function after that.

(At this point), one may protest that, since the Elucidation declares the relative to be illusory, and the Scripture Ornament declares all created things to be illusory, they do not mean that (the relative) is truly established, (as has been maintained above). Nevertheless, the description (of something) as being "like illusion" does not invariably show it not to be truth. This rather depends on the method of use of similes such as "illusion." The Scripture Ornament shows the method of use of the simile, "illusion," in the statement: "Artificial imagination is said to be illusory, and the error of duality is said to be like an illusory creation."

Vasubandhu explains that the meaning of the first phrase is that the application of the magical spell to the bases of the illusion such as sticks and clods, etc., is like the imaginative construction of the relative. And the meaning of the second phrase is that the appearance of the magical effects in the forms of horses and elephants, etc., is like the appearance of the relative as dichotomous subject and object.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the Scripture Ornament declares: "The ultimate is admitted, insofar as that (duality) does not exist therein. And where that (duality) is apprehended, there is the superficial reality."

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The commentary explains that the ultimate is the non-existence of subject-object-duality in the relative, just as the elephants, etc., do not exist in the illusions, and that such imagination of the artificial is apprehended as the superficial reality, just as the illusion is apprehended as actual horses and elephants. Thus, the Scripture Ornament does not

declare "illusion" as a simile of the appearance of reality in internal and external created things, of which (reality) they are devoid (in fact), but explains the scriptures' declarations of "illusoriness" as illustrating the appearance of the six inner media as self and life, etc., when they do not (actually) exist as such, and of "dream-likeness" as illustrating the appearance of the six external media as the field of involvement of personal self, when (in fact) they do not exist as such.

The Universal Vehicle Compendium, in supplying the meanings for the similes of the relative, such as "illusion," employed in the Mother Scripture, explains "illusion" as the simile employed to dispel the doubt: "If there are no external things, how do we apprehend objects?" It explains "mirage" as the simile employed to dispel the doubt: "If there are no external things, how are mind and mental functions produced?" And it explains "dream," etc., as the similes employed to dispel the doubt: "If there are no external things, why do we act on the basis of attraction and repulsion?"

Thus, even in regard to (such an obvious thing) as the method of employment of similes such as "illusion" for untrueness, we must distinguish without confusion the methods of employment of similes for the different types of untrueness in the Idealist and the Centrist theories.

EXPLANATION IN THE DISCRIMINATION OF CENTER AND EXTREMES

In the Center and Extremes (Maitreya) states:

Artificial imagination exists, (but) therein duality does not. Herein emptiness exists, and that (imagination) exists therein.

It is not empty, and not non-empty; thus, everything is explained.

Through existence, non-existence, and existence, such is the Central Way.

The first verse teaches the nature of emptiness; and the second teaches the same thing understood as the Central Way. It teaches emptiness accurately, in order to show what is declared to be the unmistakable re-
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alization of emptiness, the authentic knowledge of existence and non-existence, which is expressed as "when one thing does not exist in another, that other is devoid of the one, but what remains (of the other) does exist." *°In another" means the empty, which is (the process of) artificial imagination," that is, the relative. The "one thing" that does not exist" means the duality of substantially different subject and object, that is, the imagined. "Therein duality does not (exist)" teaches the emptiness of that relative with respect to this imagined. That being non-existent, what is that remaining existence? "Artificial imagination" and herein emptiness exists" show both relative and perfect (as what remains). "And that exists therein" dispels yet another doubt.

Sthiramati clearly shows agreement with Vasubandhu's explanation of the meaning of "the empty" and of "that of which it is empty." The

Subcommentary states:

Some people think that all things are totally realityless, like the horns of a rabbit, and thus repudiate everything. "Artificial imagination exists" is declared to refute them, and "by intrinsic reality" should be added (to complete the sense).

The expression "artificial imagination exists" is not complete in itself, the remainder to be added being this "by intrinsic reality." Thus, it is not that artificial imagination merely exists, it exists by its intrinsic reality, or exists established by intrinsic identity, such modes of existence being the same in the case of the perfect also.

In regard to the way in which the second phrase dispels doubt, the same (Subcommentary) declares:

Is this not contrary to the scriptures, which declare that all things are empty? It is not contradictory. "Therein duality does not exist" means that artificial imagination is empty, because free of the nature of subject and object, and not that it is totally realityless. Hence, it does not contradict the scriptures.

To rebut the argument that the intrinsically real status of the relative contradicts the statement that all things are empty of intrinsically real existence, he states that emptiness of intrinsic reality is stated intending (227)

that imagination, which appears as dichotomous internal subject and external object, is empty with respect to such (dichotomous) reality, and not that intrinsically identifiable reality is totally non-existent. This alone is the meaning of the treatises of the Brothers, and, as they also explain (the relative) as ultimately existent, there is definitely no explanation in their system of the relative as empty in itself.

In regard to the way in which the third phrase dispels doubt, the Subcommentary states:

If one protests that, since duality is totally non-existent like a rabbit's horns and artificial imagination ultimately exists by its intrinsic reality, then emptiness becomes non-existent; (we say) not so. "Emptiness exists therein" means that emptiness does not become non-existent, because the very non-existence of subject and object in artificial imagination is itself emptiness.

It is obvious how doubt about the non-existence of emptiness might arise, since "artificial imagination exists and duality does not exist" indicates existence of the former and non-existence of the latter, (and thus the perfect is not mentioned). The argument "artificial imagination ultimately exists by intrinsic reality" assumes (its opponent's) position to be that establishment by intrinsic identity is equivalent to ultimate existence, and the argument rebuts from just such a position, not saying

"such is not our position."

This master also declared, in the Thirty Commentary:

The chapter was composed in order to refute these two kinds of extremism: the notion (of some) that objects, like consciousness, (exist) substantially, and the notion of others that consciousness, like objects, exists superficially and does not exist ultimately.

Therefore, the statement that the relative is not totally non-existent refutes the position that nothing at all exists ultimately, like the passages from the Bodhisattva Stages earlier, and does not refute a position that (the relative) does not exist among knowable objects.

The fourth phrase dispels doubt of wondering why it is not (universally) (228)

realized, if emptiness of duality is always existent in artificial imagination, by showing the fact that, as the imagination mistaking dualistic appearance exists in that emptiness, it obscures (that realization).

The second verse is declared in order to refute those extremisms that are not the central way, which maintain one-sidedly that all things are empty, that they are non-empty, that they exist, or that they do not exist. All things are not empty with respect to imagination and emptiness, and they are not non-empty with respect to subject-object-duality, (all things being either) created imaginative construction or uncreated emptiness. According to Vasubandhu, this explanation should be taken in agreement with the teaching of the Mother Scripture, etc., that "all this is neither uniquely empty, nor uniquely non-empty," and it does not indicate the perfect by "not empty," nor the other two realities by "not non-empty." (The third phrase) should be understood according to the explanation of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, "existence" meaning imagination, "non-existence" meaning duality, and "existence" meaning the mutual existence of both imagination and emptiness. Any explanation that opposes these (masters), such as that, as one of those two (imagination and emptiness) exists otherwise, the other is empty, should not be taken as explaining (correctly) the belief of these (masters). And Sthiramati explains that this import is the same as that declared in the Kashyapa Chapter, after explaining existence and non-existence as two extremes, that between them lies the central way of critical examination of things. Thus he explains this very system of the "pure information" (school) as the meaning of the central way; although other Centrists hold the latter school to be superior to the former, (in fact) this system makes the two equivalent.

We have thus expressed the method of explanation in each section, according to Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. Dignaga also, in his Concise Meaning of the Transcendent Wisdom, explains the import of the Eight Thousand in agreement with the Universal Vehicle Compendium. And Dharmakirti, in the Treatise on Validating Cognition, declares the reality of the relative to be the emptiness of substantially different subject and object: "Therein, if either were non-existent, both would be destroyed.

རྗེ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་སློབ་བཟང་གྲགས་པའི་དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སློབ་པོ་

Therefore, emptiness of duality is the reality of that (relative). "
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Further, he explains the meaning of the scriptures' declarations of the realitylessness of things in the same way:

The inherence of difference in things is based on the difference of that (subject and object). That being itself an error, difference in things is also an error. No nature exists other than the aspects of subject and object. Therefore, because of emptiness of (that) nature, realitylessness is proclaimed.

The differentiation of things in regard to their production, etc., is not effected by means of mere apperception, but by means of the same consciousness that perceives duality. Dualistic perception is a delusion. Since it is false, what it establishes also becomes false. There is no nature of anything other than subjects and objects, and the nature of such apparent duality is proclaimed to be realitylessness, since it does not exist as it appears. Furthermore, he declares in his Treatise: "All natures of such things as aggregates are specifically qualified as functional, and not real. Hence, they are (ultimately) free of natures."

Statements of the form aggregates, etc., as natural things, and of formability, etc., as their natures, all are qualified by functionality. Although their basis exists substantially, they are not established in reality through their aspect of functionality. Hence he explains that this is intended by the declaration of emptiness with respect to nature, which (theory) he holds in common with the Individual Vehicle schools. Finally, the Treatise on Validating Cognition makes the same point earlier stated in the Compendium:

If (one objects): "everything is without (functional) power (ultimately)," (we answer) "the power of the seed, etc., is visible in the sprout, etc." (And if one) maintains "that is superficial (only)," (we answer) "then how could (the sprout) ever come to be?"
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As for the details of the methods of explanation of these teachers, I do not discuss them, fearing prolixity.

2. SPECIFIC NEGATION OF THE EXTREME OF REIFICATION

DESCRIPTION OF REIFICATION — THE NEGATEE

Repudiation, one of the two logical negatees of this system, is only philosophically postulated, and furthermore, as explained above is (mainly) in the system of the orthodox advocates of realitylessness. In reification, there are both conscious theoretical and unconscious instinctual varieties, the conscious reification being the (philosophical) systems of the Realists,

both heterodox and orthodox. In regard to unconscious reification, as the reification of the personal self will be shown below, here we should explain the reification of the objective self, because although the objective self is a theoretical postulate, it is the object (that would have) to be proven (to secure) the objective self maintained unconsciously, and also because the (objective self) is the chief logical negatee.

Although in many texts of this system, the objective self-habit is explained to be none other than the habitual notion of the substantial difference between subject and object, the Elucidation teaches the objective self-habit to be the habitual notion that ascriptive and descriptive designations are established by intrinsic identifiability in the relative. This is implied by its explanation of objective selflessness as identity-unreality, which is the non-establishment by intrinsic identifiability of the relative according to ascriptive and descriptive designation. Furthermore, the Bodhisattva Stages, the Compendium of Determinations, and the Compendium of the Universal Vehicle take pains to prove that emptiness devoid of the content of this habitual notion is the ultimate meaning of the central way, and is the perfect, which is objective selflessness. Therefore, if we do not know just what is this imaginatively constructed (reality) which is reified as the objective self in the relative, we will not know decisively the objective self-habit and the objective selflessness of this system.

The imagined (reality), in question when the objective self-habit is taken as the habitual notion that the imagined is established by intrinsic iden-
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tifiability, is that reality verbally and conventionally designated in such things as the aggregates, ascriptively through statements such as "This is form!" and descriptively through such statements as "This is production of form!" Since the aggregates, etc., do exist just that much, the notion that they exist there is not reification. Reification is the habitual notion that the aggregates exist by intrinsic identity as such and such (designated) entities.

Here, an objector might well demand reasons to prove the absence of a number of contradictions in this system (that he might perceive to be as follows): (first), if the negation of the intrinsically identifiable status of form, etc., as being the objective basis of names and signs, negates (only) their being the direct objective basis of expressions, then it is unnecessary to prove the relative to be devoid of that (imagined reality), since the Realists have already established the non-phenomenality of objective universals and verbal universals as actual contents and means of expressions. Furthermore, (by the same reason), since the proof of (the relative's) emptiness with respect to that (sort of imagined reality) does not establish objective selflessness, (there being no objective selflessness in the Individualist schools), meditation on such (inferior) emptiness will not purify the objective obscurations, which contradicts the Elucidation explanation that the emptiness of the relative with respect to the establishment by intrinsic identifiability of the imagined (reality) is the perfect, objective selflessness, and the Bodhisattva Stages expla-

nation that such emptiness is the object causing the purification of the objective obscurations. In the negation of form, etc. as being the conceptual objects of expressions, when the existence by intrinsic identity of the ground differentials of conceptual objects is negated, the relative will be negated as established by intrinsic identifiability, and even if (only) the intrinsic identifiability of the categorical differentials of conceptual objects is negated, it is (still) invalid (as an interpretation of this system) since the Traditionalists have proved the non-phenomenality of universals as the object of inferential validating cognitions.

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Furthermore, since the statement from the Life Migration Scripture: "Such and such a name expresses such and such a thing, but does not exist therein, and this is the ultimate nature of things," is established for the Individualist schools also, the ultimate, as emptiness (of the relative) with regard to the imagined, of the Elucidation of Intention, appears to amount to nothing more than this. Finally, it could not be correct to explain this pattern of emptiness as objective selflessness, the object used for purifying objective obscurations, since it does not indicate the pure consciousness that negates substantial difference between subject and object.

Let us now explain.

This pattern of emptiness is not already established by the Individual Vehicle schools, because the Bodhisattva Stages explains it to be the object of the wisdom purificative of objective obscurations and to be the unexcelled central way avoiding the two extremes, and because the Universal Vehicle Compendium declares that realization of this (pattern of emptiness) is realization of pure consciousness. Therefore, the Individualist schools do have philosophical assertions which amount to that reification which is the opposite of this (pattern of emptiness); that is, their habitual notion that form, etc., are established by intrinsic identity as ascriptively and descriptively verbally designated. In negating this reification, the Bodhisattva Stages refutes with scriptural reference, so the target of the refutation is also (a member of an) orthodox (school); and since the refutation would not apply to the advocates of realitylessness, nor to a particular type of Experientialist, (it must apply to) the Individual Vehicle

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schools. And therefore, (it) refutes them with three references established for them, without quoting the Elucidation.

(Having thus answered the objections in general, turning to the description of reification itself), to describe first of all unconscious reification, the Compendium statement is: "It should be recognized that naive people habitually insist on an intrinsic reality, which accords with names and expressions, in things subject to expression, because of five reasons."

The first reason is then explained as the fact that (such naive people), when asked "what is the reality of that thing called 'form'?" they answer its reality is form!" and not "its name is 'form'!" That means that when

thus questioned, they give the name of a thing as its reality, and are unable to say "the reality of that thing called 'form' is merely its designation by the name form'." Therefore, when something is designated by the expression "form," if we examine the appearance of that thing which is the basis of designation, say by the expression "blue form," it appears to be established on the strength of its own objective condition; not merely verbally and conventionally posited.

The holding of that ""blue" to be established as it appears is the reification which holds an intrinsically identifiable status (to underlie) the designation of something blue by the name "form." The above explanation has established that naive people have this (habit), and since the two realistic (Individualist) schools believe such a habit-pattern to have validity, where is the (Idealists') similarity to their system, in which, although the categorical differential of the verbally expressible is defined as mere conceptual designation, its ground differential serves as its intrinsic identity? Thus we can understand particularly the process of (234)

reification in regard to the imagined, as well as the process of reification in regard to other things. And similarly, when subject and object occur dualistically, the holding of them both to exist as they appear, substantially different, is the reification that is the objective self-habit. The answers to the remaining objections will be explained below.

THE PROCEDURE TO NEGATE IT; ACTUAL NEGATION

The Elucidation of Intention does not give any reasons proving the relative to be devoid of the imagined. Hence, as this must be understood, (236)

the Bodhisattva Stages and the Compendium give three reasons each. The Universal Vehicle Compendium also states:

To answer the question, "What makes it clear that the reality of the relative is not as it appears in the imagined reality?*" (We say) it is established because of the incompatibility between their natures, the incompatibility of multiplicity of nature, and the incompatibility of confused natures; because there is no cognition prior to names, because of multiplicity, and because of vagueness.

To express simply the proof of the relative being empty of the imagined because of incompatibility between the natures of the two; if the fact of a round-bellied thing being the locus or basis of the expression "pot" were to be established by the intrinsic identifiability or reality of round-belliedness, it would not be established on strength of conventions, and hence, the conventionally subjective cognition, without requiring any convention, would arise thinking "pot" in regard to the round-bellied thing, before there was any designation of the name "pot."

(To express simply) the proof through the incompatibility between something being one and its having many natures; since, according to the antagonist's position, the giving of many names to one thing, as in calling Indra, "Shakra," "Shatakratu," "Gramaghataka," etc., must be on the strength of the thing itself, (the names being) existent in the thing as they appear to imaginative construction, that one thing would become many.

(Third, to express simply) the proof through the incompatibility of confusing the entities of distinct things; since, according to the antagonist, when two people are called by the same name, for example, "Upagupta," there is no difference in the way the cognition "Upagupta" arises (in regard to each of them), and since name and imagination apply to each of them on the strength of their objective reality, the two must become one entity.

Since the habitual notion that form, etc., are established ultimately,
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or by intrinsic identity, as the bases of conceptual adherence, is similar to the habitual notion that (form, etc.) are established by intrinsic identity as the grounds of verbal designations, the illiterate person, who does not know the names of things, still has (the unconscious habit of) reification which is the negatee; and the reasons to negate it are similar also. The Bodhisattva Stages negates (reification by reasoning that), while a thing exists before the name is attached to it, that thing (according to the Realists) should be a non-entity before it is designated by its name, and otherwise, if it were to exist before the designation, the cognition form" would arise, even prior to the name. Although the Individualists (attempt to evade this refutation) by saying that, although there would be such faults as nominal cognition arising prior to conventional information if the direct object of conventional designation were objectively intrinsically identifiable, no such faults accrue if form, etc., are established by intrinsic identity as the ground of conventional designation and as the basis of conceptual adherence, still (the refutation is) similar (in application to them).

Thus, although form, etc., being the bases of conceptual adherence cannot be negated (conventionally) in spite of their being the verbally and conventionally established imagined (reality), because they are (conventionally) established by validating cognition, the same (conceptual basis status) being established through the intrinsic identity of those things (can be negated), since an imagined reality set up by words alone cannot possibly be a knowable object. Hence, among things established verbally and conventionally, there are those established by validating cognition and those not so established.

Nevertheless, this system asserts that as soon as something is merely established nominally and conventionally, it cannot participate in causality. The two Realist schools do not know how to establish the existence of those things such as form, etc., once their establishment by intrinsic identity as the bases of conceptual adherence and as the grounds of symbolic designation is negated. Intrinsic identity (svalaksana) here is

not that ultimate particular (svalakṣaṇa) common to the logicians.

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It is not contradictory for consciousness, as the basis of conceptual adherence, to be the imagined reality that is not established ultimately, and for (the same) consciousness to be ultimately established (in its relative nature), just as, for example, a pot's absence, being an absolute negation, is not prevented from sharing a common ground with the location (from which it is absent) by (the supposed) contradictoriness of an absolute negation and a phenomenon.

Therefore, although the statement, "Such and such a name," etc., is from a scripture canonical in the Individualist schools, it is not that there is no difference between the way they explain it (and the way this system does). For example, the expression "root-consciousness" that is used in the Mahasamghika school is explained by this system as the fundamental consciousness.

Since the above-explained habitual notion of existence by intrinsic identity, or in the ultimate, of ascriptive and descriptive designation is the chief type of objective obscuration, the determination of the non-existence of its object is correctly equivalent to the object purificative of objective obscurations.

Finally, how are these reasonings applied to arrive at "pure information?" When we negate the ultimate establishment of things, from form to omniscience, as being the grounds of designation by verbal expressions and the bases of conceptual adherence, we reach the pure information free of subject-object-duality, with the realization that there is nothing unmistaken about the habitual notions of the imagination that perceive the substances and qualities of expressible things by depending on expressive names, expressible referents, and the connection between name and referent, since all such conceptualizations are devoid of their apparent objectivities. The Compendium of the Universal Vehicle states:

Thus, such a bodhisattva who strives to reach pure information truly understands that those names made of letters, the content of mental formulations that appear as letters and meanings, are no more than mere mental constructs. He truly understands that meanings based on letters are no more than mere mental formulations. He truly understands that names are no more than mere designations of substances and qualities. Therefore, apprehending the fact that all are merely mental formulations, and not apprehending any objective identifiability in nominal things, with their ascriptive and descriptive designations, he enters pure information itself, with regard to mental constructions
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of apparent words and meanings, by means of the four thorough investigations, and the four authentic realizations.

Here, one might object that although this is a negation of subject and object based on the constructions of mental consciousness, there is no

philosophical negation of subject and object depending on the non-conceptual consciousness controlled by instincts, so how can it be valid as entrance into pure information?

This is not a fault, because the rational negation of blue existing by intrinsic identity as the basis of conceptual adherence which holds the object dichotomously apart proves that the perception of blue, in which "blue" appears as a basis of adherence, is mistaken in its apparent object, since that appears to have intrinsic identifiability. And that proof proves that that object "blue" does not exist as a substance different from the consciousness in which it appears.

Here again, one might protest that, when the ultimate status of consciousness as the basis of conceptual adherence is rationally negated, apperceptive self-consciousness, in which that consciousness appears, is established to be mistaken in its apparent object, because (consciousness) appears therein to have intrinsic identifiability. And once that is established, the philosophy of the Experientialist is demolished, since consciousness is without intrinsically identifiable status according to actual experience.

This is not a fault, because consciousness does not appear in apperception as a basis of conceptual adherence, although "blue" does appear as the basis of the conceptual adherence insistent on the externality of the blue in the perception of "blue." (The appearance of something) being an object of adherence cannot arise in apperception, etc., where dualism declines, which does not exclude its appearance in the dualistic perception of blue. The reason that when a basis of conceptual adherence appears, it must appear dualistically, is that whenever such a general notion arises in thought, it definitely arises with a dualistic appearance. Nevertheless, it is not the same in the case of this (apperceptive) consciousness, because, although it also arises generally in thought, it arises in the form of pure experience. And one cannot say, "It is the same since there definitely must be dualistic appearance in constructive thought!" because dualistic appearance in constructive thought is not equivalent to the arising of a (specific) object with a dualistic appearance. Otherwise, it would be necessary to admit the impossibility of the occurrence of the decline of dualistic appearance in constructive thought. And that is not (240)

correct, since then it would become impossible for dualistic appearance to decline (in any experience).

It is not to be imagined that blue does not appear to non-conceptual (consciousness) as the basis of conceptual adherence, since it is only so established on the strength of mental construction (itself); because (in that case) (sticks and clods) would not appear to non-conceptual consciousness as illusory horse and elephant, since they are only so established on the strength of mental construction.

Therefore, the Elucidation of Intention statement that emptiness (of the relative) with respect to the imagined, which consists of ascriptive and descriptive designation, is the perfect does not fail to negate substantial dichotomy between subject and object as well. (Furthermore),

that scripture clearly states the negation of (the reality of) external things, in the section on serenity meditation. And it does not indicate the imagined reality in general, in which there are many things, such as all universal characteristics, space, etc., because these are not relevant in the context of establishing the emptiness (of the relative), with respect to such (a specific type of) imagined reality, as the perfect. Because, although those many things have an existence that cannot be established by names and symbols (alone), they have no intrinsic identifiability, because they are merely conceptually constructed.

As for the negation of subject and object depending on external things, the Compendium of Universal Vehicle gives the reasoning (associated with the similes of) dream and reflection, etc.; the Twenty gives the reasoning negating the indivisibility of atoms; Dharmakirti gives the reasoning negating homogeneity in the production of the characteristics of subject and object; and Dignaga gives the reasoning negating the objective status of molecules and atoms.

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In regard to the Compendium of the Universal Vehicle statements that all the Mother Scripture declarations of non-existence negate the imagined reality, if we do not understand the Elucidation's procedure to negate the imagined, we will interpret them as (referring to) only the imagined reality which is substantial difference between subject and object, and we will be forced into many positions that are altogether incorrect even in the Experientialist system, for it would be extremely difficult on such an interpretation to explain the statements of the total incomprehensibility of such things as permanence and impermanence, etc.

It might even become necessary to maintain that the statements of "total incomprehensibility" refer to the (time of) the equanimity (of holy wisdom), and the statements of "comprehensibility" through specific discrimination refer to the time of the aftermath-discernment(-wisdom); but saying this would be catastrophic!

The Bodhisattva Stages, the Universal Vehicle Compendium, and the Abhidharma Synthesis mention the four thorough investigations and the four authentic realizations' as the determination of the view of pure information, and the antidote of the objective obscurations, which are those mental constructions that also serve as foundation for the addictions. And in order to understand them, it appears necessary to understand exactly the negatee, reification, and the reasoning negating the reality of the) imagined, as stated in the Elucidation of Intention. Also, as it seems especially necessary to know the way of entrance into pure information through negation of subject-object substantial difference by the reasonings (above), I have merely opened the door of analysis for the

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intelligent, having observed they have not yet begun to investigate (this question).

ELIMINATION OF PROTEST

Here, some might protest: "(We might allow that) the Elucidation of Intention states that the addictions are produced by habitual adherence to the imagined reality in the relative, evolutionary action is accumulated thereby, and thus one wanders in cyclic life; and when the identity-unreality of the imagined in the relative is seen, the sequence is reversed. (Further, perhaps), all three-disciple, solitary sage, and bodhisattva attain liberation by this same path and practice, their path of purification and their purity being the same, stated to be 'without a second,' with no other pattern of emptiness of the relative with respect to the imagined than that explained above. But then, is the meaning of this scripture taken to be that the Individualists realize objective selflessness? Or is it not? If it is so taken, then the above explanations of the distinctiveness (of the Universal Vehicle) are contradicted. And if it is not so taken, how is the meaning of the scripture to be explained?"

(Let us explain); the Bodhisattva Stages declares that ascriptive and descriptive constructions, as well as materialistic constructions, create the ground of phenomenal fabrications, which are (themselves) the objects of those imaginative constructions. On that basis, the futile views arise, and thereby the other addictions are produced and we travel around cyclic life. And, when we know that the objects held by the constructions do not exist, by means of the four thorough investigations and the four authentic realizations, this process is reversed.

Thus, (Asanga) believes that the objective self-habit, which holds ascriptive and descriptive designation to be intrinsically identifiable in things, acts as the root of the futile views, just as those Centrists who believe that the Individualists have no realization of objective selflessness hold that the objective self-habit acts as basis for personal egoism. However, since, although the termination of objective self-habits eliminates per-

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sonal self-habits, the non-termination of objective self-habits does not (necessitate) the non-elimination of personal self-habits; the non-elimination of the ultimate basis of the life-cycle does not preclude liberation from the life-cycle. Therefore, although we may take "this same path" as the path of realization of the emptiness of the relative with respect to the imagined reality, we need not take it as the path of objective selflessness, because the Abhidharma Synthesis declares the relative devoid of the imagined in terms of personal selflessness also. Furthermore, the sameness of the path of purification and of purity itself is declared because of the fact that there is no difference between the Universal Vehicle and the Individual Vehicle with regard to the purification of addictions through the realization of personal selflessness and with regard to the liberation which is the mere elimination of addictions.

By implication from the Elucidation of Intention explanation of the meaning of the Universal Vehicle Scriptures as being that the establishment of the aggregates, etc., is the relative, the reification of objective self is the imagined, and the emptiness of that (former) with respect to

that (latter) is the perfect, which is objective selflessness, we can understand the meaning of the Individual Vehicle Scriptures as being just that arrangement of the three realities which establishes the emptiness of the relative, consisting of the aggregates, with respect to the imagined, which is the personal self, as the perfect, which is personal selflessness. Therefore, the disciple for whom the first wheel was proclaimed was receptive to the realization of identity-realitylessness in terms of personal selflessness, and not in terms of objective selflessness, as the Elucidation of Intention explains by implication. And that is the meaning of the statement that the wheel of Dharma of fine discrimination was for the sake of disciples engaged in all vehicles.

(Again, some might protest that) if, taking the relative as the "empty" on all occasions of emptiness with respect to the imagined, which is (either) ascriptive and descriptive designation (or) substantial subject-object-difference, we must take the emptiness with respect to the two ways of (imagined) existence above as the perfect, then how is this reconciled with the statement of Vasubandhu from the Supercommentary, in which, taking the perfect as the empty, it is declared to be empty with respect to the other two realities? (As follows:) " 'Eye' means the ultimate eye. With respect to the eye' means the 'imagined eye' and the 'constructed eye.' 'Empty' is defined as 'free.' The same should be applied to such expressions as "the ear empty with respect to the ear. "*

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(Let us explain:) the basis upon which objective self-habits hold to (their notion of) objective self must be that which is taken as "the empty" when determining the perfect, which is objective selflessness, in any Experientialist or Centrist system. For example, when we wish to eliminate the suffering of terror when we perceive a snake in a rope, taking the rope as the empty, we must show it to be empty with respect to the snake, and it would be inappropriate to take the emptiness of the rope with respect to the snake as the empty, and to declare that that (emptiness) is empty with respect to the existence of (both) the rope and the snake as different things!

In regard to objective self-habits, such notions as the existence of indivisible atoms, of objects which are their aggregates, of instantaneous consciousness, temporally indivisible, and of consciousness which is a continuum of such (temporally indivisible consciousness), etc., are the conscious designations made only by those whose minds are affected by philosophy, and exist only for those philosophers, and not for other living beings. Therefore, the demonstration of an emptiness which is the non-existence of only those (notions) does not injure in the slightest the unconscious self-habits inherent from beginningless time. Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate that the basis upon which unconscious self-habits hold a self is empty with respect to the self supposedly held, and we must understand the negations of philosophical designations to be (no more than) factors of the negation of that (unconsciously presupposed self).

Through such considerations, since unconscious living beings perceive

a self in just this relative reality, which consists of internal and external things such as names and forms, the objects of sight and hearing, we must determine emptiness by taking that same thing as the empty. Since the error (of living beings) is not in holding the existence of the other two realities as different things in the perfect, how can the formula "the perfect is emptiness with respect to the discrete existence of the other two realities" be the determination of selflessness?

Furthermore, to hold to the existence of an objective self is not (the same as) to hold to the existence of some other thing, such as to hold to the existence of a fire on the pass. Since the external objects and the internal subject of our own mind appear to be disparate, and we hold them to be established (in fact) as they appear, the remedy of that (habit) is the demonstration that the appearance of subject and object is not established as a substantial subject-object-dichotomy, and is not (simply) the demonstration that subject and object do not exist there as different things.

Therefore, the Discrimination between Center and Extremes Com-
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mentary declares that (this pattern of emptiness) is not like a temple being empty of monks, but is like a rope being empty with respect to a snake, which statement also applies to the pattern of emptiness with respect to objective self. Therefore, if we contemplate emptiness in a pattern such as that wherein the emptiness of the relative, which is the basis upon which self is held, with respect to the imagined, which is the self as held, is the perfect, and do not allow (ourselves to fall into the trap described in) the popular saying, "Throwing the effigy out the west gate, when the demons are causing trouble at the east gate";^{s6} (then, that meditation) will act as an antidote to self-habits. But if we contemplate emptiness in any pattern different from that system, self-habits will not be disturbed at all.

As for the explanation of the Supercommentary, the "imagined eye" means the expressive verbal universals and expressible objective universals that appear in constructive thought. The "constructed eye" means the apparent eye whose nature is to hold those (verbal universals, etc., to exist) in the objective visual media; and the "ultimate eye" is taken to be the perfect which is known by equanimous, individually introspective intuition, free of subject-object dichotomous appearance, and which is inexpressible, free of expressive and expressible verbal and objective universals. Therefore, since that ultimate nature of eye, according to the wisdom of the holy equanimity, is free of (both) dualisms of apparent words and referents and of subject and object, that object of equanimity is said to be empty with respect to the other two realities, since the former dualism (word-referent) is the imagined, and the latter (subject-object) is the relative (as imagined).

The same text continues:

The imagined eye is that thing called "eye" which perceives things in the form of expressions and referents. The constructed eye is dichot-

omous appearance of visual forms which retain the nature of subject and object. And the ultimate eye is the perfect reality which is individual introspection free of all appearances, which is inexpressible, free of expression and referent... .

Thus, since, when you meditate on attention toward the ultimate,
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things constituted by creation do not appear, you should understand that they do not ultimately exist, but exist (only) superficially.

Hence, (the statement of the perfect as empty of the other two realities) is explained as the non-existence of dualistic appearance according to the holy equanimity. Therefore, this is not the way to determine the perfect, objective selflessness, which is the basic view (of the system). The Supercommentary explains ""ultimate existence" simply as existence according to the holy equanimity. Nevertheless, how could that be the ultimate existence involved in the argument about ultimate existence and non-existence, since what is admitted by equanimity in the intuitive understanding of reality is only that admitted to exist as object of its own particular subjectivity? The fact that this (Supercommentary) definitely does not admit ultimate existence capable of withstanding analysis by reasoning analytic of reality is known from the expression of total negation specifically aimed at such an admission in the section on emptiness-emptiness, ultimate-emptiness, and uncreated-emptiness, but I do not cite these, fearing prolixity.

Finally, since the Mother Scripture itself, executing the analysis of the three realities of each thing from form to omniscience, explains the emptiness of the relative, the empty, with respect to the imagined, the negatee, as the perfect, the ultimate, the ""ultimate (eye)"" must be explained as the relative eye empty of the imagined eye. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate to explain the meaning of the scripture as the emptiness of the latter with respect to the two former, (even) in the context of the (holy) equanimity.

(Indeed,) this (Supercommentary) is not the work of Vasubandhu; because it negates the (ability of) both the relative and the perfect to withstand analysis by reasoning analytic of reality, because it refers to the Transcendent Wisdom Eighteen Thousand Commentary's comment on the eight attitudes of the great personages of the Individual Vehicle,
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and because it is in complete disagreement with the explanation of the Principles of Elucidation, in which Vasubandhu demonstrates that the meaning intended in the Mother Scripture must be understood according to the Elucidation of Intention. Rather, it was written by Damshtrasena, as was well known to the scholars of the old school.

3. THUS, THE PROCEDURE TO DISTINGUISH INTERPRETABLE AND DEFINITIVE

Such being the Brother-Masters' method to explain the reality of things, (to turn to the rule of interpretable-definitive,) the Twenty states the intention of the first wheel's explanation of subject and object in terms of the (existence of) external things: "Consciousness and appearance, each arising from its own seeds;-the Muni declared there are two kinds of media, that (of consciousness) and that (of appearance)."

Again, the same text declares the need (for the first wheel): ""(The Teacher) declared the existence of the media such as the visible, etc., for the sake of the people disciplined thereby; (he declared it) on the strength of this intention, as (on another occasion he declared the existence of) a magically created being."

The teaching of the origination of consciousness, such as vision of visibles, etc., from internal and external media was for the sake of (producing) the realization of the non-existence of the perceiver, etc., apart from those media. The refutation of the literalness (of this teaching) consists of the reasonings refuting external things. Since the imagined, which is ascriptive and descriptive designation of things, is included in the objective element and the objective medium, the statement that (all media and elements) are established by intrinsic identity, without differentiating those two (that is, objective element and medium), is interpretable in meaning.

The Abhidharma Synthesis explains that the Extensive (Transcendent Wisdom) declares the realitylessness of all things intending the three unrealities. The Universal Vehicle Compendium explains the second wheel (248)

to be interpretable in meaning, thereby indicating the Mother Scripture and similar scriptures, wherein all declarations of non-existence indicate the imagined, all metaphors such as illusion, etc., indicate the relative, and the four purifications indicate the perfect. The Principles of Elucidation refutes the literal acceptance of the explanations of realitylessness in the Mother Scripture, believing it to be included in the second wheel, as otherwise the Elucidation of Intention interpretation of realitylessness would not be definitive in meaning.

The way in which this (second wheel of Dharma) is explained as interpretable is quite different from the way in which the declarations of subject and object in the first wheel are considered interpretable. For, the existence of the media of eye and of visibles is declared intending the seed and the appearance, of which each arises from the development of its own seed, called "the instinct which evolves into visual consciousness;?" which intentional meaning would not be suitable as the expressed meaning of the Individual Vehicle Scriptures. On the other hand, the three modes of unreality, which are the intended meaning of the declaration of realitylessness (in the middle wheel), are explained as the (express) meaning of the Mother Scripture. Furthermore, the existence of the external media is explained as the meaning of Individual Vehicle Scriptures, whereas the belief in the ultimate, total non-entity (of things), without differentiating the modes of unreality, is not explained as the meaning

of the Mother Scripture.

Therefore, (this system) does not explain that the Mother Scripture is interpretable in meaning because it intends the ultimate realitylessness of all things without differentiation. Rather, it explains that such (as the Mother Scripture's position) is interpretable in meaning from the point of view of its need for further explanation, since it is not fit to be literally accepted, hence is not definitive just as it stands.

Their method of further explanation is to explain the ultimate realitylessness of imagined things as their non-establishment by intrinsic identity, the ultimate realitylessness of relative things as their non-establishment in that ultimate which is the pure object, and the ultimate realitylessness of perfect things, which are themselves the ultimate, as their non-existence as the objective self.

Therefore, they do not believe that the disciples for whom the Mother Scripture was declared are those who admit its literal meaning, but rather they believe them to be those who realize the meaning of that scripture (249)

according to the explanation of the Elucidation of Intention. Hence, the intentions of the last two wheels are the same.

The Elucidation of Intention clearly explains that, having, in spite of one's admiration, refuted the literal acceptability of the meaning of the Extensive Transcendent Wisdom, (one discovers) another meaning beyond the literal, which other meaning is definitive. Thus, it calls the Mother Scripture "interpretable in meaning," since it does not clearly explicate that (other) meaning, and cannot be literally accepted. The refutation of literalness consists of the above statement that literal acceptance leads to the repudiation that holds all three realities not to be established by intrinsic identifiability.

The Principles of Elucidation shows the internal contradiction in the literal statements of realitylessness, etc.:

The Transcendent Wisdom teaches repeatedly such things as the realitylessness of all things, as well as teachings such as (are included in the passage) from "the bodhisattva wishes to enter the state of flawlessness... "up to "specifically repents all sins... ," If the expressions such as realitylessness, etc., had only literal meaning, they would contradict all these other precepts. Since there would be nothing at all to undertake, it would be impossible to accept that from such a cause, such comes to be. Or else, in regard to a certain precept, one would feel "what is there to undertake?" Therefore, such expressions are not to be taken literally. How then? (They are to be taken as) having a deeper intention.

His rule of contradiction is mainly that, if there were no reality, the relative would become impossible, insofar as precepts, such as "if you wish to attain this and this, learn the Mother Scripture," and the desire to attain, and causality, such as that involved in the maxim, "from charity, great wealth accrues," all would become impossible.

Further, even those who accept the Mother Scripture as definitive in meaning accept the repeated statements of ethical choice and causality, etc., in conventional terms and not in ultimate terms. Thus, while they do not believe in any general absolute non-reality or conventional non-existence, they apply (qualifications such as ""ultimately," "conventionally,") in general, although the scripture does not employ such qualifications in each case. Thus, this means that even (these followers of the Mother Scripture acknowledge) that causality, etc., become impossible if ultimate non-existence" (of everything) is literally accepted. And the (250)

Bodhisattva Stages and the Compendium also negate (acceptance of) the ultimate non-establishment of everything, explaining it as repudiation. Since the differentiation of interpretable and definitive meanings of scriptural statements concerned mainly with the ultimate hinges on the existence and non-existence of logical refutation of literalness, we can answer this argument of (the Idealists) if we know well how to negate ultimate existence, and also how to establish with validating cognition causality and bondage-liberation, etc., in things (whose absolute existence has been) thus refuted. Otherwise, if we maintain that "if production were to be established by validating cognition, it would become ultimate production; but, as production is only according to the claim of production by erroneous cognition, all things (such as production of sprouts, etc.) are superficially valid," then, since we cannot rebut their refutations, it would be preferable for us to depend on the interpretations of the Experientialists.

Although there are many approaches to the method of explaining (scriptures) as interpretable in meaning, intelligent persons should understand that the Experientialist method of explaining the second wheel as interpretable in meaning is precisely as above.

The Elucidation of Intention declaration of the three types of wheels (of Dharma) is not in terms of the assemblies in attendance, nor in terms of the periods of the teacher's life, but is established according to the contents (of the scripture); and they are (understood) in terms of their determination of the meaning of selflessness.

First, one wheel in Varanasi declared personal selflessness and the real existence of most things, such as the aggregates, without negating their truth-status, except in very few cases. Then, one wheel refuted the truth-status of all things such as the aggregates without any discrimination. Finally, there was one wheel of particular discrimination through the method by which the first reality is not established by intrinsic identity, and the latter two realities are established by intrinsic identity. And other scriptures that teach subjects different from these are not involved in this analysis of interpretable and definitive meanings.

The Transcendent Wisdom Instruction explains:

Only those scriptures whose meaning is literal are definitive in meaning. No other meaning is contained in such meaning, and its meaning is definitely just that; hence it is "definitive meaning." How is that mean-

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ing determined? By that scripture itself, by another scripture, or by both (itself and others).

Examples of the first type (that determine their own definitiveness) are the Mission to Lanka and the Elucidation of Intention, etc., considering the fact that they clearly differentiate the existence and non-existence of realities (of different things), according to this belief. An example of the second type is the Eight Thousand, etc., considering the fact that they do not differentiate existence and non-existence of reality as does the Elucidation of Intention. And an example of the third type is the Eighteen Thousand, considering the fact that in its Questions of Maitreya chapter, it contains an explanation of interpretable meaning and an elimination of the error of insistence on literalness, and the fact that the Elucidation of Intention also explains its interpretable meaning. This (distinction between the second and third types) is made essentially because the Questions of Maitreya chapter is absent from the middle-length Transcendent Wisdom. Thus, (Ratnakarashanti) believes that the arrangement of the three realities in the Questions of Maitreya is the same in meaning as that of the Elucidation of Intention.

Such would be valid, were they in fact the same, but, since Vasubandhu proved the Mother Scripture declarations of realitylessness, etc., to be interpretable in meaning, by means of the Elucidation of Intention, etc., the Brothers do not intend that their demonstration of the inherent contradictions of the Mother Scripture should be disproved by the Questions of Maitreya. These two are quite similar and hard to distinguish, but were they to be the same, (Ratnakarashanti) would become an Idealist, since he could not possibly explain the intended meaning of the Mother Scripture as the ultimate realitylessness and conventional existence of all things. This subject, upon analysis, is quite far-reaching in its implications, hence I will explain it below in the Centrist section.

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Chapter III

THE ESSENTIAL CENTRIST MESSAGE

1. STATEMENTS FROM THE TEACHING OF AKSHAYAMATI SCRIPTURE

The Savior Nagarjuna and his (spiritual) son (Aryadeva) did not differentiate interpretable and definitive by means of a direct reference from a source in a scripture differentiating the two. Nevertheless, (the matter) is explained by implication from the way in which they explain the meaning of the scriptures. Furthermore, the Lucid Exposition, the Wisdom Lamp Commentary, and the Central Way Illumination' take the Teaching of Akshayamati as authority when they set forth the interpretation of interpretable and definitive. Therefore, that scripture should be

taken as authoritative here. The Teaching of Akshayamati statement is:

Which scriptures are definitive in meaning? Which are interpretable? Those teaching superficial realities are interpretable in meaning. Those teaching ultimate realities are definitive in meaning. Those teaching various words and letters are interpretable. Those teaching the profound, the difficult to see, and the difficult to understand, are definitive. Those scriptures that teach as if there were an owner in the ownerless, using various expressions such as "self," "living being," "life," "soul," "creature," "person," "humanity," "mankind," "agent," "experiencer," etc., are interpretable. Those scriptures that teach the doors of liberation, the emptiness of things, signlessness, wishlessness, inactivity, non-production, creationlessness, non-occurrence, beinglessness, lifelessness, personlessness, and ownerlessness, etc., are definitive in meaning. Rely on the latter, not the former.

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The first two phrases align interpretable and definitive with the two realities in distinguishing them from the point of view of subject-matter. The next two phrases do not depart from this arrangement, since "teaching the superficial" is teaching various meanings employing various expressions, and "teaching the ultimate" is teaching the meaning that is difficult to understand, which is the universality of the cessation of mental fabrications. The last two phrases describe the methods of teaching involved in teaching the superficial and the ultimate. To teach as if self and living beings exist is to teach the superficial, which does not apply to merely that, but also to all teachings of the existence of functional things which require an agent. To teach the emptiness and non-production of things is to teach their realitylessness, and to teach the non-existence of living beings, etc., is to teach personal realitylessness; and such a method of teaching teaches the ultimate. From the fact that both (persons and things) are mentioned (as non-existent here), it follows that both are shown to be existent in the former (superficial) teaching (although only persons are referred to there explicitly). The teaching of the ultimate is not a matter of taking some other permanent thing as a ground and expounding it as non-production, etc., but is rather an indication of the truthlessness of such grounds as persons and things such as aggregates etc., since the ultimate reality is the mere exclusion of their truth-status. The Lucid Exposition explains that the (following) differentiation of interpretable and definitive in the King of Samadhi Scripture agrees with the above: "The specialty of the scriptures of definitive meaning is known according to the teaching of emptiness by the Sugata. And all teachings which mention 'person, 'living being,' and 'creatures' are known to be interpretable in meaning."

To be sure, scriptures of interpretable meaning do "lead" disciples, but that is not the meaning of the "to-be-led" (neya) (portion of the term neyārtha [interpretable meaning]). Rather the meaning of the "to-be-led" is the process of interpretation, in which it is necessary to "lead" the (obvious) meaning of the scripture around to a different meaning.

There are two types of needs for interpretation. The first (arises when a statement is obviously figurative, and) requires interpretation: for example, the statement "having killed father and mother ..." wherein "father" must be interpreted as "evolutionary entanglement" and "mother" must be interpreted as "craving." The second (arises when a statement lends itself to misinterpretation through a confusion of realities), as, for example, when (someone misinterprets) the statement "from bad and (254)

good actions arise the effects of suffering and happiness," by saying that its reality is just what is said, and there is no other reality of those (actions and effects). (It then becomes necessary) to explain that the (ultimate) reality of those two things (can only be understood) by interpreting the statement's obvious meaning otherwise.

Therefore, the Central Way Illumination declares: "How do we define definitive meaning? It is that which is explained logically and in terms of the ultimate, since it cannot be interpreted by others in any other way."S

If interpretable and definitive were to be equated with inexplicit and explicit meanings, "logically" would be enough, but "in terms of the ultimate" is stated, since the former is not enough. Therefore, according to the (second) method explained above for alternative interpretation of the meaning of a statement, such a statement as "sprout is produced from seed," is interpretable in meaning, since, although there are rational means of validation of its explicit meaning, it is not in terms of the ultimate.

Therefore, since the statement of the non-existence of true production of things is logical and its explicit meaning cannot be interpreted otherwise, as if it were not the reality of those things, scriptures with such (statements) are definitive in meaning, because they cannot be otherwise interpreted according to either of the (above) two processes of interpretation.

(In sum), the scriptures themselves are taken as that characterized as interpretable or definitive, being established as such according to whether or not their meaning needs to be otherwise interpreted. In this case, interpretable and definitive correspond to superficial and ultimate, which (correspondence) is illustrated in the Facts of the Stages declarations of the four reliances; reliance on the teaching and not the teacher, reliance on the meaning and not the words, reliance on the definitive meaning and not the interpretable meaning, and reliance on the holy wisdom and not on (ordinary) consciousness.

The Ornament of Wisdom-Illumination Scripture declares that ""definitive meaning is the ultimate." Since the Teaching of Akshayamati statements of non-production, etc., teach the ultimate, only non-production, etc., are the ultimate, and only indications of that are to be (255)

accepted as definitive in meaning. It is not to be supposed that, since on particular occasions the negatees are without qualification, non-produc-

tion, etc., are not literally intended, hence not definitive. For, when such qualification as, for example in the Hundred Thousand, "It is in terms of popular conventions, and not in terms of the ultimate," is applied to the production of things on one occasion, it is to be understood as applied by implication on other occasions also, and hence even those statements which do not explicitly mention (such qualification) are literally acceptable.

2. EXPLANATION OF THEIR MEANING; SAVIOR NAGARJUNA'S EXPLANATION

THE EQUIVALENCE OF RELATIVITY AND REALITYNESS

The scriptures declare both the existence and the non-existence of production and cessation, etc., some of them explaining the statements of non-production, etc., as definitive in meaning, and some of them explaining them as interpretable in meaning. If there were any logical refutation of the literal validity of the explanations of the non-existence of production, etc., in the ultimate or by intrinsic identity, then it would be correct to explain the objective self, which is that negated in "selflessness," as merely the imagined reality which is the intrinsic identifiability of things posited by ascriptive and descriptive designation, and which is substantial subject-object dichotomy, and to explain the ultimate reality as the absence of those (selves). However, there is no such refutation, because the existence of reality established in the ultimate, or by intrinsic identity, would utterly preclude the dependence of effects on causes and conditions.

Therefore, in the face of the fact of the non-existence of establishment by intrinsic identity because of dependence on conditions, if we insist that, without intrinsic identifiability, bondage-liberation, action-abstention, and cause-effect, etc., would become non-existent, then that insistence is to take the ultimate proof of emptiness of intrinsically identifiable reality as the ultimate refutation of emptiness! This explanation is the system of the Champions founded by the Savior Nagarjuna, which teaches the reasoning proving that the meaning of the Mother Scripture and those scriptures that agree with it cannot be otherwise interpreted but is definitive in itself; and teaches the reasoning refuting the literal validity of those scriptures that disagree with it.

As for the Elucidation of Intention statement that those who see no
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intrinsically identifiable status (in things) hold the view that repudiates all three natures, it does not refer to everyone who sees in that way, but only to those disciples who lack superior intelligence. Therefore, the Teacher declared such according to the mental capacities of the disciples, and not as his own belief. For, since the disciple of superior intelligence realizes emptiness with respect to intrinsic identity from the necessity of establishment of causality itself, such a vision (of absence of intrinsic

identity) becomes a method to negate views that repudiate reality. (However), for the (less than superior) disciple, the Mother Scripture becomes interpretable, and the Elucidation of Intention definitive in meaning, just as (Aryadeva) states in the Four Hundred that it is better to teach "self" than to teach "selflessness" to the disciple who is not properly receptive to the teaching of selflessness.

The Wisdom mentions the argument that (attempts to) refute the literalness of the Mother Scripture, etc., by arguing that all arrangements of life and liberation would be invalid, since production and destruction of things would be impossible if they were empty of intrinsically identifiable reality, (as follows:) "If everything is empty, there will be no production and no destruction, and the consequence of the non-existence of the four holy truths will be inevitable for you!" To this (Nagarjuna) answers: "If everything is not empty, there will be no production and no destruction, and the consequence of the non-existence of the four holy truths will be inevitable for you!" (emphasis added).

He states that the import of emptiness of intrinsic reality is equivalent to the import of relativity, since in the case of non-emptiness of intrinsic reality, relativity, which is production and destruction, would be impossible, and all arrangements would be invalid; whereas all these are very much appropriate in the case of emptiness of intrinsic reality.

Through logical determination of this very rule in the Centrist treatises, the Master (Nagarjuna) explains that there is not the slightest logical refutation of the literalness of the scriptures that declare the truthlessness of production, etc., and since there is no other way to explain them as interpretable, they are very much established as definitive in meaning. Intending this, the Lucid Exposition declares: "The Master composed this Centrist treatise in order to show the difference between scriptures of interpretable meaning and those of definitive meaning." Thus (Chan-
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drakirti) answers the objection that statements of the existence of the eight (properties), from cessation to diversity, and the statement of their non-existence (in the description of relativity), are mutually contradictory. He then continues:

Not knowing the intention of such teachings, one feels doubt; "Herein, which is the teaching whose meaning is true? Which is the teaching with ulterior intention?" Some of lesser intelligence understand interpretable meaning as if it were definitive. Hence, the Master composed this treatise, in order to clear away both doubts and confusions through references and reasoning.

The Scripture Synthesis answers the question about the profound by quoting the scriptures that teach the profound such as the Hundred Thousand, the Diamond Cutter, and the Seven Hundred, etc. Further, the Canon of Reason makes certain the impossibility of interpreting the meaning of these (scriptures) otherwise than taught. Therefore, (the Master) believed these to be definitive in meaning, and statements differing

from them to be intentional.

The Disclosure of the Spirit of Enlightenment declares that the statements that negate external things and establish reality in mind alone are not literally intended: "the Muni declared-All these things are only mind!-in order to eliminate the fears (of emptiness) of the naive. (Nevertheless,) that is not the reality (of things)." (Finally,) the Jewel Garland declares:

Just as the grammarians make one read the grammar, the Buddha teaches the Dharma according to the tolerance of the disciple. To some he teaches the Dharma to retrain from sins, to some to accomplish virtue, to some as dependence on dualism, and to some as freedom from dualism; (finally) to some he teaches the profound, terrifying practice of enlightenment, whose essence is emptiness and compassion.

The first sentence states that the Teacher teaches the Dharma in accord with the intelligence of the disciple. The next two phrases refer to the (258)

teachings concerned with ascendant status¹⁵ (in the world). The next phrase refers to the teaching of the non-existence of personal self and of the existence of both subject and object for those in the class of the two disciple schools. The next phrase refers to the teaching of the existence of the emptiness of duality, that is, the non-existence of the subject-object dualism, for certain disciples in the Universal Vehicle class. The rest of the passage refers to the teaching of the awesome Dharma of (integrated) realitylessness and great compassion for the disciples of extreme intelligence who are oriented toward the Universal Vehicle.

Therefore, as long as we are not capable of the establishment of all arrangements such as bondage-liberation, etc., upon the doctrine of truthlessness, we must differentiate some things that are untrue from some things that are true. For it is necessary to lead (such disciples) gradually, by teaching partial aspects of selflessness, and it is not proper to present universal emptiness when (it would be misinterpreted to mean that) there is no basis upon which to establish causality. Therefore, (the Buddha) declared the procedure of refuting reality in persons and almost not refuting it in the aggregates, and the procedure of refuting substantial subject-object difference and not refuting the reality of the emptiness of duality (itself).

However, when we are able to realize the very import of relativity as the import of realitylessness, there is no point in making any such differentiation, because we are quite capable of the admission of the validity of all arrangements upon that very basis which is the negation of intrinsic reality. Nevertheless, even for those in the Supreme Vehicle class who are in little danger of nihilistic views about causality, etc., there are a great many who, although somewhat roughly negating truth, the negatee, fail to negate it precisely. For, in the face of precise negation, so many lose sight of the functional basis of all systems verified by validating cognitions. Hence, the Elucidation of Intention differentiation of inter-

pretable and definitive still appears to be an extremely skillful technique for guiding a great many disciples to the Universal Vehicle.

Finally, as that scripture is explained to be teaching according to its disciples, we can understand the teachings that agree with it, as the same. Thus, we can understand how Asanga, the author of the treatises elucidating its intention, explains also according to the inclinations of his disciples, and does not accept the meaning he explains as his own personal interpretation.

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CELEBRATION OF THAT FACT AS THE ESSENTIAL IMPORT OF ALL SCRIPTURES

The Master praised the Lord in many treatises from the point of view of his declaration of relativity, having seen this very declaration of the equivalence in meaning of emptiness by intrinsic reality and relativity to be of the highest excellence, distinguishing our Teacher from other teachers. (The Lord's declaration was:) "By the very reason that origination depends on causes and conditions, things have no intrinsically identifiable reality."

(The Master salutes the Buddha as follows,) from the Wisdom:

I praise that perfect Buddha, the Supreme Philosopher, who taught us relativity, free of cessation and creation, without annihilation and permanence, with no coming and going, not a unity nor a plurality, (which is the) quiescence of mental fabrications and the supreme bliss!

Also from the Philosophical Sixty: "I salute Shakyamuni, the herald of relativity, by which law, creations and cessations are abandoned!" And from the Rebuttal of Objections: "I salute that incomparable, perfect Buddha, who made the declaration of the equivalence of meaning of emptiness, relativity, and the central way!" And from the Inconceivable Praise: "I salute the Incomparable One, whose wisdom was matchless and inconceivable, and who declared the realitylessness of interdependently originated things!

The first (of these quotations) declares that relativity is free of cessation, etc., eight (attributes). The second declares that it is free of them by reason of being relativity. The third declares that "relativity," the "central way," and ""emptiness of intrinsic reality" are synonymous. And the fourth teaches that cessation, etc., are free of intrinsically identifiable existence for that very reason.

All the Discourses of the Teacher proceed from the two realities, the ultimate and the superficial. Since we will not understand the reality of the teaching if we do not know the differentiation of these two, we also will not understand the procedure to explain the Discourses from the point of view of the two realities. For, all teachings of various subjects that are dependently designated and dependently occurrent, are in terms

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of the superficial reality, and the ultimate is no more than just that emptiness which is the lack of intrinsic identifiability by that reason (of relativity).

The Emptiness Seventy statement is:

The peerless transcendent Lord taught this relativity of things because of the fact of their emptiness of reality. The ultimate meaning is no more than that, but the Lord Buddha correctly designates all varieties of things, relying on conventional expressions.

Its commentary explains that the ultimate "is no more than that emptiness of reality of all dependently originated things." Thus, since (the Master) accepts the ultimate reality in this way, and establishes it as merely the exclusion of the self, the negatee, in relativity, the ground of negation, the systems of both the Champions agree, except for some differences on the qualification of the negatee, and it is incorrect to establish the ultimate reality in any other way. Furthermore, as for the belief in the truth-status of that (ultimate reality) itself, the Wisdom states: "Who entertain the view of emptiness are declared to be incurable!" that is, that it is an incurable view, and the Transcendental Praise states it to be ridiculous: "Since you taught the nectar of emptiness in order to eliminate all mental fabrications, whosoever becomes attached to that (in itself), you find utterly ridiculous!"

Since the existence of relativity as nature-possessor and ultimate reality as nature, that is, as support and supported, is (presented) according to conventional cognition and not according to the rational cognition of immaculate equanimity, according to this latter there is of course no contradiction, such as that of existence of a nature without any nature-possessor, (since all duality is eliminated in the pure-object-ultimate). And in regard to existence in the (other kind of) ultimate, that involved in the analysis of the reality of things existent by intrinsic identity, since an isolated nature cannot remain without a nature-possessor, the former (Idealist) system maintains that if the relative reality were empty of intrinsic identifiability, the perfect would also become unestablished by intrinsic identity. Moreover, this (Centrist) system declares, "Since the created is not established, how can the uncreated be established?" Thus, both systems agree repeatedly with the scriptural statement, "If form itself were not apprehended, how could the reality of form possibly be apprehended?*"

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(Finally), the statements in the Philosophical Sixty that "liberation is the only truth," that is, that it alone is true, and that created things are false and prove to deceive, must be understood by interpreting the meaning of "false" and "untrue" as "deceptive," and the meaning of "true" as "non-deceptive." Hence the "truth" in question here is not that truth which is established by intrinsic identity, which is in question during the analysis of establishment and non-establishment in reality. These created things are said to be "false," or "deceptive," as they deceive the naive-

mindful by appearing to be established by intrinsic identity, when in fact they are not so established, as for example, (someone) is said to be deceiving if he pretends to be helpful, when he is not really helpful at all. Similarly, liberation, the ultimate reality, is said to be "true," or "non-deceptive," because it is not deceptive by appearing (to be established by intrinsic identity), as in the former case (of the superficial), to the person who directly beholds it.

The heterodox schools, who do not believe in the relativity which is the dependent origination of persons and things, but believe in the truth (-status) of both, fall into the abyss of the absolutistic and nihilistic views. And those orthodox schools who, in spite of their admission of the relativity of both (persons and things) believe in their establishment in reality or by intrinsic identity, also come under the influence of absolutistic and nihilistic views.

Therefore, (Nagarjuna) believes that this very rule of the admission that persons and things which are dependently originated are devoid of intrinsic reality, like the reflection of the moon in water, is the best door to the abandonment of absolutistic and nihilistic views for those who desire to be free of them. As the Philosophical Sixty declares:

Those who insistently reify an independent self or world-alas!-they are deprived by views (such as those of things' being) permanent or impermanent. And those who believe that dependent things are still established in reality-how could they fail to be affected by the fallacies such as permanence etc.? But those who believe that dependent things are neither real nor invalid, but are like the reflection of the moon in water-they are not deprived by views!

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Absolutism is eliminated by the fact of the non-establishment in reality (of persons and things), and nihilism is eliminated by the fact of the functional capacity of each thing, as it is not invalidated by losing that capacity (just because it is not established in ultimate reality). Therefore, while admitting the emptiness of the intrinsic reality of these internal and external things, to maintain that such emptiness is annihilation of the superficial contradicts the systems of both the Champions, who emphatically maintained that relativity is free of both permanence and annihilation. Nevertheless, there are many self-styled Centrists who still believe that, or else hold the similar belief that superficial things are empty even of their own entities, both beliefs being misunderstandings of the meaning of the expression "self-empty." They further claim that "there is no method that demonstrates to us that these internal and external things of relativity are free of absolutism and nihilism!"²⁸

It is not surprising that the heterodox, who advocate the permanence of things, should not admit relativity, believing things to be established in truth, since that is the prescription of their own teachers. However, the belief in the truth-status (of things), while asserting relativity, which is the origination (of things) dependent on causes and conditions, is utterly absurd. Thus, the Philosophical Sixty declares:

For the believers in "Being," who live by upholding a supreme thing, to stay on such a path is not surprising in the least. But, for those who believe in universal impermanence, relying on the path of the Buddha, to continue to uphold the supremacy of intrinsically real things with arguments-that really is astonishing!

Thus he declares the absurdity of those who believe that production and cessation, etc., as defined cannot be reconciled with non-existence in truth, or with (non-existence) by intrinsic identity.

Since this freedom of relativity from permanence and annihilation is so extremely difficult to understand, the Teacher himself thought that if he taught the profound teaching as he understood it, others would not understand it, hence he should stay for some time without teaching.³⁰ As it is stated in the Wisdom: "Thus, knowing the profundity of this (263)

teaching to be so difficult to understand for those of lesser intelligence, the Muni's heart was very much averse to the teaching of the Dharma!" However, it seems that (Nagarjuna), the first great Champion, did not (believe) this (realization) in itself to be that difficult, as he explains that the difficulty of understanding is for those with less than superior intelligence, for whom a misunderstanding of this rule may be disastrous (and not for those with the superior intelligence). Thus, he goes on to encourage (us) by saying that we should strive to understand the meaning of reality, avoiding neglect of either both word and meaning or else just meaning of this system, and avoiding the nihilism which finds no place to establish causality, etc.; as in the Jewel Garland (as follows:)

Thus, by such misunderstanding, one is ruined. But by true understanding, one attains immediate happiness and ultimate enlightenment. Therefore, abandoning repudiation and the nihilistic view, make the supreme effort for authentic knowledge to accomplish all goals!

The Master's many other statements of logical reasonings in his explanations of the profound meaning of the scriptures should be recognized as factors contributing to the realization of this (rule of emptiness-relativity), and thus we should train ourselves in the meaning of the central way. Finally, since I have already explained this pattern of reasoning frequently elsewhere, and since I intend to compose a commentary on the Wisdom, I will not go any further here. (264)

Chapter IV

EXPLANATIONS OF THE FOLLOWERS OF SAVIOR NAGARJUNA

The chief follower of the Master was Aryadeva, who explained the system of the Master extensively in the Experientialist Four Hundred. The great Centrists, such as Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, Chandrakirti, and Shantarakshita, accepted his authority as equal to the Master's. Hence, the ancients called the treatises of these two masters "The Paradigm Treatises." Here, we will formulate the ways in which (those great Centrists) explained the ultimate intention of the "Holy Father and Son." There were many other brilliant sages, such as Aryashura and Nagabodhi, but their treatises on the central way are not available in translation (into Tibetan). Thus, we will explain the distinctive systems of those masters whose treatises are available.

THE DOGMATICIST CENTRIST EXPLANATIONS OF THE HOLY TREATISES

I. MASTER BHAVAVIVEKA'S EXPLANATION

1. ULTIMATE PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF REALITY IN PERSONS AND THINGS

The Wisdom is the principal Centrist treatise by the Master. It has eight major commentaries: the No Fear from Anywhere, and those by Devasharma, Gunamati, Gunashri, Sthiramati, Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, and Chandrakirti.' Avalokitavrata explains that Bhavaviveka follows Devasharma's White Exaltation. As for the No Fear from Anywhere, in comment on the twenty-seventh chapter, it cites evidence from the Four Hundred: "As the revered Aryadeva declares: Very rarely does it happen (265)

that there are teacher, listener, and that worth hearing. Hence, in short, cyclic life is neither limited nor limitless!" This means that the No Fear from Anywhere is not an autocommentary, as is also recognized from the fact that not even the smallest fragment of its commentary is cited in the commentaries of Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, or Chandrakirti. As for Bhavaviveka's elucidation of the intention of the Holy Ones, his explanation of the ultimate two selflessnesses becomes clear when his determination of the three realities is understood. According to the Wisdom Lamp:

Now if it is suggested that the reality of the imagined, which consists of verbal and mental expressions such as "form," does not exist at all, such (a suggestion amounts to) a repudiation of the facts, since it repudiates verbal and mental expressions themselves;

(this master) believes in the existence of the identity-reality in the relative; since he explains that if the imagined, suggested to be without identity-reality, is understood as ascriptively and descriptively designative words and mental constructions, both of which are classified among the aggregates, then repudiation (of the facts) ensues, (which repudiation proposes)

the non-existence of identity-reality in the relative. Furthermore, since the Elucidation of Intention explains identity-realitylessness as non-establishment by intrinsic identity, and since these (Dogmaticists) also determine the meaning of that scripture, it is clear that (Bhavaviveka) believes the relative to have an intrinsically identifiable reality.

In the Wisdom Lamp, (he formulates) his opponent's position: "The imagined reality is identity-unreality since it is not included in any of the five (categories); that is, name, causal process, mental construction, real knowledge, or reality,"

(This is) the position of the Compendium that the imagined is not included in the five (categories), among which "name" is defined as an anomalous creation and "causal process" is defined as the imagined's designative base. (The imagined) cannot be any of the first four, as it is (266)

not a thing, nor can it be reality, since it is merely conceptual designation.

In regard to the Center and Extremes equation of "name" with the imagined, Sthiramati explains that "name" there stands for its referents, and not the actual name itself." Further, in all such expositions, the causal process" equated with the relative includes only causes which are created things, although the Compendium states that among causes there are also uncreated things. Thus, (acknowledging) that (for the Idealist) the imagined is identity-unreality by reason of its non-inclusion in the five (categories), nevertheless, (for Bhavaviveka) such non-inclusion is not the meaning of identity-unreality.

It seems to be difficult to distinguish between (the positions of Bhavya and the Dialecticists) with regard to conventional existence, due to the fact that the treatises of this master are full of expressions such as "non-establishment by intrinsic reality," "non-production by intrinsic reality," and substantial non-establishment," etc., and the Dialecticist treatises often mention "reality," "intrinsic reality," and "intrinsic identity" with reference to conventional existence. Therefore, his explanation above of the meaning of the existence and non-existence of the identity-reality mentioned in the Elucidation of Intention is the clearest source (for the demonstration) of this master's belief in the conventional intrinsic identifiability of things.

Therefore, he believes it possible to realize both selflessnesses true to definitions, even without realizing the lack of intrinsically identifiable reality in persons and things. As for the negatee he posits as negated by the two selflessnesses, it is not merely intrinsically identifiable status, as will be explained below.

Furthermore, in the Wisdom Lamp, he shows the fault of inappropriateness of example in the argument that the imagined reality, being a referent designated by names and mental constructions of any common person, and not (itself) a means of designation, is without identity-reality, just as a snake designated in a rope (has no identity-reality).

If you venture "the objects mentally constructed by someone with both (name and concept) are non-existent, just like the cognized snake in a

rope," (then I reply that) the imagined is not non-existent, since, al-
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though (in that case) the similarity (between rope and snake) fools the cognition and the imagined object does not exist there (in the rope), conventionally speaking the (snake) is not non-existent in (some other) coiled snake (that is, altogether).

This means that it is not correct to use the non-existence of the referent of the designation "There is a snake (in a rope)" as an example of the non-existence (in things such as form) of identity-reality of the referent of the ascriptive and descriptive designations "This!" and "This is..." For an opponent could reply that, just as the object of the cognition "snake" exists conventionally speaking in a coiled snake-granted it does not exist in a rope-the object of the cognition "form" exists, conventionally speaking, in form, granted that the object of the cognition "feeling" does not exist in form.

Here, since "exists" and "does not exist" mean "has..." and "has not identity-reality," he is saying that the objects of ascriptive and descriptive designations upon term, etc., are not without identity-reality, conventionally speaking. He states that it would be contrary to common sense if there were no snake in a coiled snake, "as if there were no object of the cognition 'This is a snake!!' in a coiled snake, conventionally speaking." (However,) he allows that an advocate of the central way may negate things in the ultimate sense, meaning that if the object of the cognition (in the form of) "This is a snake" of a coiled snake were proved without identity-reality in the ultimate sense, such would (accord with) the Centrist system. Therefore, he continues in the Wisdom Lamp, if one wishes to show the identity-unreality of the imaginatively constructed, which is ascriptive and descriptive designation, one must admit the reasoning of the Centrists.

This reasoning is given in the Wisdom: "Where the realm of mind stops, there is nothing to verbalize. Reality has no production and no cessation, just like Nirvana."

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This is not to say that the Centrist reasoning is necessary in order to negate the ultimate establishment in any round-bellied thing of the entity posited there by the verbal designation "pot." For, as he states in the Blaze of Argument, both Experientialists and Centrists agree in explaining that whatever is posited by verbal signs does not actually inhere in the reality of things, since such (non-verbal) persons as the deaf and the dumb can still recognize things such as pots, and such animals as cows can recognize their own and others' calves by means of smell and color; and so on.

Therefore, the conceptual objects of designations such as "this is form!" and "this is production of form!" are (only) the referents of the designations. Conventionally speaking, they do exist by intrinsic identity; hence do not have identity-unreality. So, by negating (their) ultimate

existence, he explains the meaning of the scripture as the non-existence of identity-reality in the ultimate sense. Thus, the object intended as the "imagined" in the statement "there is no identity-reality in the imagined" is none other than the imagined in the ultimate, and the statement that it is posited by names and conventions merely means that it is verbal and conceptual designation. Thus, he does not consider the relative to have been declared to be without identity-reality; for, if the relative were not established by intrinsic identity as actual process of ascriptive and descriptive designation, it would be pointless even for the Experientialist system to explain the imagined as identity-unreality. Therefore, he maintains that the meaning of the scripture is that the perfect is the ultimate emptiness with respect to the substance and production of form, and is not as the Experientialists explain it (that is, the perfect as the relative devoid of the imagined). Likewise, this master believes that the lack of self-production, mentioned in the declaration of production-unreality of the relative as lack of intrinsic production, is synonymous with the lack of essential production and lack of identifiable production mentioned in other scriptures, and he interprets all of them as meaning non-production in the ultimate. That being so, and real production being production established by intrinsic identity, (it is clear that) he believes in production established by intrinsic identity, conventionally speaking, since he always employs the qualification "ultimately" when he negates such (establishment) in things. In the case of the Experientialists, however, while they accept the Elucidation of Intention's "self-production" and other scriptures' "intrinsically real production" as similar in meaning, they interpret both as lack of independent production, and thus believe (269)

that such non-production need not imply ultimate non-production. (Finally), since (Bhavaviveka) believes that the relative would have to be established as it appears if it were to be established in truth, which would invalidate the scriptural statements of illusoriness, he explains the Elucidation of Intention as (teaching the relative's) emptiness of intrinsic reality.

2. CONVENTIONAL EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE OF THINGS EXTERNAL

Let us explain this (master's) position as to whether superficial phenomena are objective (external things) or subjective (products of consciousness). Although the Holy Father and Son did not explicitly pronounce upon the existence or non-existence of external things on the conventional level, this master believes that external things exist conventionally, that the sense-consciousnesses perceive things in determinate form and not as indeterminate, and that both (external things and internal consciousnesses) are sequential as causes and effects.

Thus, (he maintains that) the Ten Stages statement that "the three realms are simply mind" is intended to refute any creator of the world other than the mind, such as heterodox schools assert, and is not intended

to refute (the existence of) external things. Further, since he believes that even this statement of the Mission to Lanka-"The externally apparent does not exist, and a variety appears in the mind, similar to bodies, belongings, and places; (but) I say it is simply mind!"-does not refute external things, one should reflect on whether he believes the refutation of external things can never be the meaning of any scripture.

In the Wisdom Lamp, he explains the first statement (above) as meaning that external things do not exist by intrinsic reality, and that the "production of the variety in the mind, similar to things such as body, belongings, and places" means the fact that (the mind arises) having aspects (imparted by and) similar to those things. He explains "simply mind" as above.

(He further maintains that) it is not so that atoms do not appear as objective conditions of sense-cognitions when they aggregate (with other (270)

atoms) as form and sound, etc. (He maintains that) armies and forests, etc., are aggregations based on different types (of atoms) and hence are not substantially existent; whereas molecules of homogeneous atoms, dependent upon one basis, form (objects such as) pots, etc., hence are substantially existent. He even maintains that cognitions perceiving two moons, etc., would not arise without an external objective support, since such perceptions) must arise based upon apprehension of one moon.

(He argues that) if there were no external (objects), scriptural declarations that sense-cognitions occur from objective conditions would be repudiated, since their occurrence from objective conditions would be impossible either conventionally or ultimately.

Therefore, he does not accept (the theory of) the fundamental consciousness, for if he did, there would be no point in admitting external objects, since the occurrence of consciousnesses perceiving objects would be derived from the development of the instinctual propensities of that (fundamental consciousness), without any external objects. Thus, since he does not admit that (fundamental consciousness), he does not posit any addicted mentality, as he states in the Heart of the Central Way, "the term 'consciousness' definitely indicates the self."

Further, he does not believe in apperceptive self-consciousness, stating in the above text: "How could any mind itself be perceived apart from the perception of objects?" For he refutes even in conventional terms the following arrangements, which are clearly the rule if apperception is admitted: that consciousness arises as a dual perception in the aspects both of external objects and of itself, appearing as actual experience of the aspect of subjectivity not apparent externally; that apperceptive self-consciousness is experience subsequent to a prior objective perception; and that the two (consciousness and apperception) are (related as) objective condition and subject (respectively). His system seems to agree with master Jñānagarbha's interpretation of the central way, insofar as he also does not refute intrinsically identifiable status (in things) conventionally, and he (also maintains) the existence of external things.

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3. THE MAIN REASON FOR NEGATION OF ULTIMATE EXISTENCE

What is the main reason for negation of existence in the ultimate, according to this master? Except for occasional negations by means of a negative reason, he (usually) refutes (ultimate existence) by means of (the technique of) "perception of an inconsistent fact." (In) other (cases), considering ease of examples that conform to reason and probandum, he sets forth arguments such as the following: "The eye does not see form in the ultimate, because it is a sense-faculty, like the auditory sense-faculty;" or "the earth-element is not the ultimate reality of solidity, because it is an element, like water." Thus, he emphasizes (the technique known as) "confutation through similarity of reason," which is often used in the treatises of the Holy Father and Son. His intention is that if solidity and sight of form were established as ultimate entities, then differences of solidity and non-solidity in things similar (by virtue of being) elements and of sight and lack of sight of form by things similar (by virtue of being) sense-faculties would be impossible, since reasons cannot be found to support such differences. Thus, if (something) exists in the ultimate, it should exist on the strength of its own objective condition, and not just be set up on the strength of cognition according with its appearance. Hence it should be independently existent, requiring nothing else. Therefore, there would be no valid evidence supporting the discernment of such differences (in different things). For example, if smoke were to occur independent of any cause, the absurdities that it could occur from anything or that it could not occur from fire would become obligatory.

Thus if identifiable existence (of anything) were possible in the ultimate, it would have to stand exclusive and isolated in its own essence, as something apart from the actualities of cause, condition, and aggregation. Hence, such things as elements and their composites, aggregates of eight kinds of atoms, and mind and mental functions, without mutual dependence, would not exist at all. Thus all things which arise from combinations of causes and conditions and which cannot exist apart from them must be stated to be ultimately and substantially inexistent. He prefers to demonstrate the faults (of ultimate existence) by showing that **(272)**

nothing may exist apart from aggregation and that an ultimate existent would have to exist independently, rather than negating (ultimate existence) as other masters prefer, through the analysis of unity and multiplicity of parts and wholes.

Our intelligence will expand tremendously in reasoning (power) when we thoroughly understand the key reasonings employed by the great followers of the Holy Ones. Hence, we should learn thoroughly this system's reasoning that if something were to exist in the ultimate, the confutation of similarity of reason arises.

II EXPLANATION OF SHANTARAKSHITA AND KAMALASHILA

1. ULTIMATE PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF REALITY IN PERSONS AND THINGS

Since Shantarakshita shares the position (expressed in Kamalashila's) explanation in the Central Way Illumination²⁹ of the meaning of the Elucidation of Intention statements of identity-unreality and production-unreality, which accords with Bhavaviveka's (interpretation), he also believes in a conventional reality established (in things) by intrinsic identity. This can be understood also from their acceptance in common (with Dignaga, etc.) of the reasonings employed to establish causality in the Seven Logical Treatises.

2. CONVENTIONAL EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL THINGS

Do external objects exist or not, conventionally ? The Wisdom Lamp states:
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Although some people first accept (the theory of) pure information, and later wish to abandon it completely, it would be better (to avoid it from the first, as it is better) to stay far away from mud, rather than getting soiled and having to wash yourself off. Therefore, it is correct to realize the selflessness and non-production of consciousness just as one realizes the realitylessness of external things.

The Wisdom Lamp Commentary here explains that this refers to the system of certain Experientialists, who first, when still involved with superficial reality, negate external things and accept pure consciousness, and later, when they wish to realize ultimate reality, accept that even pure consciousness must be abandoned. That is, it is better to teach realitylessness from the beginning rather than first presenting one with the reality of (pure) consciousness and later refuting such reality. This view that the realitylessness of consciousness should be realized just as is the unreality of external things clearly negates the idea of certain Centrists that a disciple must necessarily be taught in such stages. Accordingly, although the Wisdom Lamp's refutation of the position, "those two should not be contemplated simultaneously but by stages," that "it is not necessary to be stingy about simultaneous meditation (of both) from the beginning" is explained by the Commentary (to refute) the belief of "certain Experientialists," (I) consider (that belief) to resemble (Shantarakshita's). Therefore, although such a system (as that mentioned by Bhavaviveka) does occur occasionally (in works prior to Shantarakshita),

still, master Jñanasena's belief that master Shantarakshita, with the composition of his major treatise, founded that Centrist theory that poses the conventional non-existence of external things, is correct. To quote the Autocommentary of the Central Way Ornament:

Those who wish to answer all false criticisms based on the premise of the fact of causality should investigate the nature of those superficial things"Do they have only the nature of mind and mental phenomena, or do they have the nature of external things?"-Concerning the latter thesis, some (do not accept it,) saying-"The treatises declare 'mind-only' to refute (the reality) of agent and experiencer (and do not mean it literally"-while others (do accept it,) considering"What is involved in causality is exclusively consciousness alone, and whatever is objectively established, that resides in consciousness."
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Here, Shantarakshita quotes from the Heart of the Central Way, and sets forth the belief in external things we have described above. He records his own belief under "while others... considering...."

In regard to the authority of which scriptures he relies upon, he makes that clear in the same Autocommentary: "Such an interpretation is in agreement with all the statements occurring in the Dense Array and in the Elucidation of Intention, etc. We also consider the Mission to Lanka statement appropriate-External form is non-existent-one's own mind appears as external things.'

Thus, depending on the method of "mind-only," one can understand with little difficulty the realitylessness of personal self, personal possessions, and the subject-object dichotomy. Subsequently, those of no small intellectual might, with intense efforts, may analyze that mind with respect to its (possible) natures of unity or multiplicity and, thereby seeing no essence (of the mind) in the ultimate (sense), may understand the central way that abandons all extremes. According to the Ornament of the Central Way: "The unreality of external things is to be realized depending on the (principle of) mind-only. Thus depending, utter selflessness is to be realized in that (mind) as well,"

He further quotes the Mission to Lanka: "I explain non-production as the reversal from cause and condition, the negation of (external) causes as well, and the establishment of the mind alone. Things have no external existence, nor can the mind be apprehended-in order to abandon all views, (I teach) the nature of non-production."

The Central Way Ornament Elucidation comments that the first of these verses teaches the non-production of the Idealist system, and the second teaches the non-production of the Centrist system. The Universal Vehicle is attained through the doors of these two methods, that of pure information through the emptiness of external things in the conventional, and that (of the central way) through the intrinsic unreality of all things in the ultimate. The Central Way Ornament continues: "Holding the reins of reasoning, while mounted on the chariot of the two methods, through the realization of their meanings, Universal Vehicle status will

be attained.

Now, as he must explain this system of the conventional non-existence
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of external things as being the inner intention of Savior Nagarjuna, which
treatise of the Master teaches this, in his opinion?

The Central Way Ornament quotes the following verses in order to
prove the non-existence of external things:

Herein is no production at all
Nor is there any cessation.
Production and cessation both
Are exclusively mind-only.

Things referred to as "primary elements," etc.,
Are really comprised in consciousness;
And by that knowledge, one gains freedom.
Are they not, then, false presumptions?

The latter of these two verses occurs in the Philosophical Sixty. The
first verse teaches mind-only, while the second answers the question about
the mention of primary elements and their material combinations by
stating that it is the consciousness itself that appears as such things, and
thus they are included in consciousness. Whether it concerns conscious-
ness or external things, the proposition that (either one) exists in the
ultimate sense is a false presumption since they are not apparent to the
wisdom of reality.

Now the Central Way Ornament Elucidation explains that the first
verse is quoted from the Mission to Lanka. However, Ratnakarashanti
takes both verses to be Nagarjuna's, and thus he believes Centrism and
Idealism to be the same, since the Master taught mind-only also. It is
evident that he was misled by Shantarakshita's quoting of the verses in
one continuum; but there are other instances of verses by different authors
being quoted in continuum.

This system admits the reality of determinants (of cognition) such as
blue and yellow, and interprets Dharmakirti's position as being the same
thus (Shantarakshita) is a Centrist who (is like the Idealist who) believes

determinate cognition to be conventionally true. He postulates apper-
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ception on the conventional level, and although he does not clearly state
whether or not he admits fundamental consciousness, it is obvious he
tends not to admit it. (Incidentally,) the Pandit Sahajavajra states that
the interpretation of Lva-ba-pa puts him in the category of Centrists who
(are like the Experientialists who) believe cognitive determinants to be
conventionally false, since for him determinants such as blue and yellow
do not even have conventional reality.

3. EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF THE ELUCIDATION OF INTENTION

Well then, does this system interpret the meaning of the Elucidation of Intention according to the explanation of the Experientialists? Or other wise how does it interpret it?

In the Central Way Illumination (Kamalashila) explains that the Elucidation of Intention teaching that the ulterior intention of (the statement of realitylessness is) the three unrealities is a verification of the definitive meaning status of the Mother Scripture, etc.:

On that account, the Lord's teachings of non-production, etc. were declared only in terms of the ultimate. Hence, by teaching the ulterior intention (of the teachings) to be the three unrealities, (the Elucidation) establishes their authority as the sole definitive meaning, as (those teachings) show the central way free of both extremes.

Furthermore (he continues), that teaching (of the Elucidation) is declared for the sake of dispelling the mental habits of reification and repudiation that prevent access to the ultimate-repudiation of the superficial reality (of things), and reification of the existence of things that are (supposedly) permanent, etc., yet that do not exist conventionally, and of the (ultimate) existence of form, etc. as they appear. Repudiation is avoided by refutation of the literalness of statements of non-production by demonstration that such statements are made in terms of the ultimate, (277)

and further by establishment of the need for accepting the existence of production and cessation conventionally.

Experts accept the equation of the relative with the production-unreality, due to the fact that things are produced dependent on conditions and not from their own selves alone, with the pronouncement that "the dependently occurrent is emptiness with respect to self-existence." Similarly, the Questions of Anavatapta states that what is produced from conditions is not produced with intrinsic identity--"What is produced by conditions is not produced--there is no intrinsic reality of production in it." Therefore, since it is produced from causes and conditions, it is not necessary that the relative exist in truth, for otherwise even false things such as illusions would be true phenomena. And that is why the Elucidation of Intention declares the relative to be "like illusion," intending that there is no distinction between illusion and truthlessness. Therefore, things such as impermanence when held to be ultimately existent are imagined realities, which are stated to be identity-unreality, since they are not established as they are represented. This (above line of reasoning) avoids reification.

It is not contradictory to explain identity-unreality as the ultimate non-establishment of the relative, since (naive realism) adheres to the reality of the imagined in the relative itself, and hence it is necessary to dem-

onstrate the absence of such an imagined identity-reality in the relative. In regard to the fact that the Elucidation of Intention explains the identity-unreality as being due to the lack of intrinsic identifiability of the imagined (only), and does not mention identity-unreality as the lack of intrinsic identifiability of the other two realities, this master considers that it signifies that the very same lack of ultimate status of the other two realities is being explained as the identity-unreality which is the lack of intrinsic identifiability of the imagined. And (for him) it is extremely clear that reification is avoided by (taking) ultimate lack of intrinsic identifiability as the meaning of identity-unreality, whereas repudiation is abandoned by the fact that conventionally there is an identity-reality which is intrinsic identifiability. Therefore, while this master and the Experientialists agree (in asserting) that causality is repudiated if the relative is lacking in intrinsic identifiability, this master differs in his (278)

qualification that the lack of intrinsic identifiability is "in the ultimate," whereas the Experientialists argue that if something has intrinsically identifiable status, it must exist ultimately. As for the meaning of the Elucidation of Intention statement that the relative is empty with respect to the imagined, since those phenomena of the relative are lacking in intrinsic identifiability as the real referents of ascriptive and descriptive designations of form, etc., as "such and such," this master maintains his belief in (the imagined as) the conceptual object, just as Bhavaviveka (does) as explained above. Furthermore, in the Central Way Illumination (Kamalashila) interprets the statements of non-production, etc., as intending the ultimate realitylessness which is objective selflessness. To answer the argument that the statements of some scriptures that all things are realityless and unproduced, etc., are interpretable in meaning (since) the Elucidation of Intention, etc., reveal the ulterior intention of the scriptures' meaning, he states:

therefore, the exposition of intention (of a statement) does not preclude (that statement's) definitiveness of meaning; because the very fact (that their intention is exposed) establishes the statements of non-production, etc., as definitive in meaning, eliminates any contradiction with experience, etc., and gets rid of any assumptions of literalness. To quote the Holy Elucidation of the Intention itself...

"Therefore" is explained as meaning that all things are exclusively without reality, due to the realitylessness stated by the Elucidation of Intention as ultimate realitylessness, being both ultimate and manifested by the realitylessness of things. And this (above quote further) explains that the Elucidation of Intention exposition of the ulterior intention of the statements of realitylessness, etc., establishes their definitiveness of meaning by refuting their literal acceptability. This system equates literal acceptance (of "non-production," etc.) with the notion of utter non-existence of production and cessation etc., saying that the Centrist admits non-production in the ultimate sense, but accepts production, etc., in the

conventional sense, and hence should not insist upon the literalness of statements of productionlessness, etc. It thus equates admission of the ultimate non-existence (of production etc.) with the non-acceptance of the literal meaning (of such statements).

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We might now object that, if such is the case, it contradicts the Elucidation of Intention explanation of the second wheel of Dharma, which teaches "realitylessness" and "non-production" as interpretable in meaning, since (according to this position) the Elucidation of Intention establishes those (teachings) to be definitive in meaning.

Although (Kamalashila) does (not) explicate the rebuttal of this contradiction in the Central Way Illumination, his intention is that, granted that there would be a contradiction if one and the same scripture were both stated to be interpretable in meaning and also established as definitive in meaning by showing its intention, not (only) one scripture is involved, but (many) scriptures that are similar only insofar as they belong to the middle wheel of Dharma. That is to say, teachings such as "there is no form," in a scripture such as the Transcendent Wisdom Heart, where the qualifications "in the ultimate" and "in truth" are not explicitly applied, are not fit to be accepted literally as taught, and thus are interpretable, requiring further interpretation by supplying the qualifications in the ultimate," etc., since "eye" and "ear," etc. are only non-existent ultimately and are not non-existent conventionally. However, this analysis also means that the scriptures such as the Transcendent Wisdom Hundred Thousand, which apply such qualifications as "in the ultimate sense" to their negatees, are established as literally definitive in meaning; thus, the statement that the second wheel is interpretable in meaning does not apply to all (the scriptures) of the second wheel.

Now, the Elucidation of Intention refutes the (type of) literal acceptance of statements of productionlessness, ceaselessness, and realitylessness which holds "That is just so!" but does not refute (the type of) literal acceptance which accepts ultimate realitylessness, etc. Fitting these two facts together, (Kamalashila) asserts that, although the acceptance of the non-existence of substance, production, and cessation with intrinsically identifiable status would be (erroneous) literal acceptance, this scripture's teaching of identity-unreality due to non-existence of intrinsically identifiable status refutes the ultimate existence (of that intrinsically identifiable status, and thus is definitive in meaning). He (is compelled to) explain it in that way by his crucial belief in the validity of intrinsic identifiability in the conventional sense.

In sum, he believes that the Elucidation of Intention establishes scriptures such as the Mother Hundred Thousand as definitive in meaning, because the Elucidation of Intention teaches that "of the two kinds of scriptures taught in the second wheel of Dharma to those devoted to the

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Universal Vehicle, those that apply the qualifications such as "ultimately"

and those that do not, one should not take the statements of the latter literally, but should understand according to the former kind that production and cessation, etc., exist conventionally and do not exist ultimately," By these reasonings, we can completely understand his method of explaining the interpretability of the first (wheel of Dharma).

If the meaning of this scripture is not the formulation of the three reality theory of the Experientialist, does (Kamalashila) believe that no scripture has such a meaning?

In the Central Way Illumination, he states that when the Elucidation of Intention, the Mission to Lanka, and the Dense Array fail to refute intrinsic reality of the mind on certain occasions when external objects are negated and mind-only is established, they are teaching in accordance with the inclinations of those who must be led gradually, being unable to realize all at once the realitylessness of all things.

Thus, he interprets the meanings of these scriptures by differentiating the above teachings from those teachings given to disciples who are capable of realizing the realitylessness of all things all at once. And, although master Shantarakshita does not explicitly settle the question of the three realities in the same manner, (from) at least those of his works that have been translated (into Tibetan), (it appears that) the intentions of both masters are the same.

The Central Way Illumination teaches in detail the style of path founded by Bhavaviveka, in which the meaning of the Elucidation of Intention statement of the three realities is interpreted according to the Centrist, not the Experientialist, system. Knowing the subtleties of both methods of scriptural interpretation, one will understand the various techniques of reasoning and scriptural interpretation of the Great Champions.

4. INTERPRETATION OF THE MAIN REASON REFUTING ULTIMATE EXISTENCE

A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LOGICAL NEGATEE

If one accepts only the conventional reality of intrinsically identifiable status, then of what sort is the negatee, which is not merely that (status), but is said to be "true," "real," and "ultimate" status?

It is extremely important to identify the negatee, as otherwise there would be no clear awareness of either the mental habit holding to truth-
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status, etc. (in things) or of the general (character) of the negatee thus held. Then our sense that such (truth-) status (in things) is impossible would be merely a dogmatic aversion, and no matter how often we assert this is the fault inherent in such status and this is the proof of its non-existence," we will reach no solid understanding of the import (of these assertions).

Commenting on the statement that "earth," etc., are not ultimately the realities of the elements, (Bhavaviveka) says in the Blaze of Argu-

ments:

"Ultimate object" (paramārtha) is called "object" (artha) because it is a knowable (object), which is to say it is something to be examined and understood. "Ultimate" (paranma) has the meaning of "supreme." Thus the (parallel [karmadhāraya]) compound "ultimate-object" (paramārtha) is formed, as it is both an "object" and an "ultimate." Otherwise, (analyzing the compound as a genitive tatpuruṣa) it is called "object of the ultimate" as it is the object of the ultimate, non-conceptual intuition. Further, (as an attributive compound, [bahuvrīhi]) (it means) "that (object) conforming with the ultimate," as that "ultimate meaning" exists for the wisdom that conforms to the realization of the ultimate.

Of the three (meanings) mentioned, the latter is significant here (in our concern to understand "ultimate status"). Bhavaviveka continues:

There are two kinds of ultimates. One is non-operational, transcendent, immaculate, and unfabricated, and the other is operationally involved and endowed with fabrication, known as "pure mundane intuition conforming to the stores of merit and wisdom." Thus, there is no fault, with regard to this (latter kind of ultimate), as employed to qualify our thesis.

Here, (we) must accept (as a type of ultimate) the rational cognition analytic of the ultimate, not (reserving ultimacy for) only the holy after-math rational cognition. Therefore, when the basis of the analysis of (282)

existence and non-existence by the Centrists and other (philosophers) is said to be "non-existent ultimately," what is meant is that that basis (objects, etc.) does not exist in the face of reason analytic of the ultimate, and that such (rational cognition) does not establish them (as ultimately existent). This (above) is the clearest explanation (of this point) in the treatises of this master (Bhavaviveka); and (the type of ultimacy involved) is not identified so clearly in the writings on the two realities of master Jñānagarbha, nor in the Central Way Ornament and its Autocommentary.

In the Central Way Illumination, the three wisdoms are termed "ultimate," since their object is the ultimate reality:

All cognitions arising from hearing, reflecting, and meditating upon (the meaning of) reality are termed "ultimate" because they have the object which is undeceiving, and because the aim of these (cognitions) is ultimate. They may further be distinguished as either direct or (inferentially) indirect, and by these (mundane) things are known to be exclusively unproduced (ultimately). Therefore, the expression "(things are) ultimately unproduced*" means that they are not established (as ultimately existent) by these authentic cognitions.

Things are) said to be unproduced on the strength of the consideration of these (cognitions), since they are not established as produced according to (these) authentic cognitions. The two selflessnesses are "ultimate" as they are corroborated by (correct) reasoning, and are "objects" as they are the objectives of those aspiring to realization and the abandonment of obscurations and are the aims of infallible ultimate intuition-hence they are taught as having the nature of the "ultimate object." Accordingly, if "reality" is taken to refer to rational cognition, it, and not conventional cognition, negates intrinsic reality. And, if "reality" is taken to refer to actual ultimate reality, it is not found to exist by rational cognition analytic of ultimate reality. This is explained in the Subcommentary of the Ornament.

This indicates that things such as production, etc., are not established as the actuality of things, for if such production of things was to exist in actuality it would have to be established by cognition of the true and the ultimate, and it is in fact not so established-and that very fact is also termed "ultimate non-production."

How would production have to be established to be established in actuality? For example, when one sees in hallucination a stick or a clod (283)

as an illusory horse or an illusory elephant, although such things appear to such (distorted) cognition, one cannot say that that stick does not appear to be such (as a horse). Likewise, when a sprout appears to be produced from a seed, although such is no more than an appearance to (visual) cognition, it cannot be said that that sprout does not arise from that seed (at all). But then, one might suppose in that case, is that not "ultimate production," since objectively the sprout is produced from the seed? This does not fault (Kamalashila's position), for, although there is an appearance of horse or elephant, as far as the source of the mistake (that is, stick or clod) is concerned, such an appearance is on the strength of the cognition of hallucinating vision, and is not produced from its own natural conditions; otherwise, it would appear even without any hallucination. Likewise, in the case of the seed's production of the sprout, it is not produced on the strength of its own objective existence and is only presented on the strength of its appearance to conventional cognition. Therefore, the perception of the production of the sprout on the strength of its own inherent condition, not merely as presented on the strength of appearance to its (corresponding) subjective cognition, would be the perception of ultimate production. And thereby can be known (what is meant by) "*existence of ultimate or true production"; and thereby can be understood the (problem of) existence and non-existence of ultimate, real, and true production of all other things.

The Central Way Illumination states that "all living beings perceive such a real, inherent self in things as is indicated (by their conditioning), and all things thus falsified by their mental habits are said to exist only superficially."

The superficial cognition that mistakenly perceives (things') reality where

there is ultimately unreality and which arises from beginningless instincts, pretends to all living beings as if there were a true existence of things; and thus what exists according to their habitual thoughts is said to be superficially existent." Since ultimate existence is taken as the reverse of that (type of existence presented by falsifying cognition), it is explained in contrast to it. And, (on this point), the systems of all the Dogmaticist Centrists are similar.

(In regard to criteria of validity within the superficial,) although conventionally existent (things) cannot be established (merely) on the strength of appearance in non-analytical cognitions such as the two unconscious self-habits, they can be established conventionally on the strength of their appearance in conventional cognitions that are not faulted by other validating cognitions. Thus, in the system of this master, although there is (284)

such a thing as a conventional reality established on the strength of appearance to such (unfaulted, conventional) cognition, it must be qualified as "not (merely) established on strength of appearance to purely subjective cognition." Although he does indeed admit the ultimate reality of those emptinesses which are the emptinesses of those (conventional) objects with respect to the (hypothetical) objects of truth-habits, those (emptinesses themselves) are not established on the strength of (objective) realities which (themselves) are not established on the strength of their own appearance to their corresponding subjectivities. This is how to understand the meaning of "emptiness of emptiness" (in this system). The above-mentioned ""truth-habit" is the unconscious truth-habit of this system, which does exist for living beings unacquainted with signs, although not by way of connection of name and referent. Therefore, although one can (refute its intellectual objects by) arguing that if the object of the truth-habit were to exist, then it could withstand analysis by reasoning analytic of the ultimate, indivisible things would exist, and (so would) intrinsic reality with the three qualities, etc., the (philosophical) holding of such (untenable positions) is not the (only) function of the truth-habit, since their refutation (by itself) does not establish the actual (experience) of truthlessness.

Due to the fact that imprecise identification of the object of the truth-habit of this (master) entails the granting of truth-status to every object of rational cognition, certain scholars of former times adopted such a belief (in truth-status). Others asserted the utter absence of any object of rational cognition. And still others asserted the existence and non-existence of the objects (of rational cognition) by distinguishing between the (differentials) of "reason" and "inference."

In conclusion having identified this unconscious objective self-habit, one understands all reasonings negating objective self as either its actual negation or as a factor of it. One should understand the thrust of this (practical) teaching as (inculcative of) repeated analysis of whatever is internalized in the pattern of one's own mental processes, through learning, teaching, and thinking (upon this matter). Indeed, ultimately, such an attitude is required on all other occasions of the expositions of self-

lessness by any of the Buddhist (philosophical) schools.

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B. REASONING NEGATING THE NEGATEE

What is the chief reasoning used to negate the above negatee?

With some exceptions, the reason used to negate the negatee of this system is the reason (called) "non-perception of the related fact." Nevertheless, the Central Way Ornament, relying on the Mission to Lanka and the Meeting of Father and Son, expounds its proofs by means of the reasoning known as "absence of (true) unity and multiplicity," and the Central Way Illumination employs (the reasonings known as) "the diamond-smithereens," "negation of production from existent (causes) or non-existent (causes)," "negation of production through four alternatives," and "absence of unity and multiplicity." It finally employs the reason of relativity" which is a reason (defined as) "perception of the inconsistent fact."*

The conclusive scope of the demonstration of the internal contradiction in an opponent's (position affirming ultimate existence) is as follows: the absolute status of anything is refuted by showing first of all, in the face of no matter what assertion of Buddhist or non-Buddhist school, the impossibility of an indivisible, a thing without a multiplicity of parts such as periods of time, parts of physical objects, or aspects of cognitive objects. Then one demonstrates that, whereas conventional objects may exist as unitary things while established as composed of many parts, as far as absolute status is concerned, there are inevitable inconsistencies. If part and whole are ultimately different, there can be no connection between them, and if part and whole are absolutely the same, then the whole becomes a multiplicity. (Shantarakshita and Kamalashila) expound (such arguments), being thoroughly conversant with reasonings such as that of Aryadeva, "There is no finger apart from the joints, etc."

To exemplify (their fuller line of reasoning) as in the Central Way

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Illumination, "to refute (ultimate) production of one thing from another, (first) the (cause) is restricted to being either permanent or impermanent, and then production from a permanent thing is refuted. Then, (production from) an impermanent thing is restricted to being either simultaneous or sequential, and production from a simultaneous (cause) is refuted. Then, a sequential (cause) is restricted to being either destroyed or undestroyed in its production of effect), and production from a destroyed (cause) is refuted. Then production from a formerly undestroyed cause is restricted to being either obstructed or unobstructed, and production from an obstructed (cause) is refuted. The refutation thus far is rather simple. Then production from an unobstructed (cause) is restricted to being either wholly unobstructed or partially unobstructed; then, in the former case, there must be a confusion of two things occurring at different times, and an atom and (its aggregative effects such as) a molecule must be confused

as single object, (the causal atoms) being wholly unobstructed; or else in the latter case, as (the supposed indivisible cause, being 'partially' unobstructed) would have parts, it would be a superficial (production, no longer absolute)."

Further, the conclusive scope of the demonstration of inconsistencies (in the advocacy of ultimate production) lies in the refutation through the analysis of sameness and difference in wholes and parts. Thus, there are many doors of reasoning demonstrating the faults of such (assertions) as (ultimate) production from something else.

The ultimate refutation accomplished by master Jñānagarbha in his Analysis of the Two Realities, where his actual reasoning negating truth-status is the refutation of (ultimate) production through four alternatives, is quite similar to those (above-mentioned) of Shantarakshita and Kamalashila.

(Finally), all of these (reasonings) are the great paths of philosophical analysis of the followers of Savior Nagarjuna, and thus should be learned by those who wish to expand their intelligence in reasoning. And if one understands the reasonings of these (masters) of the Dogmaticist school, one will easily understand the reasonings in the other (schools), so there has been no digression.

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Chapter V

DIALECTICIST ELUCIDATION OF THE HOLY INTENTION

THE QUESTION OF INTRINSIC REALITY IN PERSONS AND THINGS

1. THE DISTINCTIVE SPECIALTY OF THEIR NEGATION OF INTRINSIC REALITY IN PERSONS AND THINGS

A. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THEIR NEGATION OF INTRINSICALLY IDENTIFIABLE INTRINSIC REALITY

Bhavaviveka found many faults with Buddhapalita's explanation of the Wisdom, but he did not criticize him out of disagreement over the two selflessnesses.

Avalokitavrata explains:

The great teachers of the central way, the Holy Father and Son, Bhavaviveka, and Buddhapalita, all show the method of the Transcendent Wisdom by explaining that inner and outer relativity exists conventionally, functionally efficient as mere illusion, and does not exist ultimately, being without substantiality.

(In effect, he considers that) both masters (Buddhapalita and Bhava-

viveka) explain the patterns of ultimate reality and of illusory, conventional existence in the same way. Furthermore, Jñanagarbha, Shantarakshita, and Kamalashila do not propose any difference between the selflessnesses of their systems and those of the system of Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti. Chandrakirti (on the other hand), while accepting that Buddhapalita, through correct interpretation of the intention of the holy (masters), presents the ultimate and the conventional without differing from his own system, still insists that his (and Buddhapalita's) system is distinct from the systems of the other Centrists. Thus, in the Introduction to the Central Way Commentary (he states):

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Let the experts please be certain that what we expound here in the course of our rebuttal of any other system accords with the doctrine of emptiness, and that such is not the case with other treatises, just as (they are certain that) this doctrine known as "emptiness" is not taught flawlessly in any treatise other than the Wisdom. And thus, the proposition advanced by some, that "the Centrists conventionally accept the very same things for which the Traditionists posit ultimacy," should be recognized as merely an expression of utter ignorance of the actual meaning of the Central Way Treatise.

He then goes on to quote and dismiss a similar statement about the Analyst system (and the Centrist system), and he finally concludes "Thus, since it is inappropriate that (this) transcendental doctrine should resemble (in any way) a mundane doctrine, experts may be certain that this system is distinctive (from all others)."

He argues for the distinctiveness of his own system from that of other Centrists and attributes their belief that the Realists' absolute is the Centrists' conventional to their ignorance of the actuality of the central way. His reason is that in his own system nothing is admitted to be established by intrinsic identity, even conventionally, and those (Realists) establish (everything, ultimate and superficial) on that basis only. Since if either of the two realities is confused the other will be confused, it is incorrect that the transcendental teaching which does not confuse the two realities should resemble a mundane teaching which does confuse them both. Thus, this system of the holy masters has nothing in common with the Realists' theories, not only with regard to the ultimate but even with regard to the superficial.

Now when (Jñanagarbha, in) the Autocommentary of the Analysis of the Two Realities, quotes the verse: "What is absolute for one is superficial for another; just as (the same woman) is regarded as mother by one and wife by another"; and the Subcommentary identifies the verse as being Nagarjuna's, it is (obvious) from (the above passage of) the

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Introduction Commentary that such is not the case. As for the allegation that Shantarakshita wrote the (above) Subcommentary, while it may be a case of (another author with) the same name or a case of borrowing

the name, it is not (the Shantarakshita who is) author of the Central Way Ornament, etc. For (not only does Kamalashila) refute, in his Compendium of Principles Elucidation, this author's explanation of the purpose of composing a treatise (which he would not do if it was his own master's explanation), (but also) this author approves the literal meaning of the statement of (Jñānagarbha in) the Autocommentary to the effect that the theory of the non-existence of the apparent subject-object(-duality) is contradicted by perception and refuted by common sense, (which is precisely opposed to the position of Shantarakshita).

Furthermore, it is incorrect to object that "if the difference between the negatees of the two Centrist schools were no more than that (presence and absence of intrinsically identifiable production conventionally), why does Chandrakirti not make a specific refutation of that (insistence of the Dogmaticist on conventional, intrinsically identifiable production)?"¹ (For, in fact, Chandrakirti does just that) in the Introduction Commentary, (first formulating the Dogmaticist argument as follows):

It is fine to negate production from self and other since there is no ultimate production, but it is undoubtedly the nature of the objects of perception and inference such as form and sensation, etc., to be produced from something else (conventionally). If you do not admit that, why mention two realities, as there would only be one reality left? Thus, production from something other does indeed exist.

The objection is that, although in the negation of intrinsically real causality it is proper to negate other-production in the ultimate, "real" or "intrinsically identifiable" other-production must be admitted conventionally, or else the superficial reality would be annihilated. To rebut (290)

this (Chandrakirti) methodically proves the non-existence of identifiable production in both realities. And this is established to (counter) the (Dogmaticist) Centrist theory that intrinsically identifiable production exists conventionally, though not ultimately, and is not (directed) at (any theory of) the Realists.

B. DESCRIPTION OF THE NEGATEE AND PROOF OF ITS NON-EXISTENCE

a. Habitual Modes of Intellectual and Unconscious Reifications, and Proof of Their (Object's) Non-existence

What sort of (mental) habit holds (things) to be intrinsically identifiable? To describe first of all the pattern (of this mental habit) of the philosophers; they investigate the meaning of the conventional expression "person" in such uses as "this person performed this action and experienced this result," by such (analysis) as "is the 'person' the very same thing as his' own aggregates? Or is 'he' something different from them?" When they discover whichever possibility, either sameness or difference (to be

the case), it gives them a basis for establishing that "person," and they are then able to establish his accumulation of evolutionary action and so forth. If they do not find (any such basis), they are unable to establish (either "person" or his "actions," etc.). Hence they cannot rest content with the mere use of the expression "person." Thus, such establishment of "person" through analytic investigation into the referent of the conventional expression "person" is the establishment of person as having intrinsically identifiable status. And all the Buddhist philosophers, from Analysts to Dogmaticists, hold (their various types of "persons") in this kind (of pattern),

Similarly, (this pattern of establishment of intrinsically identifiable status) holds with regard to all things, either created, such as forms and sensations, etc., or uncreated, inclusive of the Traditionist (concept of space established as that absolute negation which is the mere absence of concrete impenetrability. (That is,) in establishing the existence of anything believed to be verified by validating cognition, (these philosophers) cannot do so if no (intrinsically objective) referent is discovered upon the investigation into the status of the object which is indicated by the (291)

expression of a particular name, and thus do establish existence (of some thing) when the opposite (that is, ultimate discovery of objective referent) holds true. Finally, the intrinsic identity (svalaksana) involved in (this sort of) intrinsically identifiable status is altogether quite different from the "ultimate particular" (svalaksana) explained precisely as "functional capacity" in the logicians' treatises, and from the "defining characteristic" (svalakṣana) explained as that which characterizes (something as) different from everything else, such as heat in the case of fire, in the Abhidharma Scripture, etc.

It is the method of Chandrapada not to accept even conventionally the presentation of such a sort of existence, his own method of presenting the conventional (being exemplified) in the Lucid Exposition:

Moreover, this example is incorrect because the expressions ""pestle" and "Rahu" do exist among mundane conventions, established without analysis, and do apply to their referents, body and head (respectively), just as the designations "person," etc., (exist conventionally and apply non-analytically to conventional entities, although ultimately there is no such thing as a referent of "person").

This statement answers (the argument) that one can use the conventional expression "hardness is the intrinsic identity of earth," although there is no earth that is not hard, since designation and referent are conceptually appropriate, just as people employ the conventional expressions "body of a pestle" and "head of Rahu," although there is nothing more (to a pestle) than a body, and nothing more (to Rahu) than a head. The (gist of) the answer is that it is correct, according to conventions (292)

of social communication, for a speaker to dispel the doubt of a listener with the expressions "pestle" and "Rahu," since the latter has formed the notions of "body" and "head" from hearing the corresponding words and is wondering, "whose body?" and "whose head? Thus, the speaker wishes to eliminate the possibility of reference to any body other than that of the pestle, or to any head other than that of Rahu. However, this example does not correspond to the case of the expression "hardness is the intrinsic identity of earth," there being no earth which is not hard, and hence no need to dispel any such doubt.

(Chandrapada) then goes on to give another reason for the inappropriateness of the example, explaining that the example of the two expressions is inapplicable to (a case of essential) non-difference (expressed verbally by different terms), since (in fact) the things "body" and "head" and the qualifications "pestle('s)" and "'Rahu('s)" prove to be different in terms of mundane convention. (Of course, Chandrakirti is quite aware that) when one investigates the referents of (these) expressions, they are not found to be different things, since Rahu's head alone is called "Rahu," and since the referents of "pestle" and "body," when sought out, are not to be found apart. (Now) it is when (this point) is brought out as an argument (in favor of the applicability of the example that Chandrakirti is impelled to) state (most) succinctly (his position on the presentation of the conventional). Immediately following the above quotation (in the Lucid Exposition, (he states):

If you propose that the example is indeed applicable since (pestle and Rahu) are proved to be nothing different from body and head, since only those (latter) can be apprehended, I say that is not so; for, in the usage of social conventions, such a sort of analysis is not employed (as that seeking essential identity, etc.), and further, the things of the world are (only) existent (insofar) as unexamined critically.

Thus, the argument that, although just such an entity and identity exist for the listener, when the meaning of that conventional expression is examined, they are not established (even conventionally) as entity and (293)

identity, since no "pestle" and "Rahu" are found apart from the body and the head-(that argument evinces) the method of presenting the (conventional) existence of things of other philosophers explained above. And Chandrakirti answers them, saying that "existence" is a social convention, and, as it cannot be presented through such analysis, it is presented non-analytically.

The manner of this non-analytic presentation (is demonstrated) immediately after the preceding passage: "Although analytically, there is no self apart from forms, etc., from the social superficial point of view such (self) has its existence dependent on the aggregates. Thus, as 'Rahu' and 'pestle' are similar in this respect, your example is not established." "There is no self" means that there is no analytically discoverable ground on which to establish "Devadatta," since, when examining the

expressions "Devadatta's body" and "Devadatta's mind" to find the basis of reference of "Devadatta" and the mode of existence of his body and mind, no Devadatta is discovered, either as merely his body and mind or as something apart from them. This means that "Devadatta" is not established by intrinsic identity and not that he does not exist at all, as he does exist superficially depending on his aggregates. This, he indicates, is the way to understand both examples.

As for the manner of establishing things (in general), he continues:

Likewise, analytically it is obvious that there is no identified (referent) in such things as "earth" apart from such (identities) as "hardness," and there is no unsupported identity apart from the identified (referent)-thus, it is just superficial, and therefore the masters (Nagarjuna and Aryadeva) presented existence in terms of merely mutually dependent status.

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That is to say, in presenting "earth" and "hardness" as referent and identity, it cannot be done by establishing them as the discovered object of the above-mentioned analytic quest of the designative bases of the conventional terms used for identified referent and identity, as such things can only be presented as existent in terms of their mutual relationship. He then continues to explain with (further) reasons the necessity to accept his method of presenting persons and things as the only sure one:

This is necessarily to be accepted in precisely that way only; otherwise, the superficial would not be the superficial, and would either lack validity entirely or would become (ultimate) reality. (Further), not only such things as "pestles" become impossible when submitted to the logical analyses that will be demonstrated here, but even (the aggregates) such as "forms," "sensations," etc., have no existence. Thus (according to your understanding of the superficial) you would have to assent to their utter non-existence even superficially, just like the pestle," etc. As such is not the case, this (mistaken procedure of presenting the superficial analytically) is out of the question.

Having thus declared himself, Chandrakirti concludes by stating that one must consult the Central Way Introduction to learn the correct method of presenting the dependently designative (superficial reality). This shows that when conventional existence is presented as something discovered analytically, it is so presented by logical processes that inquire into (questions of) ultimate status, and thus such a thing does not exist superficially, but exists ultimately. By so showing (it is clear that he equates) "intrinsically identifiable status" with "ultimate status." Here one may object, "why should this be a distinctive feature of your (Dialecticist system), as the Dogmaticist Centrists also do not attribute conventional existence to things discovered by philosophical analysis? Do they not also refute the presentation of superficial things as things discovered by rational analysis, as for example in the Two Realities:

Since it exists as it appears, analysis is not applicable: things are faulted by becoming other (than they appear to be) when subjected to analysis.

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This objection arises from a lack of discernment regarding the analytic methods of the two types of Centrists, by means of which they inquire into the question of ultimate status (in things). The Dialecticist accepts simply the above sort of analysis as analysis of (something's possession or lack of) ultimate status, as witnessed by the above quotations and their frequent explanations that existents are merely nominal, symbolic, and conventional. "Mere nominality" means, as aforementioned, the undiscoverability of anything through investigation into the meaning of conventional expressions, and does not mean that names exist and things do not, or that there is nothing which is not a name. (Finally,) although they do not accept everything proposed by the verbally ascriptive conventional intellect as conventionally existent, neither do they accept any conventionally existent things somehow not posited by conventionally ascriptive intellect.

The Dogmaticist Centrists (on the other hand) believe that forms and sensations, etc., cannot be presented (as conventionally existent) on the strength of conventionally ascriptive intellect, but can be so established on the strength of their appearance in undistorted sense cognition, etc. Therefore, there is a great difference (between the two systems) in regard to the type of cognition involved in the question of (something's) establishment "on the strength of cognition." Thus, they believe that the simple analysis of things, not as established on strength of such (undistorted, etc.) cognition, but as existent or non-existent on the strength of their intrinsically objective condition, serves as the analysis of the question of their ultimate status, and they do not accept the above (Dialecticist) analytical method alone (as resolving the question of ultimate status). Therefore (it is evident that) they accept intrinsically identifiable status (as) conventionally (existent). And consequently (the two systems) also differ as to what is excluded by the word "merely" in the scriptural statements such as "merely nominal" and "merely designative."

We might suppose here, as the mundane person engages in a great deal of analysis-"Is it happening or not?" or "Is it produced or not?"-that it must be improper to reply to such inquiries, "It happens!" or "It is produced!" However, this type of inquiry and the above analytic method (296)

are utterly different. The mundane person is not inquiring into coming and going through analysis into the meaning of the use of the conventional expressions "comer," "goer," "coming," and "going" out of dissatisfaction with (the fact that they are) merely conventional usages. He is rather making an unreflective²³ inquiry into the unreflective usage of the expressions "coming" and "going." Therefore, how can there be any contradiction between accepting such investigations (as proper to common parlance and the acceptance of the undiscoverability of the meaning

of conventional expressions through philosophical analysis)?

Such holding to intrinsically identifiable real existence arrived at through analysis of the meaning of conventional expressions is not the habit-pattern of unconscious self-habits. Yet it is that (unconscious self-habit) which binds living beings in the life-cycle, and thus it is that very (habit-pattern) which philosophical reasoning must principally refute. What is the habit-pattern (of unconscious self-habits)?

(Unconscious self-habits) hold to the existence of things internal and external as if they existed in their own right, not merely established on the strength of convention. When such (self-habits) hold persons such as "Yajña" in that way, they are (called) "personal self-habits," and when they hold things such as "eye" and "ear" in that way, they are called objective self-habits." By this fact, the two selves also can be understood (as not intrinsically different but different with reference to the objects involved).

Although this mental habit does not hold (objects in this way) after analysis of the meaning of expressions, if the objects thus held (as objectively real) were to exist in fact, they would have to be discoverable by the analytic cognition that analyzes the manner of existence of the referents of conventional expressions. Therefore, since there is no contradiction between the fact that non-analytic, unconscious self-habits with their objects are the principal rational negatees and the fact that the treatises contain only analytic negations (on the theoretical plane), one (should) not adhere to the notion that "the texts merely negate intellectual mental habits with their objects."

Although persons whose intelligence is unformed by theories and living (297)

beings bereft of symbolic awareness would not be able to verbalize "existence of objects (in their own right) not established on strength of conventionally verbalizing intellect," still the meaning (as present in their perceptions) exists for them. If this were not the case, then even the meaning of the holding of (the two types of) self would cease to exist (for these beings), (if it is argued that such mental habits could not exist in beings who could not verbalize them).

Although the Experientialists and the Dogmaticists assert that the two selves, which, as negated in persons and things, underlie the two selflessnesses—along with the ways they are conceptualized—are quite different objects, this system distinguishes selflessnesses with respect to their bases of reference, but does not assert a difference in "selves" that are actually non-existent.

In the Central Way Introduction, in the following: "This selflessness was proclaimed to be of two types, on account of the division between persons and things, in order to liberate living beings..." (Chandrakīrti) states the distinction (as made) according to the distinction between persons and things and does not state it as made from the point of view of (any sort of) two selves. Furthermore, in the Four Hundred Commentary, he explains: "As for 'self,' it is a reality or substance of things that does not relate to anything else. As it does not exist, there is self-

lessness. That again is understood as twofold because of the distinction between persons and things; namely, personal selflessness and objective selflessness." Here, an "unrelated reality" is an independent reality, which would be existence with the mode of being of an objective entity, not merely as a nominal designation.

Here one might suppose that if (we maintain that) all Buddhist schools from Analysts to Dogmaticists believe things admittedly established by (298)

validating cognition to have intrinsically identifiable status, then we contradict (our) previous explanation of the Experientialists' rejection of intrinsic identity and postulation of verbal and conventional status in regard to the admitted existence of the imagined (nature of reality), as constituted by ascriptive and descriptive designation. (However,) we are not liable to this fault, for, granted that they do state that what can be established by ascriptive and descriptive designation is "not established by its intrinsic identity," they do not admit (such non-establishment as equivalent to) the quest and non-discovery of a designative base to which (something's) name is assigned. Therefore they do hold to intrinsically identifiable status as explained in this (Dialecticist system). Although their treatises explain the ascriptively and descriptively designated as "merely verbal," they interpret "'mere verbal designation" as (meaning) that there is no real object as apparent to the perception of the dualistic cognition of disparate subject and object. This differs from the (meaning of) "'mere verbal designation" in this system.

b. Meaning of Statement of Twofold Selflessness, Even in the Individual Vehicle

The Experientialists and the Dogmaticists believe that the Individual Vehicle Canon does not teach objective selflessness, but teaches only personal selflessness, which (latter) therefore needs no further explanation in the Universal Vehicle, having been determined in the Individual Vehicle. However, the system of the two masters rejects both of these ideas.

First, in regard to the way in which the Individual Vehicle Canon teaches objective selflessness, Buddhapalita states:

As examples of the selflessness of created things, the Lord used "illusion," "echo," "reflection," "hallucination," "dream," "ball of foam," "bubble," and "plantain trunk." He also stated things to have no actuality, no reliable reality, but to be mental fabrications and false. When he stated "all things are selfless," he meant they were without reality, the word "self" meaning "intrinsic reality.*

He explains that since the Individual Vehicle Canon contains the use of the metaphors "foam," "bubble," "reed," "hallucination," and "il- (299)

lusion," for the five aggregates, respectively, and also the statements "all these are false," and "all things are selfless," it does teach the unreality of all things, "self" meaning "intrinsic reality."

(Chandrakirti) states, in the Introduction Commentary, that the Individual Vehicle teaches objective selflessness, and he cites quotations from Individual Vehicle Scriptures such as " form is like a ball of foam." He explains, in the Philosophical Sixty Commentary, that (Nagarjuna) does not give the reasonings to reject nihilism, as these are explicit in the Individual Vehicle, but does give the reasonings to reject absolutism, because, although (the Individual Vehicle contains) statements such as there is only one holy truth, and that is Nirvana, whose nature is non-deceptive," these statements are not frequent, uninterrupted, and set forth in a continuous exposition.

In this context, Bhavaviveka rejects (Buddhapalita's interpretation), saying that "these examples demonstrate that the apparent personal self does not exist, and hence teach personal selflessness, not objective selflessness. The meaning of the word 'self is not the 'intrinsic reality of things,' but is the 'self of a person.' If the Individual Vehicle taught objective selflessness, the Universal Vehicle would be pointless."

(In response, Chandrakirti in the Introduction Commentary) supports (Buddhapalita), giving evidence from the Jewel Garland, and declaring that "(Buddha) teaches not only objective selflessness in the Universal Vehicle, but also the stages, the transcendences, the vows, and the two stores, etc., and therefore (the Universal Vehicle) is not pointless."

Chandrakirti further proves that such is the position of the Master (Nagarjuna), quoting the Wisdom:

The Lord knew things and their non-existence,
Hence, in the Advice to Katyayana,
He accomplished the negation
Of both existence and non-existence.

The Lord declared as "falsehood"
Everything that is deceptive.
All created things are deceptive,
Therefore, they are false.

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He also quotes the Philosophical Sixty:

When the Victors declare
That Nirvana is the sole truth,
What intelligent person would then presume
That other things were not rejected?

Thus as (Chandrakirti) proves definitively from the Wisdom that the meaning of "falsehood" is ""unreality which is emptiness with respect to intrinsic reality," and faults any other interpretation, it must definitely

be accepted that the thought of the holy (masters) is that even the Individual Vehicle Canon expounds objective selflessness. Nevertheless, this does not (seek to) establish that there are no statements in the Individual Vehicle Canon to the effect that "there is a reality in things which is established by intrinsic identity," as such statements do occur there frequently.

In regard to personal selflessness (generally), according to all Individual Vehicle and Universal Vehicle philosophers, it is postulated as merely the non-existence of a substantial, self-sufficient person, distinct in nature from the aggregates. As for the pattern (of belief in such a person), the self that is the basis of the notion "I" is held to resemble the master of the aggregates and the aggregates are held to resemble its servants, since the "I" is held to control them, and they to belong to it, as expressed in such notions as "my forms" and "my sensations.

Thus, when (such a self) appears self-sufficient and distinct in nature from the aggregates, like master and slaves, and it is assumed to exist in reality, then that is the habitual adherence to its substantial existence. When that (type of self) is negated, the person (is admitted by these philosophers) as a "mere designation" upon the aggregates, the (word) mere" ruling out the existence of the self as something other than the aggregates.

In regard to the method of designation, Bhavaviveka in the Blaze of Argument states that "thus, conventionally we designate consciousness with the word 'self because (thereby) the conglomerate of body and faculties is designated according to the scriptural statement, "Conscious-

ness is the self, because it takes rebirth. " Thus, he cites the scriptural statement that the aggregates are designated as a "living being," just as an assembly of pieces is designated a "chariot." He continues to make his case, with statements from certain scriptures in which the mind is called the "self," such as "If the mind is controlled, happiness will be attained," and "When the self is controlled, heaven will be obtained," and with reasonings such as "the self appropriates the aggregates, and consciousness takes rebirth; therefore consciousness is established as the self,

This master does not assert any fundamental consciousness, hence (for him) the consciousness that appropriates the body is the mental consciousness, and other (philosophers) who do not admit a fundamental consciousness are in agreement. Those who assert a fundamental consciousness assert its actual continuum as the person. As for the scriptural references that these (philosophers use to support) their assertions about the personal self, they are too numerous to mention.

According to Chandrakirti's system, although (these philosophers) do negate the substantial existence of such a (self-sufficient) person, they do not (thereby) negate the intrinsically identifiable status of the person, and thus do not (accept it) as merely a conventional designation. Hence, since their holding to its (intrinsically identifiable) existence is tantamount to adhering to the person as true, it is (still) the personal self-habit, just as

(holding things as true) is the objective self-habit.

Above all, he explains that the direct realization and subsequent meditation upon the non-existence of that self-sufficient, substantial self, which is (also) the very object the heterodox hold as the real, internal agent, a "soul construed as different from the aggregates, do not reduce in the slightest the habitual reality-notion (explained) above in regard to forms, etc. Thus (such meditations do) not apply to the elimination of addictions such as desire which arise from the notion of the reality of the aggregates.

Thus, he states, in the Central Way Introduction:

When you understand selflessness through your yoga (method,)

You do not realize the (ultimate) reality of forms, etc.

Greed, therefore, initiated on perception of form,

Will (still) arise, since you have not realized the (ultimate) nature of those (objects).

and in the Philosophical Sixty Commentary:

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It is completely impossible to eliminate addictions for those who, although they want to do so, still perceive an intrinsic reality in forms, etc. To show this, (Nagarjuna) declared: "What could stop the great poison of addictions in those whose minds have the place? Even when they are in (an indifferent) state, they will be seized by the snake of addictions."

Here, "place" means the object which gives rise to truth-habits, (namely), a (supposed) intrinsically identifiable status (in things).

As for (the previous) method of others to present the person as designatively existent, it is not (corroborated by) the meaning of this statement in the Individual Vehicle Canon: "Just as 'chariot' designates the assembly of its parts, so superficially 'living beings' designates the aggregates"; because (if they did accept this meaning, they would know that) just as the "chariot" ascribed to the parts cannot properly be a part, so the "person" designated as ascribed to the aggregates cannot properly be an aggregate.

It might be supposed, nevertheless, that since "chariot" is ascribed to the assemblage of the parts, the chariot thus being precisely the assemblage itself, it is (the same) also with the aggregates (and the "person"). (However,) the very fact that something is an ascriptive designation necessarily rules it out as being (itself) the referent designated, just as (events) caused by the elements are designated as "blue" and "eye," etc. (yet those elements and events are not merely the words "blue" and "eye," etc.). And, as such (designations) as "pot" are similar (in this respect) to the "self," there need be no uncertainty in regard to them (either).

(Chandrakirti) states this point in the Introduction: "The scripture states that it is ascribed to the aggregates; therefore, the 'self is not the

mere conglomerate of the parts.*"

Again, it might be supposed, from the scriptural statement, "When the ascetics and priests think 'the self,' they are looking only at these five aggregates," that these (five aggregates) are the self, as they are mentioned there as the object of the view of self. However, (such statements) do not teach the aggregates as being the object of the view of self by way of positive proof, but rather the word "only" refutes the existence of any (303)

object of the view of self other than the aggregates. This is confirmed in other scriptures, where statements such as "form is not the self" refute the possibility of each one of the aggregates being the self. As (Chandrakirti) expresses it in the Introduction:

If the aggregates are admitted as self because of statements
By the Teacher-"The aggregates are the self!"
(It is a mistake).
He (merely) negates the self as other than the aggregates,
As proven by other scriptural statements-
"Form is not self," etc.

This statement also gives insight into the verbal meaning of the expression "futile view."

These (reasonings above) acknowledge the conventional existence of the objective object (the mere "I") of unconscious "I"-habits, which have two kinds of objects, objective and aspective. The aspective object is the intrinsically identifiable status of the self, as held in the thought "That self exists by : its intrinsic reality," and does not in fact exist, even conventionally. (Similarly,) the (objective) object of unconscious futile views, which are (forms of) possessiveness, is (the designation) "mine." And the aspective (object) is held to be the intrinsically identifiable status of "mine." Here the objection may be raised that if the aggregates are not properly the object of unconscious self-habits, the scriptural negations (such as) "forms etc. are not the self" are inappropriate, because those (aggregates mentioned) are not properly the object or basis of the unconscious futile views which hold (those aggregates) as the self.

This criticism does not apply, since both the mental habits holding self and aggregates as the same and the mental habits holding self and aggregates as different are intellectual mental habits and not unconscious (mental habits). Yet still, if there were (an object) as supposed by the unconscious futile views, it would not exist in any other way than as either the same or different (from the aggregates), and therefore negating (those possibilities) through such analysis would still be appropriate. The foregoing has demonstrated that scriptural authority supports (this (304)

position) and does not fault it. (To give proof by) reasoning, it is not reasonable for the consciousness or any other aggregate to be the self, since the aggregates are appropriated by the self, and the self is the

appropriator of the aggregates; otherwise, agent and action would become the same.

This very (argument) is the intention of the holy (masters), as witnessed by the statements from the Wisdom: "if firewood were the fire, then agent and action would be the same"; and "by (the example of) wood and fire, all processes of the self and appropriation, together with (notions) such as 'pots' and 'wool,' are completely explained."s3

Furthermore, (Nagarjuna) states, in the Wisdom: "Appropriation should be understood as similar. . . ." Just as action and agent exist in designative dependence on each other and have no intrinsically real status, so should the appropriated and the appropriator be represented.

(For example,) one can easily employ the expression ""Yajña sees" based on (his) eye's seeing of forms, and one can easily employ the expression "his eye sees forms" based on Yajña's looking at forms, and yet this will not be contradicted by the facts that (in the first case) the eye that sees the forms is not Yajña, and (in the second case) that the Yajña who looks at forms is not an eye. Likewise, while it is admitted that one can use conventional expressions such as either "I was sick and am cured" or even "my eye was sick and is cured" when one's eye is sick and is cured, nevertheless, social conventions do not establish the actual eye itself as both the self and the property of the self. By this example, one should understand the remainder of the experiential media, internal and external, in relation to the self; that is, depending on one of them the other is represented as "hearer" (of sound), etc.

Now the heterodox (scholars), perceiving that it is inappropriate to posit such things as eye, etc., as the person, posit a "person" who is a seer, etc., and is substantially different from those (things such as eye). And other orthodox Buddhist scholars, perceiving the flaws in (the postulate of) substantial difference, posit consciousness or some other function of the aggregates as the person. (But) those who understand the teachings of the Victor as being unmistakable are liberated by the realization that there is no reality (in things) other than that which is merely designated conventionally. This is declared in the Introduction Com-
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mentary. (A caution here is that) one must know how to represent properly the accumulation of evolutionary action and the experience of effects in the light of the fact of the mere designativeness (of things). Therefore, since (Chandrakirti), according to his determination in the Introduction and its Commentary of the intended meaning of scriptural statements such as "just as 'chariot' designates, etc.," understands personal selflessness as the lack of intrinsic reality (of person), tantamount to the undiscoverability of the referent of the conventional expression "person," having sought it in seven ways, his explanation is utterly distinctive from others. And the substance of the intention of the Buddhapalita Commentary is the same.

2. ON THAT BASIS, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THEIR

METHOD TO ELUCIDATE THE HOLY INTENTION

A. DISTINCTIVENESS IN (INTERPRETATION OF) REALIZATION OF SELFLESSNESS, THE GROSS AND SUBLTE SELF-HABITS

The unexcelled distinction of Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti's elucidations of the intention of the Holy Father and Son, setting them apart from other elucidations, is their representation of the two realities, wherein all the structures of the life-cycle and of Nirvana are perfectly viable. (Thus, they) establish the existence (of things) on the strength of convention, (those things) having no reality not established on the strength of convention. (And this reconciles the facts that) investigation of the referents of conventional expressions for "persons" and "things*" discovers nothing at all either the same or different, etc., and yet conventional expressions such as "Yajña" and "eye" are definitely to be employed.

(The fact that) "conventional existence" and "conventional production," etc. mean (that the existent is) established as such on the strength of convention (is corroborated in the following) statements, first from the Dharma Digest:

Worthy son! Being in the world consists of habitual adherence to (the notions of) production and cessation, and thus the Tathagata, with his great compassion, in order to avoid generating terror in people, declares that "(things) are produced and ceased" on the strength of conventions. However, worthy son, here, nothing at all is produced...

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and from the Emptiness Seventy:

The Buddhas declare (that things) "are," "are produced," "are destroyed," "exist," "do not exist," "are inferior," "mediocre," or "superior," on the strength of social conventions, and not on the strength of reality.

Furthermore, the Mother Scripture, etc., state that "(things) exist as mundane conventions." Therefore, the Centrist must represent (existence) as conventional. However, although mundane convention does employ formulations such as "the sprout is produced from the seed," they are employed only without investigation into the referent of the conventional expressions through analysis as to whether it is produced from itself or from something else, etc. (This is) because the holy masters explained (conventional expressions) in just that way. It is also because the ascription of "person" to something substantially different from the aggregates and so on is definitely inappropriate as the meaning of non-analytic mundane conventional expressions, this system's presentation of that meaning being apparent from the above explanation of (its) interpretation of "person." For, in the world, the self and its possessions are represented as master and slaves.

It being thus necessary to understand in accordance with this explanation that such is the rule of the ultimate existence and non-existence of persons and things, and that (hence) also such is the (rule of) twofold selflessness, there is no way to arrive at the realization of personal selflessness while still asserting philosophically the existence of an objective self. (This is supported in) the Introduction Commentary where it is said that without destroying the mental habit of an objective self, personal selflessness is not realized.

This is the superior position of the holy masters. In the Philosophical Sixty, in saying: "There is no liberation through 'existence,' nor will 'non-existence' take one beyond this world-the Great Ones are delivered by thorough knowledge of both reality and unreality," (Nagarjuna) states that there is no liberation as long as both absolutism, which holds things as having intrinsically identifiable existence, and nihilism, which sees cause and effect as impossible, are not destroyed, and that there is liberation when the actuality of reality and unreality is known, free from the two extremes. "Liberation" here is not properly interpreted as mean-
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ing (liberation) from objective obscurations, as (Chandrakirti's commentary) specifies (it to be liberation) from this cyclic existence (that is, from addictive obscurations).

Similarly, (Nagarjuna) saying in the Jewel Garland: "thus, it is delusory to hold this miragelike world to 'exist' or 'not to exist'; and the deluded are not liberated. The absolutist goes to heaven, the nihilist to bad migrations. But one who does not rely on duality, knowing reality accurately, does become free," declares that the avoidance of the two extremes of being and nothingness is necessary for liberation from cyclic life.

Thus, when teaching objective selflessness as the negation of subject object substantial dichotomy, the Universal Vehicle teaches a gross and a subtle (form of that) objective selflessness, the (first) failing to negate intrinsic reality in the (remaining) cognition devoid of duality, and (the latter) negating intrinsic reality in that (cognition) as well. And just as we take only the latter as definitive in meaning, so, with the Disciple Canon's teaching of both a gross and a subtle personal selflessness, we should accept the subtle selflessness as definitive in meaning, since the reasons are the same in all respects.

This being the case, the (Dialecticist) method of equating the self-habits with the two obscurations is also different. Whereas the other Centrists understand objective self-habits as objective obscurations, this system takes them to be addictive (obscurations). Thus Buddhapalita (explained) how (Nagarjuna) wrote the Wisdom, having seen the danger for living beings in the variety of sufferings, to teach them the true reality of things in order to liberate them. He further explained how, although "reality" means "lack of intrinsic reality," the eye of intelligence (of living beings) is obscured by the darkness of delusion, and they think there is an intrinsic reality in things, whereby their attraction and aversion (for these things) arises. (Finally, he explained) how the illumination through

the knowledge of relativity clears up the darkness of delusion, the intrinsic unreality of things is seen, and attraction and aversion do not arise, thus (308)

deprived of any ground. To corroborate (his statement) he cites (Aryadeva's) Four Hundred: "The seed of existence is consciousness, and objects are its sphere of activity. When the objects are seen to be selfless, the seed of existence is stopped."

Thus, "delusion," grouped with desire and hatred (as one of the three major addictions), is explained as consisting of truth-habits about things and as the seed of existence, and it is further stated that its abandonment requires the realization of selflessness, which itself is the realization of the intrinsic unreality of things. Therefore, (Buddhapalita) believes the actual holding to the truth of personal and objective things to be addictive misknowledge.

(Chandrakirti also) clearly explains the holding of things as truth to be addictive misknowledge, the first of the twelve links (of dependent origination), in his Four Hundred Commentary: "Consciousness, attached to things under the influence of addictive misknowledge which causes excessive reification of intrinsic reality in things, is the seed of the cyclic process. And, when it entirely ceases, it is established that the life-cycle ceases"; and in his Introduction Commentary:

Misknowledge, whose nature is the obscuration of the understanding of the real nature (of things) and the reification (of reality) in things without intrinsic reality, is utterly false... Thus, the superficial truth is established under the influence of the addictive misknowledge included among the (twelve) factors of existence.

Both personal and objective self-habits are present in this unconscious misknowledge, and hence the personal self-habit also is addictive misknowledge. For this reason, there is no contradiction involved in the fact that sometimes misknowledge, and sometimes unconscious futile views, are said to be the root of cyclic existence. Now the objective of such unconscious self-habits is the basis of the "I"-habit, hence the mental habit holding other persons to have intrinsically identifiable status is not (among) the futile views, although it is a personal self-habit.

This interpretation is the superior position of the Holy Father and Son, as (Nagarjuna), saying in the Emptiness Seventy: "The Teacher proclaimed that misknowledge is the consideration that things arisen from causes and conditions are real, and from that the twelve factors arise," declares further that terminating misknowledge with the realization of (309)

things' emptiness of intrinsic reality terminates all twelve factors (of dependent origination).

(Aryadeva also) states that the realization of relativity is necessary for the termination of the misknowledge included in the three poisons, as in the Four Hundred: "Delusion gets into everything, just as the physical

sense (pervades) in the body; hence by conquering delusion, all addictions are also conquered. When relativity is realized (in things), delusion does not arise; hence all our efforts herein are only to explain that message." The meaning of "relativity" is repeatedly stated in this system to be emptiness of intrinsic reality."

Therefore, all the reasonings of the central way are factors of the eradication of the habit-pattern of misknowledge, the root of the life-cycle. Hence, having identified how our own unconscious misknowledge maintains its hold, we should strive to terminate it, and should not amuse ourselves with expertise in mere hair-splitting with other philosophers! One might well wonder, if indeed unconscious personal self-habits and unconscious objective self-habits are without difference in habit-pattern, what about all those explanations of the Dogmaticists?

The notion of the existence of a self-sufficient, substantial person, distinct in nature from the aggregates, holds the person to be substantially different from such things as feet and hands, etc., and hence is not present in those whose minds are uninfluenced by theories. (Chandrakirti) states this in the Central Way Introduction: "When an ordinary man plants a mere seed, he says, "I made this son!" or I have planted a tree!"; hence there is no production from other (things) even in social conventions." And Buddhapalita also states: "(The ordinary person) when he plants a seed of a tree and it grows, points to the tree and employs the expression I planted this tree! "

Hence he does not hold the (seed and the tree) to be substantially different. If the contrary were true, that is, if it were conventionally ordinary to think of substantially different things producing each other), the absurd consequence would be that when a (juniper) tree grows, one could employ the expression "I planted a myrobalan tree!"

If we apply this reasoning, we must say (with Chandrakirti in the Introduction): "When an ordinary person hurts his hand, he says and thinks I am hurt!"; hence there is no substantial difference between the two in (the conventions of) the world."

Such things as these are not only expressed by ordinary people, but
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are also accepted necessarily in such a manner. If we could not establish that the tree is planted and the person is hurt because of (the apparently objective) fact that the planted seed is not a tree and the hurt hand is not a person, then such (expressions and considerations) would be impossible, and the whole (conventional) order would be demolished. The essence of these (above) reasonings dictates that we interpret as intellectual the objective self-habits explained as unconscious by the Dogmaticist philosophers.

Such being the case, one wonders what to do with objective obscurations. There is no clearer identification (of objective obscurations) in the indisputable treatises of the Father and Son or in the whole Dialecticist literature than (the following) identification (of Chandrakirti's) in the Introduction Commentary:

The instinct for misknowledge is the hindrance to complete comprehension of knowable things. It also exists as the instinct for desire, etc., and is the cause of corresponding functions of body and speech. Further, that instinctual propensity for misknowledge, desire, etc., is only eliminated in (attainment of) Buddhahood or omniscience, and not in any other (persons or stages).

"Such functions of body and speech" belong to the saints, who exhibit the unfortunate propensities of body and speech called "jumping monkeylike" and "contemptuous toward others," which propensities have been eliminated by the Teacher, yet are not eliminated by them. "Also" points out that the instinct for desire, etc., is also a hindrance to the full comprehension of knowables. Hence, the instincts of all addictions constitute the objective obscurations, and all factors of the error of dualism, their effect, are included within those (objective obscurations).

(Chandrakirti defines) "instinct" itself as "that which defiles, infects, and goes along with the mental process, its synonyms being lower limit of addictions, "habituation, and 'root. *"

Although there is no other way to abandon these objective obscurations than the above-explained path of realizing the ultimate reality, the dif-
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ference of the abandonments in the Individual Vehicle and in the Universal Vehicle arises from the (various) degrees of completeness of the factors of the method and from the duration of the time of familiarity (with the method).

The above indications enable us to understand the differences as to interpretability and definitiveness between the various methods of liberation from the various obscurations, through the realization of the selflessnesses in the various forms of the two self-habits. And the key points (are found in) the many different scriptural statements that identify the two self-habits and (explain) the gross and subtle forms of the two selflessnesses.

Since the interpretation, condition, and actuality of the instincts are difficult questions when one does not accept any fundamental consciousness, I should explain them here; but I will not undertake this since the matter cannot be settled briefly, and I hesitate to digress too much.

In sum, these distinctive specialties (of the Dialecticist system), different from other philosophical systems, have arisen regarding the questions about whether or not (the two selflessnesses) are understood by the (various practitioners of) the Universal Vehicle and the Individual Vehicle, about the two self-habits, and about the two obscurations, for the reason that the interpretations of the truth-habits regarding persons and things are different, and hence the selflessnesses of both (persons and things) are also different.

B. DISTINCTIVE SPECIALTY OF ALLOWING THE EXTERNAL OBJECTIVE WITHOUT ALLOWING APPERCEPTIVE

CONSCIOUSNESS AND FUNDAMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Since such is the way of representation of persons and things, it is not possible to make distinctions such as "conventionally, 'persons' such as 'stream-winners' exist, but 'persons' such as 'hell-denizens' do not," because they are similar insofar as they are equally non-existent ultimately and equally existent conventionally. Likewise, among things (categorized as) aggregates, elements, and media, it is not possible to make a distinction such as that "corporeal things do not exist, but mind and mental functions do," because they are equally existent or equally non-existent in terms of (either of the) two realities.

All the postulates of those other Centrists who claim equal existence of the external objective and the internal subjective, and of certain
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Centrists¹ and Idealists who claim that the subjective exists and not the objective, amount to no more than the claim that, for something to exist, it must have intrinsically identifiable status, and that, if something has no such intrinsic identity, it cannot exist. This (Dialecticist) system also accepts the impossibility of the intrinsically identifiable status of the external objective (world), but disagrees over the question of a (consequent) necessity for the (utter) non-existence of the external objective. Therefore, if one understands in general how to represent the existence of anything whatsoever, in spite of its lack of intrinsic identifiability, one is well able to understand the reasonings for the impossibility of differentiating the existence and non-existence (in terms of the same reality) of the objective and the subjective. (Conversely,) without that (general understanding), one cannot understand (those reasonings).

Therefore, (Chandrakirti) states in the Four Hundred Commentary that reasonings such as "there is no objective (realm), because neither gross nor subtle (forms) of matter exist, because the negation of indivisible atoms also negates gross (substances) which are their aggregates," can negate the indivisibility of objective (things), but cannot negate the very existence of objective (things), since (such a conclusion) is faulted both by scriptural authority and by common sense.

In regard to (interpretation of scriptural references germane to the status of the external objective), according to Bhavaviveka, the meaning of the Ten Stages statement that "the three realms are merely mind" is not that the word "merely" negates those (external objects), but clearly that it negates any sort of world-creator other than the mind, (and Chandrakirti agrees with this interpretation). (However), Chandra does not accept Bhavaviveka's explanation that the (Mission to Lanka) statements such as "the externally apparent does not exist" do not negate external objects. (Chandra) rather explains that, although the scripture does teach that (negation of the external), it is interpretable in meaning. Thus, he refutes (the Experientialist use of these references) by saying, in the case of the Ten Stages, not that the scripture is interpretable in meaning, but that (negation of the external) is not the scripture's meaning; and by

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saying, in the case of this Mission to Lanka reference, not that (negation of the external) is not the scripture's meaning, but that the reference is interpretable in meaning. (Chandra's) intention is that one should accept as taught both the Mother Scripture's instruction that the five aggregates are all indiscriminately empty with respect to intrinsic reality and the Abhidharmic explanations that all five equally have their particular and universal natures; because the objective and the subjective are similar in that the analysis of the mode of existence of the referents of verbal designations (of such things) discovers no (substantial referents), and yet as both are posited as superficially existent on strength of verbal conventions, there is no difference (between the objective and the subjective superficially either). Therefore, such discriminations (between the objective and the subjective) in regard to their existence and non-existence contravene the conventions of common parlance as well as the representations of the ultimate, and hence are wrong about both realities. As (Aryadeva) says, in the Four Hundred:

(In regard to subject and object) to say
"The one exists, yet the other does not!"
Is not proper ultimately, nor conventionally.
Thus, one cannot even use the expression.

Thus, this is also the intention of the Holy (Nagarjuna).
As for the meaning of such statements as: "Such (things) as the so-called (four) elements are really comprised in consciousness," (it is that) forms, minds, mental functions, and anomalous creations are designated as elements, etc., according to their representation in the consciousness that perceives them; because if they were not so represented, they could not be represented as separately existent. Thus, those things such as elements are included in the category of consciousness, being merely its representations. And therefore, such an (authoritative) reference is not a negation of external objects, its meaning being as (above and as) elucidated in its own commentary. Thus, when the creative purity of consciousness is directly known as unproduced with respect to its intrinsic reality, then also the variety of objects it represents (will be known) as free (of intrinsic reality) and (their apparent objectivity will) decline, just as a (mirror-)image terminates when the (original) form terminates.
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Nor does the non-acceptance of the fundamental consciousness fault (this position). For, the fundamental consciousness is (only) asserted to (serve) as a basis of effects of evolutionary actions, (especially) the development of evolutionary effects of actions arising after a long time, since actions are terminated in their own second moment, and there is supposedly) no effect arising from a terminated thing. And hence, when one can present phenomena even without intrinsic identifiability, a (posited) fundamental consciousness is no longer necessary, since a terminated thing is perfectly admissible as a phenomenon. As (Chandra states) in

the Introduction:

Since things are not really ceased intrinsically,
This is possible without a fundamental;
Understand how evolutionary effects can arise sometimes
Even long after evolutionary actions have ceased!

Not only is it easy to abandon absolutistic and nihilistic views in regard to both realities when one knows how to represent a realityless causality by rejecting intrinsic identifiability even superficially, but also the coherence of the evolutionary effects of actions is viable even without admitting any fundamental consciousness. As Chandra states in the Introduction Commentary:

Therefore, not only does intrinsic realitylessness (enable one) to abandon utterly absolutism and nihilism with regard to both realities, but also the coherence of the effects of actions, even when the actions are long terminated, is viable without imagining any such things as the continuity, retentiveness, and possession of a fundamental consciousness.

"Therefore" refers to his previous explanation of how one intrinsically realityless thing produces other intrinsically realityless things. Although it is necessary, upon denying fundamental consciousness, to rebut other criticisms such as the charge of the incompatibility of the final mind in death with the initial mind in (the subsequent) birth, Chandra does not **(315)**

explain them, thinking that knowing this (above) rule enables one to know the others. And I will not digress to explain them here, fearing prolixity.

(Finally), the key point in not positing the fundamental consciousness is the acceptance of external objects, for if one does assert (the existence of external objects) one must agree with the statement of the Center and Extremes:

(One may say) "Consciousness arises, seeing
Things, beings, selves, and ideas,
(But) those objects do not exist (in fact)";
(And) if they don't exist, neither does it!

(Chandrakirti) explains the method of proving that a terminated thing is a phenomenon in his *Lucid Exposition* and in his *Philosophical Sixty Commentary*, and I intend to explain it in my super-commentary on the *Wisdom*. (Finally), the representation of the three times (past, present, **(316)**

and future), through the key point of admitting a terminated thing as a phenomenon, is a major distinctive specialty (of this system),

(Chandrakirti) states the position of the protagonist who asserts apperception and the refutation (of that position) in the Introduction Commentary (along the following lines): "Memory is impossible without prior experience, hence memory is produced from experience. There is memory of the prior object — Such was seen' — and of the prior subject — I saw. Hence, there is experience of such (subjective prior states) as the cognition of blue. Further, if that (cognition) was experienced by some different cognition, that (second cognition) would have to be experienced by still another, which would entail (the fault) of infinite regress. Or, if the prior cognition were to be experienced by a later cognition, that later cognition would not encompass other objects such as form. Hence, a (cognition) must experience itself, as it is certain that there are only the two (possibilities of simultaneity or successiveness) in experience. Therefore, subsequent memory establishes that the prior experience of a past object includes an apperceptive consciousness."

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(Chandra answers:) "If this proof is made in terms of substantially existent (mental states, etc.), then, as there is no such (substantially existent) memory, your (reason is) as (difficult) to prove as your probandum. Or, if (the proof) is in conventional terms, as that (apperception) is not established for your antagonist as the cause of memory (even conventionally), your proof of the existence of apperceptive consciousness by the existence of memory is like proving the existence of water-crystal and fire-crystal by the existence of water and fire."

As this antagonist's (syllogism) is (an inference) reasoning from an effect, (Chandra) takes it in terms of its holding apperception as the probandum. That being done, an example is not found, since even if (this

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antagonist) were to propose, "there is an experiencer of blue-cognition, because of the existence of a subsequent memory; just as (in the case of) blue (which is perceived and subsequently remembered)," although there is a mere conformity to the reason and probandum in the example, invariable concomitance between them cannot be established. Hence, the example is not mentioned explicitly, like the fact that apperceptive consciousness is the probandum. And, although (such a syllogism) might prove the (existence of) mere experience, as that would be (proving the) already proven, it is not (formally) proposed, like that (fact that apperception is the probandum).

According to (Chandrakirti's) system, the non-existence of apperceptive consciousness does not preclude the production of memory, as he shows in the Introduction:

As I have no (intrinsically) other memory
From that (cognition) experiencing objects,
I will remember "I saw (it)!"-
This is the system of social conventions.

This verse does not refute the above-explained reason for holding that the production of memory is excluded by the absence of apperceptive consciousness. It (merely) refutes the notion of apperceptive consciousness above, which depends (logically) on a special sort of (intrinsically other) memory (for whose production it is necessary). The notion is that, since when one remembers a prior seeing of blue as "I saw it before," one is remembering that former seeing as seen by oneself, that (special) sort of memory would be precluded if the former blue-cognition did not experience itself, and thus that former (cognition) was self-consciously apperceptive.

(However), (Chandrakirti) proves that the notion "I saw it before" occurs not by the influence of apperceptive consciousness, but by the influence of the application of both the prior experience of the blue object and the later memory-cognition to one (and the same) object. And further, (319)

in order to prove that, he argues that since the (same) object which is first experienced and discerned by the prior cognition of blue is remembered by the later blue-cognition, it is not not experienced and not not discerned. As he states: "according to me it is because experience and memory are not intrinsically identifiably other." If merely that reason (of identifiable otherness) were (enough to establish apperception), then Maitreya's experience would be remembered by Upagupta. Therefore, if those two (memory and experience) were established as substantially different, as the opponent would have it, the natural (conventional) mind would hold notions of (their) substantial otherness, it would not hold that what was perceived by the former blue-cognition is perceived (also) by the later memory, it would be impossible for experience and memory to have the same object, and it would be impossible for the memory "I saw it before" to occur. But according to us, those two are not substantially different and the natural mind has no such notions, and hence (we can) show that it is not impossible for memory to hold "I discerned it" about an object discerned by a previous cognition. Furthermore, (memory) accedes to an object by force of the attraction of a prior experience, being without any independent motivation to discern any object, as is not the case with any other (hypothetical independent cognition, such as the second instant of blue-cognition, etc.)

Thus, this non-acceptance of apperceptive consciousness, even conventionally, is the ultimate in the negation of intrinsic identifiability, even conventionally. Although he does not state explicitly whether or not (this negation is accomplished) by restricting experience to self-experience or other-experience, he means to pose no such alternative, just as, in not accepting the lamp's self-illumination while accepting its luminosity, he does not restrict it to the alternative of illumination by itself or by other means.

One might object that in the case of the lamp there is no fault of non-substantiation by validating cognition even if it does not illuminate itself; and yet consciousness is different from the lamp, since it becomes non-substantiated by validating cognition if it is not taken as self-consciously

apperceptive. (Then we reply): "How would you answer the argument that if a lamp does not illuminate with respect to itself and does not illuminate with respect to any other, it is not established thus as luminous, nor as anything else, and hence is not established by validating cognition?" If you consider that, although it is not luminous with respect to itself or to any other, it illuminates pots, etc., hence is established as luminous, well then, (we suggest) it is just the same in the case of consciousness! If you further object that, since the actual cognition of objects itself depends on apperceptive consciousness, without apperception the (320)

object-cognition is not substantiated, we repeat that it is still just like the case of the lamp. And if you still imagine that in that case you will take your stand on the fact that lamps illuminate themselves by themselves, (we must insist that) this is wrong, as then it would be impossible for darkness to obscure them, and also darkness itself would obscure itself. And if you accept that, then darkness would be invisible. In short, since consciousness is designated through its dependence on objects, it is without intrinsically identifiable status, and objects themselves are just the same. By this reason, not only are these two (subject and object) conventionally mutually dependent, but the further point is that due to the mere interdependent designativeness (of things), apperceptive consciousness is inadmissible.

This can also be understood from the reason refuting apperceptive consciousness given (by Nagarjuna) in his Rebuttal of Objections:

If (you think) validating cognition is self-substantiated, then your validating cognition is substantiated without requiring any objects, since the self-established depends on no other.

But you object that the "I" in the memory "I saw blue before" is the person, and since that is excluded from blue-cognition, how can memory of it be memory of blue-cognition?

Although eye-consciousness perceiving blue and person seeing blue are mutually exclusive, there is no contradiction in saying "I saw blue" depending on that cognition's perception of blue. So, how can that memory of "person," "I saw blue before," based on the memory of blue-cognition's seeing blue, exclude the memory of blue-perceiving-cognition?

C. DISTINCTIVE SPECIALTY OF NON-ACCEPTANCE OF DOGMATICIST LOGICAL PRIVACY

a. Origin of The Negation of Private Dogmatism and Other Methods to Explain its Import

The scriptures definitely contain the meaning that if one interprets them in one way, one must accept private dogmatism, and if one interprets them in another way, it is inappropriate to do so.

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Nevertheless, nowhere in all the translated treatises of the orthodox schools is it made explicit that inquiry into the question of private dogmaticism and public dialecticism. (reveals that) private arguments are invalid and dialectical arguments valid, except in the treatises of Chandrakirti and his followers.

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This becomes explicit in (Chandrakirti's) pioneering of the system of the Champions when, in the Lucid Exposition, in the context of showing the inapplicability of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's elucidation of the (opening) stanza (of the Wisdom), "not from self, not from other.. .," he set forth many proofs that Buddhapalita did not maintain any private dogmaticism, and that (further) it would be irrational for (any) Centrist to be privately dogmatic, (setting forth also) many refutations of the contrary opinion. And it is explicit also when, in the Four Hundred Commentary, in the context of refuting the assertions of Master Dharmapala, he briefly outlined the procedure to refute private dogmaticism.

As far as Bhavaviveka was concerned, he did not think there was any disagreement between himself and Buddhapalita about whether or not to accept private dogmaticism. He seemed (simply) to assume that (Buddhapalita's) system did not live up to (an assumed tacit) acceptance of private dogmaticism. This is the key to (Bhavaviveka's) failure to assert any distinction between himself and Buddhapalita in regard to the negatees (used) in their negations of intrinsic reality in persons and things. Avalokitavrata, a follower of Bhavaviveka, was familiar with the Lucid Exposition, hence one might expect him to explain, in his commentary on (Bhavaviveka's) refutation of Buddhapalita in the Wisdom Lamp, whether or not he found Chandrakirti's criticism of Bhavaviveka to be applicable. Likewise, one might expect Shantarakshita, Kamalashila, and their followers to set forth a rebuttal of Chandrakirti's refutation of private dogmaticism. (However, the fact is) none of them did so.

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In general, the two (Dialecticist) masters took as the ultimate in profound and subtle reasonings both those reasonings proving the perfect viability of all systems such as causality in the absence of the intrinsic reality that is negated as intrinsic identifiability even conventionally, and also (those reasonings) negating that negatee (of intrinsic identifiability) by the very reason of relativity, asserted clearly to be the relativity of (all things), transcendental and non-transcendental. Moreover, among these (ultimately subtle and profound reasonings), (they) took this negation of dogmaticist privacy as the most subtle (of all).

In this regard, a certain pandit argues that the private logical reason would be appropriate if there were substantiation by validating cognition of both reason and the invariable concomitance proving the probandum;

but it is not appropriate, such not being the case. (For) it is wrong to assert that a logical reason can be authoritatively substantiated for both protagonist and antagonist, since the protagonist does not know what is established by validating cognition for the antagonist, as he cannot the details of the other's thoughts by either perception or inference; nor does he know what is established by validating cognition for himself, as it is always possible his judgment is in error.

(But we respond that) this (approach) is utterly wrong, for if such were the case, it would also be inappropriate to refute (an antagonist with a public syllogism), even if one (based one's argument upon) the assertions of the opponent (and not upon one's own private assertion). For, one could not know the antagonist's position, not knowing his thoughts, and one's own refutation through advancing (the antagonist's) fallacies could be wrong, as it would always be possible that one's judgment about those fallacies could be mistaken.

(This same pandit) argues that the reason that the invariable concomitance (of reason with probandum) is not established by validating cognition is that perception, although it can cognize the concomitance of the presence of fire with the presence of smoke in a kitchen, does not cognize the concomitance of the presence of fire with the presence of smoke in all times and places; and further, inference does not cognize the concomitance of the probandum-property with a reason present at all times and places. Thus, (he concludes) concomitance is established by mere conventional assertion, and not by any validating cognition.

This (argument) also is entirely wrong, because it negates (the valid cognizability of concomitance) by distorting the import of the exposition of the method for establishing concomitance given in the logical texts.

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For the import of the (logical) treatises is certainly not that the proof of the concomitance of presence of fire with presence of smoke, based on (the example of a kitchen), is a proof of the concomitance of presence of fire of a kitchen with presence of smoke of a kitchen. Otherwise, the reason of presence of smoke in an occasionally smoky kitchen would prove the presence of fire of that kitchen (always). This is because, if the reason of presence of occasional smoke proved the invariable concomitance of the presence of fire, then concomitance would be proved between whatever is taken as reason and whatever is taken as (probandum-) property (just by taking two things in that relationship). And it is also because the mode of proof of that would be as mentioned above (as denied to be the import of the treatises). Thus, if the kitchen is the base for certification of the invariable concomitance of fire-presence with smoke-presence, and the invariable concomitance is the thing to be certified there, you (Pandit), if (concomitance is) as you think, just show us an additional exemplary case as a basis for certification of concomitance! Similarly, how could the proof, based on the (example) pot, of the concomitance which proves the impermanence of sound by the reason of (its) production be no more than a proof of the concomitance of the pot's impermanence with the pot's production? Thus, do not wrongly

construe (the nature of concomitance), since the method to certify the reliability for all times and places of precisely the establishment of concomitance of fire-presence and impermanence with mere smoke(-presence) and (mere) production (respectively), unspecified as to time and place, is the mention (as examples) of the "smoke(-presence)" of this time and place and of the "production" of this time and place. Therefore, having followed this reasoning, still to insist that the precise reversal of the argument rebuts (my refutation of your position) is like a drowning man's clutching at a bunch of straw!

Now, (such a pandit) might say that the face-value or habitual perception of things is established without analysis by commonsensical (325)

validating cognition, having refuted any validating cognition unerring about its objects, giving the fact that the opponent's system and not his own asserts the ability (of things) to withstand rational analysis as the reason that the negated fallacy does not rebound upon himself. Nevertheless, he does not seem to (be able) to discern the difference between the analysis as to conventional status and the analysis as to actual status (of things), or the difference between the two types of Centrists' (respective) analyses of actual status (of things). Finally, although he constantly declares that "there is no intrinsic identity, even conventionally," still, since he seems not to know how to represent such (systems) as causality in the (condition of) the mere nominal designation (of things), as the referents of conventional designations cannot be discovered when (analytically) sought, according to the above explanation, his assertions are no more than (empty) talk.

Again, some other (scholars) assert that the import of lack of the private reason and private thesis is that the truthlessness which is the simple exclusion of truth is not something that can be proved, and that the false views (of antagonists) are negated by consequences based on the antagonist's assertions or the ultimate implications of those assertions, there being absolutely nothing established by validating cognition.

Still others say that all schemes of ultimate and superficial (realities) are presented only for the view of others, and not as one's own system. And they even say that "even that statement itself was not made by me, but only appears (to be so made) in the view of others ! (But) such talk never happened among the refuters of private dogmatism of ancient times, and is merely the chatter of latter-day (philosophers).

The majority of these above persons, while asserting the special negatee of this system, negate the validated cognizability of relativity, and thus are the chief target of our critique. However, I already explained and refuted their (theories) in my Stages of the Path of Enlightenment, and so I will not enlarge upon them here.

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b. Existence of Reason Proving Probandum
but Non-existence of Private Reason

i. How There Is Proof of Probandum by Reason

Our own interpretation (is as follows): if you assert the intrinsically identifiable status mentioned in the Elucidation of Intention, you definitely must employ private (syllogisms), like the orthodox Realists and Bhavaviveka, etc. If you do not admit even conventionally any intrinsically identifiable thing, there is no doubt that you must not employ private (327)

dogmaticism. Thus, the negation of the subtle negatee likewise comes down to this. This is not (a question of) not asserting private dogmaticist (syllogisms) in the belief that if there is no intrinsically identifiable thing even conventionally, then the establishment of the probandum of our own position, the means of proof proving that, validating cognitions, and their objects are all prohibited. In the Introduction Commentary, (328)

when (Chandra) negates both positions through the analysis-"The cause produces the effect through contact or without contact?"-as proof that the fault lodges with the opponent, (he states): "Accordingly, this examination applies to (the view that) the produced and the producer (are) intrinsically identifiable...." Thus he states that the fault (arising) from the alternative analysis accrues to the belief in intrinsically identifiable cause and effect, and that there is no such fault in the position (that cause and effect) are without intrinsic reality, just like illusion. Then, when the opponent uses his own arguments to rebut him, he answers:

The fault you just advanced"Does the refutation refute the refutand through contact or without contact?"—applies to whoever has a definite position, but this consequence is not applicable to me since this position does not exist for me.

As the reason for the dissimilarity of the two, he states in the verse that he has no position of his own, and in the commentary, he adds: "Because refutation and the refutand do not have intrinsically real status."

Thus, he explains "positionlessness" as meaning the lack of intrinsically real or intrinsically identifiable assertions, which has the same meaning as the reason explained for dissimilarity (of positions) in the passage on causality.

In this context (Chandra) goes on to quote (the Transcendent Wisdom Scripture):

When Shariputra questioned Subhuti with the analysis, "Do produced things obtain an unproduced attainment, or a produced attainment?" he answered, ""Neither is acceptable." And then to the question, "Then is there no attainment or realization?" he answered, "Though those

two do exist, (their existence) is not in the manner of a duality."

He then quotes further: "Those two and the (stage of) stream-winner, etc. are (existent) as mundane conventions; in the absolute, there is no attainment and no realization." (And continues to comment):

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Here, because of the logical consequence of duality, he negates the getting of attainments as either produced or unproduced things. Since duality is inapplicable in (the condition of) unreality, he accepts the reaching of attainments as non-analytic mundane conventions; likewise, although refutation and refutee do not exist either through contact or without contact (in the ultimate), one should know that refutation refutes the refutee conventionally.

Further: "Refutation devoid of intrinsic reality refutes the refutee, and a reason, even without (intrinsic) validation, being devoid of intrinsic reality, proves the probandum."

Thus, he declares that all proof and refutation should be taken according to the dialogue between the two Elders. "Attainment" means that to be acquired. As for the (suggestion that), when questioned through analysis as to what attainment is acquired, if neither is admitted, then (perhaps) there is no obtainment of result (at all), that is to hold that, when analysis discovers no (result), it negates any (possibility). "(Though those two) do exist" refers to (things merely) not found by rational cognition, and not (totally) negated--hence, they are said to exist. The statement that "it is not in the manner of a duality" means that neither of the two analysands, "produced" or "unproduced," are discovered. The rest of the quotation elucidates the import that "ultimate non-existence" is the analytic non-discovery (of anything) in the manner of duality, and "existence" is conventional existence. Although this is perfectly clear, since the words "analytic" and "non-analytic" are difficult, one must know all the above-explained four methods of analysis. "Duality is inapplicable in (ultimate) unreality" means that if one admits intrinsically identifiable existence, or existence that is not merely established by force of convention, dichotomous analysis is applicable, but if (one admits) unreality or intrinsic realitylessness, such analysis is not applicable.

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Thus, in the Lucid Exposition, he states that validating cognitions and their objects are presented in mutual dependence, once intrinsically real status is denied them. And (Nagarjuna), in his own commentary on Rebuttal of Objections, states with examples that one can prove a probandum even without intrinsic reality.

In general, with the rule (from the Wisdom): "To whatever emptiness is appropriate," (Nagarjuna) states repeatedly that for the position of emptiness with respect to intrinsically identifiable reality, all systems of the samsaric life-cycle and of Nirvana are valid. Thus, if we hold as

invalid the function of logical reasons proving probanda and the function of validating cognitions apprehending their objects, it merely demonstrates the feebleness of our intelligence.

As for the meaning of the Rebuttal of Objections statement, "if I had any position, then there would arise that fault for me," it is the same as (the above lines of Chandra), "... applies to whoever has a (definite position)..."; and likewise the following statement, "(but) since I have no position, there only is no fault for me," has the same meaning as (the above), "since this position does not exist for me this consequence is not applicable." Therefore, the import of "thesislessness" and "positionlessness" (should be understood) according to the explanation of the Introduction Commentary.

(Further, Aryadeva) states in the Four Hundred:

Whoever takes no position at all,
Either "existence," "non-existence," or "both existence and non-existence,"
Cannot be (successfully) refuted
Even if (one tries) for a very long time.

This is not an authoritative source for (the Centrist's) non-assertion of proof of probanda even in the non-analytic conventional. For, although (Aryadeva) states that he cannot be faulted because he has no position, (Chandra) explains, in the Introduction Commentary, "because of the fact of the inappropriateness of these dualistic (analytic) theories in regard to the designatively existent, (an opponent's) refutation and rebuttals will (331)

never succeed in faulting the Centrist in any way." (That is), since refutation through (dualistic) analysis such as "is the attainment produced or unproduced?" is inapplicable to the non-analytically posited designatively existent, established by force of conventions, criticism through dualistic analysis will never succeed in refuting (the Centrist).¹²⁸ Therefore, when (Chandra) in the Lucid Exposition uses these (above) references as evidence for the statement "because he does not assert any other position," given as the reason for the improperness of a Centrist's use of private dogmaticism, (he is only giving) evidence for the (fact that) the Centrist does not assert ultimate status or does not properly assert the intrinsic identifiability (of anything). And the statement "if there is no such (assertion) and if such (another type of assertion) is improper" negates private dogmaticist (reasons), and does not negate a mere reason's proof of its probandum. "Dualistic theory" is stated to have three patterns: the theory that the negatee is a truth, and that the negation negating it is (also) a truth; the theory that (the negatee) has intrinsic identifiability and (its negation) total non-existence; and the above-explained dualistic theory (about production and non-production, etc.).

ii. Rule of Non-Assertion of Private Reason

Here, one might imagine that, if intrinsically identifiable position, reason, and example are never possible, then not only private dogmaticism, but also all functions are invalidated. Nevertheless, this system establishes the validity of all functions, such as proof of probanda, (precisely) by negating that (intrinsic identifiability). Thus, what might be the reason for the impropriety of the admission of the functional effectiveness of (conventional) private reasons and probanda (in particular)?

(Chandrakirti) explains this in the Lucid Exposition in three (parts): giving) the reasoning negating the private (approach), the way in which the opponent tacitly accepts that reasoning, and the reason why his own approach is not likewise subject to the same criticism.

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(First), (Chandra) criticizes Bhavaviveka's syllogism, "Internal media are certainly not self-produced absolutely, because they exist, just as consciousness itself exists," (in the following manner):

Your use of the thesis-qualification "absolutely" is unnecessary from your own standpoint, since you do not accept production from self even superficially. (If you maintain that) it relates to (the standpoint of) others, it would be better to refute (your) heterodox (opponents) without any such qualification, since they muddle the two realities and should be refuted in terms of both. (Further), since it is inappropriate to refute the claim of self-production in mundane conventional terms, it is inappropriate to employ such qualifications in that (context); for the mundane person assents to the mere arising of an effect from a cause without any analytic inquiry into whether it is produced from self or from other. Again, if it is the case that (you) wish to refute even the superficial production of the eye, etc., which your opponent believes to be absolute, this then entails with respect to yourself either the thesis-fault of subjectlessness, or the reason-fault of groundlessness, since you yourself do not accept eye, etc., as absolutely (existent). If you object that my critique is inapplicable since, although absolute eye, etc., are not established, superficial eye, etc., exist, (I must ask you) then what is qualified by "absolutely"? If you venture that it qualifies the negation of production since you are negating ultimate production of superficial things such as eye, etc., (I must insist) that this is wrong, because you

did not state (it in) that (way), and because, even if you had stated it thus, it would entail the fallacy of subjectlessness with respect to the other party.

To rebut this critique, (Bhavaviveka) argues that, when the Buddhist proves the impermanence of sound in (arguing with) the Vaisheshika, (the subject and probandum) are considered in general, and not as specifically qualified; because, if it was considered (as qualified specifically), there would be no means of establishing the probandum. For if the subject

was considered to be "sound as a transformation of elements," it would be unestablished for the Vaisheshika, and if it was considered to be "sound as a property of ether," it would be unestablished for the Buddhist. Thus, just as (in that case) mere sound in general, with qualifications disregarded, is considered to be the subject, so (in this case) the mere eye, etc., are considered as subject, disregarding all qualifications such as "absolute" and "superficial," and there is no fault of the non-establishment of subject.

In answer, (Chandra) refutes (Bhavya) by demonstrating the arguments such as (that based on) the mutually exclusive difference between the erroneous and the non-erroneous (objects and cognitions), in the light of Bhavya's own claim that the intrinsic actualities of subjects such as eye are not discovered by mere erroneous (cognitions). The gist of these (arguments is as follows). It is inappropriate to posit "mere eye, etc.," disregarding qualifications in light of the two realities, as subjects of the syllogisms proving the absence of production from self of eye, etc.; because the validating cognition that encounters that subject is a cognition that is unmistaken about the intrinsic reality of eye, etc. (according to your own system); and because, as unmistaken cognition does not mistake intrinsic reality, the object it encounters cannot be an erroneous object that falsely appears to have intrinsic identifiability when it actually does not. In regard to the way in which the first reason is admitted (by Bhavya), in a philosophical system that claims that whatever exists, exists by virtue (334)

of its own objectivity, (a cognition) that errs in its perception of intrinsic identifiability cannot be represented as (validly) discovering its proper object. Any sort of validating cognition, either non-conceptual or conceptual (that is, perception or inference), must be unmistaken about the intrinsic identity of its validly cognized object, whether perceptual or conceptual. Thus, a validating cognition must derive its validity from an object which, not being merely a conventional, nominal designation, has intrinsic objectivity or intrinsic reality as its own actual condition; and this is just what (Bhavya's) own system claims. (Finally), the second reason is established by the fact that an object's being discovered by such a type of validating cognition precludes its being an erroneous object. Likewise, an object's being discovered by erroneous cognition precludes its being a non-erroneous object. Therefore, (Bhavya) has not been able to avoid the fault of (his syllogism's) having an unestablished subject (as Chandra previously pointed out).

(Here) some might object that, "just as, in regard to the validating cognition perceiving sound, there is no need to establish it to be qualified as either permanent or impermanent, having first restricted it to such an (335)

alternative, in order for it to serve as a means of establishing the subject sound, so it is not necessary to establish cognition as qualified as either erroneous or non-erroneous, having first restricted it to such an alternative, in order to show it to be the validating cognition that is the means

of establishing the subject. In the same way, even though the validating cognition perceiving sound, having restricted sound to being either permanent or impermanent, finds no permanent sound nor any impermanent sound, that does not preclude its perceiving (mere) sound. Likewise, even though the validating cognitions perceiving eye, etc., do not find eye, etc., as either true objects or false objects, having restricted them to being either true or false, that does not preclude their perceiving (mere) eye, etc. Therefore, those arguments that it is inappropriate to hold mere eye, etc. as subjects (of Bhavya's syllogism) are invalid."

Since such doubts as these would never even arise for Bhavaviveka and his followers or for the Realist sages, Chandrakirti does not explicitly dispel them. Nevertheless, since they do arise for my contemporaries who do not understand this dispute, I will explain. When one examines whether an object is established by validating cognition or not, to pronounce it "established by validating cognition," it is necessary to cognize the indicated object as established as it appears to a non-conceptual validating cognition, or as established as it is ascertained or constructed by a conceptual validating cognition. And that means that it is a genuine object, since it is presented as established as it appears to us or is ascertained by us, and since (our) cognition is presented as non-erroneous in its perceptual object or in its ascertained or conceptual object. Thus, there is no question of (an artificial separation between the object and its cognitive status, as if) the object alone were restricted to an alternative (of being true or false, etc.) and its cognitive status were not so restricted to that alternative. And therefore, since a genuine object is presented as that discovered by a cognition unmistaken with regard to its intrinsic identity, how can the truth or falsity of an object be a question of alternative analysis of the object and not of (the object) as presented to cognition? (Of course) these (methods of verifying objects) are the methods of establishing (objects) by validating cognition used by the disputants who claim that existents exist by their intrinsic objectivity (such as the Dogmaticists), and not our (Dialecticist) method (of establishment of objects by validating cognition).

Thus, the Dogmaticist position is that, although genuine objects such as eye(-medium) are perceived by non-erroneous cognitions, they need **(336)**

not be established as qualified as either conventionally or ultimately objective, (that is) with their status in light of the two realities (determined), and that, although it is proper to analyze the ultimate existence or non-existence (of an object) when it is considered as that qualified (by ultimacy or superficiality), how can criticisms expressed through examination of (an object's) qualification by (one or the other of) the two realities be applicable when (the object) is merely considered as a general subject (of a syllogism)? But Chandra considers that objects so (posited by Dogmaticists) become objectively existent, which is just the same in meaning as "ultimately existent," thus cannot possibly be "merely subjects," since (fundamentally) considered so qualified (as ultimately existent, etc.). And he thus refutes (the contention that) (eye, etc.) are merely

considered as unqualified general subjects (of the syllogism).

If the essence of these (arguments) is understood, one can know the reasons why the Dogmaticists explain that "the analysis of the superficial reality divides it into true and false (objects), because although both can appear (to ordinary cognitions), (the former) are able to perform functions, and the (latter are) not able to perform functions," and yet they do not divide the subjective (cognitions) into true and false. (And one can also know the reasons) why the Dialecticists represent both subjects and objects as true or false according to the mundane (usage) itself, and yet do not so present them in their own system (all in the superficial being false).

Finally, if (the Dogmaticists venture that) the subject (of the syllogism) is presented as established (merely) by erroneous cognition, in which things do not have the intrinsic identifiability they appear to have to both conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions, then the probandum (of the syllogism), namely, intrinsic realitylessness, would already have been established; and how could it be acceptable for an opponent for whom this remains to be proven? Therefore, (even in this case, Bhavaviveka) would still have the fault of unestablished subject (according to his own lights).

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(Here, the puzzled contemporaries further object that) if objects discovered by mistaken cognition and non-erroneous knowable objects were contradictories, then also the object discovered by inferential rational cognition and the ultimate reality would also be contradictories; because it is inadmissible that (ultimate truth) could be discovered "merely," by erroneous cognition and hence must be discovered by cognition un-mistaken with regard to the intrinsic reality (of its objects). And further, all superficial (objects) would become (ultimate realities), because they are encountered by the Victor's phenomenologically omniscient intuition; and yet the word "merely" excludes their discovery by an un-mistaken cognition.

The first criticism does not apply, because, although inferential rational cognition is a mistaken cognition insofar as it is mistaken in regard to (the mode of existence of) its apparent object, it is not the case that everything it discovers is the result of mistaken cognition. For example, our (correct) perception of the sound of a conch, which is both sound and (intrinsically) false, does not preclude our failing to perceive a false sound. (In regard to the second criticism,) a suspicion (such as the objector's) might well arise when considering the context, but the express intention of the speaker is to refute that (superficial objects) are discovered by analytic cognition that analyzes the modes of existence (of those objects), thus he says "merely," and he does not refute (the possibility) that such objects can be encountered by non-erroneous cognitions; because as (Chandrakirti) says in the *Lucid Exposition*, "We say 'what's the use of such application of fine analysis to mundane conventions? as the superficial is found to have its self-existence merely by erroneous cognition.'" Although this mode of explanation (of Chandra's) does

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not correspond with his explanations elsewhere concerning the admission (by Bhavaviveka) that the ultimate status of the basic subject (of the syllogism) is lost, there is no discrepancy with his theory on the refutation of private dogmaticism.

These (above explanations aim to) refute the import (of Bhavya's methodology); now, we should refute his example.

When the Buddhist proves the impermanence of sound to the Vaishe-shika, both systems do not verify (sound) with any validating cognition that finds sound (either) as a property of ether (or) as an elemental transformation. Nevertheless, they can point to "this thing" which is the mere sound that is the goal of validating cognitions. However, the case is different when the advocate of emptiness of intrinsic reality proves to the advocate of non-emptiness of intrinsic reality that eye, etc. are not produced from themselves. For not only can they not discover any objective existence or any objective non-existence, but also they cannot point out to each other, "such a thing as 'this' we both encounter as the actual thing to use as subject of argument." Thus, the contention of the Dogmaticists such as Bhavaviveka, that although there is no pointing out of any general (object) disregarding that kind of qualification (such as "encounterably objectively existent" or not), one can apprehend a general subject disregarding such qualifications as "ultimately" or "truly established or not," cannot be maintained; because if something exists objectively, it is a thing that exists truly. Thus, as this (disagreement) occurred on account of the key point of the disagreement about the measure of the negatee, also in the case of the proof of the impermanence of sound, the two systems can show that "sound is established" even though not according to their respective systems' qualifications, as long as that does not involve any validating cognition, as might be expressed by "(we) both (accept) a validating cognition encountering sound that serves as a validating cognition for this kind of manifestation of sound." (Now) this (analysis) is in terms of the protagonist's assertion of objective

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existence, but even if the Dialecticist were to play the role of protagonist, he could not show any method of establishing (a subject generally) by a validating cognition encountering the subject, disregarding qualification as to objective existence or non-existence, to such an antagonist (who asserts objective existence).

By means of these reasonings, you should also understand the method of (proving Bhavya's fault of) non-establishment of the reason.

(Chandrakirti) appropriately criticizes (Bhavya) by specific analysis as to whether the subject is discovered by true or false cognition, since Bhavaviveka himself criticizes (the Analysts) as to the meaning of their reason in the syllogism "the internal media are productive causal conditions, because the Victor said so," by analysis in the light of the two realities, saying "if you say that it is in a superficial sense, it is unsatisfactory to you yourself, and if you say it is in an ultimate sense, it is

unsatisfactory to me." And the reason for this is the key point that the two realities are set up as those discovered (respectively) by cognitions that truly see knowable objects and by cognitions that superficially or falsely see knowable objects. As (Chandra) states in the Introduction:

Through true and false perceptions of all things,
They are held as having two realities;
The object of true perception is Thatness,
That of false perception said to be superficial reality.

Here, when one only uses the twofold analysis relating to the two realities in regard to the reason, one must ask, "what is the sense of the reason" However, when one makes a threefold analysis (of the reason) including the (possibility of) a mere (general) (reason) unqualified by either of the two (realities), one must ask "What do you set forth as a reason?"

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(Chandrakirti) states as the reason why the above criticisms do not similarly apply to his own methodology, his non-acceptance of private dogmatism: "Syllogisms proving probanda in our own system are sufficient if established for the antagonist, since their only purpose is to refute his false imaginations." (He goes on to explain) that it is sufficient if either party (to a dispute) accepts (a subject, reason, etc.), giving the example of a mundane dispute, and that even Dignaga, who asserts that in (formal) proof and refutation, it is necessary that both establish (subject and reason, etc.), should in fact accept the former method, since (even he does admit that) refutation through scripture and personal inference are only established for oneself,

The meaning of "private dogmatism*" is (illustrated) in certain contexts in the Wisdom Lamp where (Bhavya) generates syllogisms for establishing his probanda, having certified the status of his reason and his subjects both (in proof and refutation) with validating cognition, that is, privately, from the objective condition of the referents, without deriving (his position) from the assertions of his antagonist. These (passages) are marked by expressions such as "it is stated in 'independent' (rang dbang du) terms," or "in terms of refutation" where (the Tibetan) "*"independent" (rang dbang) is synonymous with (the Tibetan) "private" (rang rgyud),

(In conclusion), (the Dialecticist) accepts both reasons and probanda without accepting private reasons and probanda, since the probanda are not yet established by antagonists who assert that existents are intrinsically, objectively existent, and since he cannot certify that "*"such and such is the method for establishing by a validating cognition an object which is not qualified, as above, as either objectively existent or as ob-

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jectively inexistent. And when (a Dialecticist) sets forth a public syllogism proving the realitylessness of the objective status of a sprout, employing

the reason of relativity and the example of a mirror-image, he does not call (his syllogism) "public" and "not established for both (parties)" because he himself does not assert the concomitance between the sprout and relativity or between relativity and intrinsic realitylessness, but because, as above, (his reason, etc.) will not be established independently by validating cognition for his antagonist. Thus (a "public syllogism") means that (it employs reasons, subjects, etc., which are) not established for both (parties) by validating cognition in such a (private) manner. Although the sprout and its relativity are established by natural, conventional, validating cognitions in the mental processes of both protagonist and antagonist, that (type of validating cognition) is confused for the antagonist with (a presumed) validating cognition encountering intrinsic objective existence, and the two are not distinct for him until his (authentic) view is generated. Hence the protagonist is unable to show him (anything established by merely conventional validating cognition) until such time (as his confusion is gone), even though the protagonist himself distinguishes (the two types of validating cognition). Although Dialecticists among themselves may demonstrate methods of establishment (of subjects, etc.) by validating cognitions without deriving them from each other's assertions, (they employ) validating cognitions presented in verbal, conventional terms, and not presented in terms of the intrinsic objectivity of the phenomena (involved). Hence, (the employment of) private dogmaticism is inappropriate (for them also). In regard to (phenomena) such as a sprout, there are three perceptual habits: one holding it to be objectively existent; one holding it to be objectively inexistent; and one holding it without qualifying it in either way. If the distinction is clearly understood that all three of these habit patterns exist in the mental process of one in whom the authentic view is generated, but that only the first and the last are present in the mental process of one in whom no authentic view has been generated, then one will put a stop to the following false views: (the view) that rationality (342)

does not put a stop to all perception (controlled) by the mental constructions (such as) "this is it"; (the view) that all practices before the generation of the authentic view, such as cultivation of the will to enlightenment, are but truth-habits, or sign-habits; and (the view) that after one lays claim to having generated in mind the authentic view, there will be no intentionality in all one's acts.

Therefore, it is not enough, when proving a probandum with a public reason, for the antagonist only to accept it. The subject, probandum, and the reason, etc. must be established by (conventional) validating cognition recognized from one's own point of view, and even the antagonist must definitely or somewhat accept it. Otherwise, if (the antagonist) is mistaken about the conceptual object, he will be unable to generate the view that realizes ultimate reality. And this very fact of the indispensability of conventional validating cognition as the cause of encountering the supreme reality is the import of (Nagarjuna's famous) statement: "Without relying on conventions, the supreme reality will not

be understood."

(Finally), one might suppose that, according to this (critique by Chandrakirti), the Dogmaticists such as Bhavaviveka--since they (by implication) assert what amounts to ultimate or true status (of phenomena)--should not be classified as Centrists. (However), we cannot say "I accept that as a pot," when we ascertain its roundness yet are not sure that it is a pot, since it is yet to be established by validating cognition. And we cannot say that the Vaisheshika is not a philosopher who asserts a whole substantially different (from its parts), even though (in our view) he proves by validating cognition what amounts to be the non-existence of the whole "pot" substantially different from its parts. Just so, those (Dogmaticist) sages are Centrists, since they clearly assert truthlessness, refuting with numerous rational methods the true existence of phenom- (343)

ena. And this does not contradict (Chandrakirti's) statement that, if one is a Centrist, it is wrong to engage in private dogmatism, just as, although it is wrong for a monk holding vows to break them, it is not necessary that he not be a monk by the mere fact of his breaking them (to some degree).

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Chapter VI

AVOIDANCE OF CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE (DIALECTICIST) SYSTEM AND THE SCRIPTURES

AVOIDANCE OF CONTRADICTION WITH THE ELUCIDATION OF INTENTION

Now one may wonder, if the interpretations of the other masters are as explained above, how does this master interpret the differentiation between reality and realitylessness with reference to the three natures and the method of presenting interpretable and definitive meanings of the Elucidation of Intention?

On this subject, there is no clear explanation in the original treatises of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, nor did Buddhapalita explicate the details of this (question). However, (Chandrakirti), in the Introduction Commentary, explains four theories (of the Idealists) to be interpretable in meaning: (namely), the theories that the first two natures (respectively) do not and do exist with intrinsic identifiability; that there is a fundamental consciousness; that there are no external objects; and that there is final genealogical determinism. His own words are as follows, (first quoting an Idealist):

"This scriptural reference makes it clear that even other scriptures of that same type are interpretable in meaning."

Which are the ""scriptures of that same type?" (They are) such as

the Elucidation of Intention, teaching the three natures, imagined, relative, and perfect, with the imagined utterly non-existent and the relative utterly existent; and (teaching that) "the grasping consciousness is deep and subtle, all seeds streaming (therein) like flowing water; thus I do not show it to the naive, thinking it inappropriate, lest they construe it as a self." And such as these are explained to be interpretable by the scripture: "Just as a doctor prescribes medicines for the sickness of invalids, so the Buddha teaches even 'mind-only' to some living beings."

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Thinking that the last (of the four doctrines) could be understood as interpretable from the proof of (the doctrine of) the unique vehicle executed (by Nagarjuna) in the Scripture Synthesis² (Chandra) in the Introduction Commentary proves by reason and reference the interpretability of the first three (doctrines), this quote showing the (proof of) their interpretability through scriptural reference. There are two kinds of "mind-only" references, those that negate external things and those that do not. With reference to the type of scripture that makes such statements as "the externally apparent does not exist," (Chandra states) that the Mission to Lanka clearly shows their interpretability. For, the statements of "mind-only" are not in terms of the Teacher's own system but in terms of the inclination of the disciples, just as the doctor does not give medicine to particular patients out of his own whim, but in accord with the particular pattern of the patient's sickness.

(Chandra) continues, saying, "likewise the mention of Buddha-essence in the Buddha's discourses... and concludes his quotations by saying, "thus, such kinds of scriptures, all of which are accepted as definitive in meaning by the Idealists, are clearly shown to be interpretable in meaning by this (very) scriptural reference." This passage is explained (by Jayananda) in his Subcommentary as showing the interpretability of the statements of "mind-only," by using the statements of the interpretability of the "Buddha-essence" as examples, and he also explains "this scriptural reference" as referring to the Ten Stages refutation of the world-creator in the context of the realization of relativity. (But) this is incorrect, since (Chandra) in his own commentary uses the interpretability of "mind-only" statements as the example, and then proves the interpretability of all scriptures taken as definitive by the Experientialists by reason of the statement of the interpretability of the Buddha-essence (doctrine). Thus, "by this scriptural reference," in this context referring to one of two (preceding quotes), refers to the Mission to Lanka indication of the interpretability of the Buddha-essence (doctrine) and of the (fact that)

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realitylessness is to be understood as the inner (gist) of all the scriptures. And, as for the Ten Stages refutation of any other creator (than the mind), this is stated as evidence for the fact that the "only" in the expression "mind-only" does not exclude external things, and not as evidence showing that the negation of external things is interpretable in meaning.

"Such kinds of scriptures" refers to those that give teachings such as those in the Elucidation of Intention above, and does not show that the Idealists assert the definitiveness of scriptures that show the Buddha-essence (doctrine) to be interpretable! There is no question about both these points. Our own view is that (Chandra's) quotation of the statement of the interpretability of the Buddha-essence (doctrine) is the (scriptural) proof that the Elucidation of Intention doctrine of the fundamental consciousness is not to be taken literally.

In this regard, it is first necessary to understand that the teaching of the (Buddha-) essence is not literally intended, as the Mission to Lanka states:

Those scriptures that teach according to the inclinations of living beings are erroneous in meaning, not giving the message of Thatness. A teaching which is like a mirage, deceiving thirsty beasts by having no water, may generate devotion in the naive-minded, but is not the message that establishes the wisdom of the Holy Ones. Therefore, you should follow the (intended) meaning, and should not be attached to the expression.

Further, in the Mission to Lanka, Mahamati questions:

The Lord promulgates the Buddha-essence in the discourses, saying it is naturally radiant, primordially pure, endowed with the thirty-two marks, and existing within the bodies of all living beings. You say it is like a precious gem, wrapped in a filthy rag, being permanent, stable, and eternal, but wrapped by the defilement of the aggregates, elements, and sense-media. How is this Buddha-essence-theory different from the soul-theory of the heterodox? For the heterodox also espouse a soul as permanent, inactive, qualityless, all-pervading, and indestructible.

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In answer, the Lord said that the Buddhas teach the Buddha-essence (intending) the objective selflessness, the non-apparent object, with its synonyms such as "emptiness," "signlessness," and "wishlessness," in order to avoid the fear of selflessness on the part of the naive and to educate the heterodox who are attracted to soul-theories, and thus it is not the same as the heterodox soul-theories. Present and future bodhisattvas should not become attached to it as a self. Thinking that those beings whose thoughts have been dominated by soul-theories will more quickly come to enlightenment if their thoughts dwell in the sphere of the three doors of liberation, the (Buddhas) teach the Buddha-essence to that end. Thus one should understand the Buddha-essence as corresponding to selflessness, in order to eliminate heterodox views. I quote (and paraphrase) here no further, fearing prolixity.

Thus, (Chandra) proves the non-similarity between the theory of the Buddha-essence and the theory of the existence of self by the reason that (the Buddha's) statement intimates as its intended basis the emptiness which is objective selflessness, out of the need to eliminate the (disciples')

fear of selflessness and gradually to lead those attached to soul-theories toward selflessness. Such being the case, the soul-theorists are intending just what they are teaching, whereas the Teacher's intended meaning, which he considers when teaching, and his literal meaning are utterly different. When the soul-theorists teach the permanent, and so on, self, they are at all times certainly and firmly committed to their own literal meaning, whereas the Teacher sometimes teaches as if his literal meaning were true, but then later (indicates that he did so) in order to lead (the disciples' minds) around to the intimated meaning he was intending. Thus, (Chandra shows we) must see through the (apparent) similarity, saying "the two are not the same." This clearly shows that if we literally accept the teaching of Buddha-essence as previously expounded, we would be the same as the theorists of soul-existence; and that very fact is the refutation of the explicit (teaching of the Buddha-essence). Thus, what intelligent person would dispute whether or not such statements (of Buddha-essence) in other scriptures are established as interpretable in mean- (348)

ing, when this scripture has shown the intimated basis, the need, and the refutation of literalness? It is very clear about the inappropriateness of literal acceptance, using the example of a mirage, and saying, "one should follow the (intimated) meaning, and should not be attached to the (literal) expression." If, in spite of this, one does not accept the elucidation of (Chandrakirti), but accepts the interpretability of this teaching from rational refutation of its literalness, that being the personal precept of the Indian sages, and yet still does not admit that the above scripture demonstrates the fact (of the Buddha-essence's interpretability), then one merely exhibits one's own true nature!

Further, in the Scripture Synthesis, (Nagarjuna) introduces all the above-quoted scriptural passages with the remark, "the Tathagata, by teaching a variety of doors to the (Great) Vehicle in terms of (the inclinations of) the disciples, teaches this very profound ultimate reality." "This profound ultimate reality" refers directly to the just previously quoted references from the Transcendent Wisdom, etc., teaching the emptiness which is objective selflessness. And "in terms of the disciples" means that such explanations are influenced by the inclinations of the disciples, which has the same meaning as (Chandra's) statement above that "this is the teaching to generate devotion in the naive, and is not the teaching of ultimate reality."

As for the way in which literal acceptance (of the Buddha-essence theory) is the same as the advocacy of the existence of self, (this literal acceptance may be formulated as the assertion that) the Buddha-essence exists as literally taught, the Buddha not having taught the Buddha-essence thinking of the intimated meaning of emptiness, non-production, or selflessness, etc., which is the mere exclusion of the fabrications of objective self or of identifiably existent production, but (having meant it) literally as he taught it. And the (Buddha-essence's) permanence is not merely that indestructibility which is the mere exclusion of the negatee, destruction, but is a permanence which arises as an established entity,

like (the colors) yellow or blue, not needing to be represented as the exclusion of negation. Such being the case, as there is no difference (between this position and) the type of permanence (maintained) by the non-Buddhist advocates of the permanent self, (this position) amounts to an assertion of a permanent phenomenon. The refutation of this (theory) is (accomplished by) the elucidations in the higher and lower orthodox schools of the reasonings refuting the permanence advocated by the heterodox (philosophers), since those (Buddhist scholars) do not accept any such (permanent) thing.

Once one asserts the determination of a permanent thing that is not
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merely a negation excluding destruction, one is not suitably receptive to any sort of explanation of the two selflessnesses, taught to be the selfless reality which is the mere exclusion of the fabrications, the two "selves." As these scriptures have stated above, (the Buddhas) declare (the Buddha-essence, etc.) for the sake of those who are attached to self-theories, in order to eliminate their fear of selflessness.

Therefore, there are two modes (of teachings) with interpretable meaning. There are those interpretable meaning teachings for the sake of gradually leading to reality those Buddhists who are suitably receptive to explanations of the ordinary personal selflessness and the gross objective selflessness; and showing the refutation of their literal meaning is extremely difficult. (Second,) there are those interpretable meaning teachings taught in order to educate those of the heterodox type who, as explained above, are not ready for the full explanation of even the ordinary personal selflessness, as they either openly advocate the heterodox self or else have a great habitual affinity for such views from their former lives; and it is easy to show the refutation of their literal meaning.

If thus the doctrine of the existence of a (Buddha-) essence which is permanent, etc., is interpretable in meaning, how does one establish the interpretability of (the doctrine of) fundamental consciousness?

The two expressions, "Buddha-essence" and "fundamental consciousness" are repeatedly declared to be synonymous; thus, from the Dense Array Scripture:

The various realms are the fundamental consciousness, and so also are the Buddha-essences. The Tathagatas indicate that very nature by means of the expression "fundamental consciousness." Although the "essence" is renowned as the "fundamental," the feeble-minded are unaware of it.

Likewise, the Mission to Lanka mentions that "the Buddha-essence, renowned as the "fundamental consciousness, is endowed with the seven (auxiliary) consciousnesses." Thus, they are the same, being verbally
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synonymous considering their intended meaning, in spite of the fact that they are not shown to be literally (and conceptually) equivalent, the one

being permanent, the other impermanent, since the fundamental consciousness is taught intending the very same thing intended by teaching of the essence. Such being the case, the demonstration of the former's interpretability establishes the latter as interpretable in meaning. Such is the view of Chandra, as he states in the Introduction Commentary that "it must be acknowledged that it is precisely emptiness that (the Buddha) indicated by the expression 'fundamental consciousness,' in order to introduce the intrinsic reality of all phenomena."

Thus, although that intended is the same thing (when speaking of "essence" and "fundamental"), the disciples are different. The disciple for whom the "fundamental consciousness" is declared is suitably receptive to the teaching of the ordinary personal selflessness and of the objective selflessness which is (defined as) emptiness of subject-object-duality. (We know this) because such (a disciple) is unable to understand the intrinsic realitylessness of all persons and things; because the fundamental consciousness is presented out of the necessity of teaching emptiness with respect to external objects, as (Chandra) says in the Introduction:

"Fundamental consciousness exists!" "Person exists!" «"These aggregates alone exist!"--These teachings are for the sake of those who do not understand Thatness, the most profound of things.

(Finally), the source that shows the interpretability of the differentiation of the first two (of the three) natures with regard to not existing and existing (respectively) with intrinsic identifiability is the Mission to Lanka passage quoted in the Introduction Commentary immediately after the scriptural citations that show the interpretability of the above doctrines; namely, the statement, "Mahamati, this inner understanding of the scriptures of all Buddhas has the nature of emptiness, productionlessness, non-duality, and intrinsic realitylessness. ..." Thus, (the Buddha here) **(351)**

declares that any sort of scripture whatsoever should be understood as having this very meaning (of non-duality, etc.).

Well then, how does this system present the interpretability and definitiveness of the three wheels (of Dharma)?

(Even) in the first wheel, the statements of intrinsic realitylessness of persons and things are definitive in meaning. (However, the explanation of personal (selflessness) through negation of merely substantial self-sufficiency (of a supposed self) different in nature from the aggregates, rather than through negation of the intrinsic identifiability (of that supposed self) is interpretable in meaning. That intended by such (explanations) is the mere conventional existence (of self). As for the necessity (for such an interpretable teaching,) it is in order to avoid the arising of nihilism (in such a disciple) from the teaching of the emptiness of persons and things with regard to intrinsic identifiability, to cultivate their mental processes by teaching the gross selflessness, and (finally) to introduce them to the subtle selflessness. And the refutation of the literal accept-

ability (of these teachings) consists in the reasonings negating intrinsically identifiable status (of things).

Next, in the second wheel, the statements that persons and things are empty with respect to ultimate or intrinsically identifiable existence while yet existing according to mundane conventionality are the ultimate in definitive meaning. They were taught to those Universalists able to understand the equivalency of relativity empty of intrinsic identifiability with emptiness with respect to intrinsic reality, since (causal processes) such as bondage and liberation are definitely non-viable (if presumed to) have intrinsically identifiable status, and it is indispensably necessary to accept the relativity of such (causal processes as) bondage and liberation. In the abbreviated teachings of such (second wheel scriptures) as the Heart of Transcendent Wisdom, such as "those five aggregates should be precisely viewed as empty of any intrinsic reality," the negatee is not explicitly qualified with the expression "in the ultimate," yet is implicitly so qualified, as such (qualification) must be understood from the context of the elucidations of (all) statements of emptiness with respect to intrinsic identifiability. Or, even if such were not the case, such (qualification) must be understood as implicit (in the abbreviated versions), since once the qualification "in the ultimate" is applied in such (extensive) versions as the Mother Scripture, it must be understood (as implicit) in (352)

all scriptures of the same class. For example, when a contemporary author composes a treatise, and expresses himself consistently on a certain subject, we must understand (as implicit) (his consistent expression) in those contexts where he does not so express himself (for brevity's sake, etc.). Finally, (in the third wheel), the statements of the lack of intrinsic identifiability of the first nature and of the intrinsically identifiable existence of the latter two natures (are interpretable in meaning). (They are) taught for those (disciples) of the Universal Vehicle class who would find no ground to establish cause-effect and bondage-liberation in the intrinsic realitylessness that is emptiness with respect to intrinsically identifiable status, in order to forestall their falling into the great nihilism from (misinterpreting) the teaching of the middle wheel and in order to introduce them to the subtle objective selflessness by cultivating their mental processes by means of the teaching of the gross objective selflessness. (These statements were made) intending the Idealist differentiation between the first nature and the latter two natures, as (respectively) being established verbally and conventionally and being identifiably established on the conventional level. The refutations of the literal acceptability (of this third wheel teaching) consists of the formulations of the Centrist treatises (to the effect that), although there is no rational refutation of the ultimate non-establishment of persons and things, all presentations such as causality are impossible if (things) are ultimately or intrinsically identifiably existent.

Such is (Chandra's) method of presenting the interpretability and definitiveness (of the three wheels of Dharma), which, although in disagreement with the formulation of the Elucidation of Intention, is con-

sistent with the King of Samadhis and the Teaching of Aksayamati. We must not confuse the (above teachings about the) turning of the wheel of Dharma three times with the meaning of the (following) passage from the Questions of King Dharanishvara:

Just as the jeweler perfects a gem by stages with the threefold cleansing and the threefold rubbing, so the Victor, knowing the scope of the impure living beings, makes those infatuated with the world tired at heart and causes them to engage in the religious discipline by means (353)

of the doctrine of renunciation, such as "impermanence," "misery," "selflessness," and "ugliness." He causes them to realize the deep process of the Tathagata doctrine, by means of the teaching of emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. Next, he installs those living beings in the Buddha-realm by means of the teaching of irreversibility and the teaching of the purification of the three spheres (of acts, that is, agent, action, and patient). And those living beings, having become equalized in their various genealogies and faculties, realize deeply the ultimate nature of the Tathagata, and are dubbed "the unexcelled worthies for offerings."

Thus, this (passage teaches) how a single person is led first into the Individual Vehicle. Then, being introduced into the Buddha-realm, the Universal Vehicle, finally he reaches the stage of attaining Buddhahood. (On the other hand,) the three wheels of Dharma are turned for the sake of Individual Vehicle and Universal Vehicle disciples of different characters. (This is also evident from the fact that) the Scripture Synthesis quotes this scriptural passage as a proof of the fact that there is ultimately one vehicle, since even the Individualists enter (eventually) the Universal Vehicle and attain Buddhahood. Thus, as both the first two stages (mentioned in the passage) lead (the disciple) in the Individual Vehicle, the selflessness of that first stage is like the selflessness included in the four (aspects of the first holy truth, that is,) impermanence, etc., said in the Four Hundred to be a means of cultivating a (disciple's) character before teaching him the view of emptiness. Such (selflessness) is the absence of the self that is (presumed to be) independent among its possessions. (In the passage above), "irreversibility" means that once one enters that (vehicle) it is not necessary to go on any different vehicle.

Here one might object that if the meaning of the scriptures is (both) as the Idealists elucidate it and (also) as the Centrists elucidate it differently, then it becomes a matter of internal contradictions for the speaker (of the scriptural discourses), and the meaning of the scriptures is (entirely) refuted.

Well now, is it the import of the Disciples' Canon that there is no permission for taking life, (even) depending on (certain) circumstances? Or is it not? If it is not, then there would be no difference between the Individual Vehicle and Universal Vehicle Canons with regard to whether taking life is prohibited or allowed. If it is, then, as the import of the

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Universal Vehicle Canon is indeed that, given certain (dire) necessities, taking of life is permitted, there is an internal contradiction for the speaker (of the canons). If I say that, what answer do you have? If you venture that while as far as the Individual Vehicle disciple is concerned there is never permission for taking life, there is no contradiction, since the speaker's intention is that (only) given certain special (cases of) Universal Vehicle (disciples) is there such permission, (then you have answered your own question). Where then is the contradiction in there being (statements about) intrinsic identifiability, considering the intellects of certain Universal Vehicle class disciples who are not (yet) receptive to the full explanation of the profound, and in there being (statements that there is) no intrinsically identifiable status in anything, considering those disciples who are receptive (and able) to understand the full import of the profound?

We cannot apply (this sort of intentional analysis) to statements such as "Having killed father and mother... ," where although the literal meaning is not the meaning of the expression, since that is determined by the speaker's desire, namely (that one should eliminate) existence and craving, since the speaker here wants this sort of disciple to understand the actual meaning as explicitly expressed (albeit symbolically). Therefore, our position is that the non-definitiveness (of a teaching) is proven by showing a (logical) refutation of its literal meaning, the explicit meaning having necessarily been expressed, since no subject of the expression is shown other than the literal one, and there must be some subject of expression (in any even interpretable teaching). Therefore, there are two kinds of cases, one where (a teaching) is both the expressed meaning of the scriptural passage as well as the intention of the speaker, and another where it is necessarily established as the meaning of the scriptural passage, even when it is not the intention of the speaker.

THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
(ELUCIDATION OF INTENTION) AND THE QUESTIONS
OF MAITREYA (CHAPTER OF THE TRANSCENDENT
WISDOM EIGHTEEN THOUSAND)

(Here, it is commonly objected that) if the Elucidation of Intention presentation of the three natures is as explained in the Idealist system, do
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we likewise accept the Questions of Maitreya chapter? Or do we not? If we do, then, as in the case of the Elucidation of Intention, it is not correct to accept the Mother Scripture literally. If we do not, then (how do we account for the fact that) the following passage "Maitreya, consider that imagined form as insubstantial. Consider that constructed form as substantial, not because of its independence, but because of the substantiality of construction. Consider that ultimate form as neither substantial

nor insubstantial, but as derived from the ultimate"-agrees with the Elucidation of Intention by mentioning the substantiality of the relative and by proving the mere nominality of things from form to Buddhahood with the three reasonings (given above) such as "because there would be no cognition prior to the name," etc.?

To explain: Maitreya, wishing to learn how the bodhisattva practices the transcendent wisdom, asked how he should learn (to understand) things from forms to Buddhahood, and was answered that he should learn them as being "mere names." (Maitreya) then asked (further) about how to learn that forms, etc., were "mere names," since, as names such as "form" are apprehended along with the things that serve as their referents, "forms," etc. are not properly "mere names." If there is no referent, a name is not suitably a "mere name"; since, if the objective referent exists, the word "mere" excludes nothing, and if it does not (356)

exist, neither does the name, since it is without referential basis. (The Buddha) then answers that (names) from "form" to "Buddhahood" are coincidentally designated upon their referents, that is, that nominal designation is coincidental. Since "coincidental" here has the meaning of artificial," it refutes the intrinsic reality (of the referents or the names). If, as the Idealist would have it, this passage does not negate the truth-status of forms, etc., but (merely) negates the truth-status of "forms, etc." as nominally designated entities, then the intention of the above statement that (all things) from form to Buddha are mere names should be demonstrable (as meaning that) entities designated by such as "this form, etc." are mere nominal designations (which is not so stated in the passage). In the subsequent passage, where (Maitreya) asks if forms, etc., are non-existent with respect to any nature, and the (Buddha) says he does not say that, (Maitreya) again asks "then how is it?" and (the Buddha) replies that "they exist by mundane terms and conventions, but not in the ultimate." Thus (if the Idealist interpretation were correct), then this statement that (all things) from form to Buddha are equally non-existent in the ultimate, and equally existent in the conventional would be wrong. Therefore, it is mistaken to urge that this chapter elucidates the interpretability of the Mother Scripture by showing the intention of the (scripture's) earlier statements that all things are ultimately non-existent and conventionally existent.

Therefore, the import (of the chapter) is that, since nominally designated things are artificial, that is, established as existent in conventional terms, there is no referent to which names are attached which (itself) is not established as merely conventionally existent. And since that is not to say that in general there is no phenomenal basis for using names, the statement of the existence of that (conventional referent) and the statement that (all things) are mere nominal designations are not contradictory.

Thus, (Maitreya) asks how it is correct that "form" should be coincidentally nominally designated, since the consideration "this form" does not arise by virtue of seeing a manifestation of form without (knowing)

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the name "form," but arises by virtue of the name. (The Buddha) answers that it is correct for the thought "form" to arise since form is established on strength of convention, existing in that mode even before a name has been attached to it. (He) then asks Maitreya himself if a cognition that thinks "form" with regard to a phenomenon arises without depending on the name ("form"). (Maitreya) answers that such does not happen, and (the Buddha) states that for that very reason "forms, etc." are coincidental nominal designations. This (passage) indicates that that reason is the proof that forms, etc., are established on strength of conventions, and is not proof of the opposite, as (he) implies that if form had intrinsically identifiable status, the thought "form" would have to arise without requiring any designation of the name ("form"); just as a sprout would grow without requiring any seed if it were established by its intrinsic identity. (Further), the statement of the coincidentalness of designations of forms, etc., by the (further) reasons of a single thing having many names and many things being designable by one name, means that it is mistaken (to think) that nominal conventions are used on strength of intrinsic identifiability and are not just established coincidentally on strength of conventions.

When one uses these (three) reasons to prove something, it is not at all required that they be used in the way they are used in the Universal Vehicle Compendium. For (Nagarjuna), in his *Subtle Weaving*, uses the latter two (of the three) reasons to negate the ultimate status (of phenomena): "Furthermore, ultimate status is not established because (realistic cognition) is not possible; because of the obvious fault of the confusion of multiple aspects of expressions and their referents, and because of the indeterminacy (of expressions with respect to their referents)."

(Returning to the scripture), (Maitreya) asks if, when one apprehends phenomena from "form" to "Buddha," it is not so that one only perceives that reality of forms, etc., which consists of nominal and conventional designations. (The Buddha queries in turn then) that since there are phenomena which serve as referential bases of nominal designations, is it not the case that forms, etc., have intrinsically real status? (Maitreya) responds that, as for the reality of forms, etc., the referents of conventional designations such as "forms, etc.," it is no more than mere mental
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construction. (Finally the Buddha,) at that "'mere construction" statement, responds: "Well then, what were you thinking when you questioned as before?" This passage indicates that there is no contradiction between the statement that phenomena which are referential bases of names exist, although not as intrinsically identifiable entities, and the statement that such are mere nominal designations.

Thus (Maitreya) suggests that, if forms, etc., are merely names and conventions, would not the reality of forms, etc., then be apprehended, meaning thereby that it would be contradictory to say both the above

"it is mere designation" as well as "its reality is not apprehended"; which means that it is not contradictory for the reality of form etc., to exist, since even one who advocates "mere designation" must accept (the relationship of) designation and referent. In answer, (the Buddha counters, asking that) if (those things are) mere nominal designations, do they have production and destruction, addictive defilement and purification? (Maitreya) then answers that they do not, and (Buddha finally) declares, "Well then, is the question 'If things are mere designations, wouldn't they have their own reality?' appropriate?*"

Then, as explained above, they engage in the exchange beginning "Well, are forms, etc., totally non-existent with respect to any nature?" indicating that the negations of reality, production, destruction, addictive defilement, and purification are in terms of the ultimate and that forms, etc., exist conventionally. Thus, since even mere designations (only exist) in terms of convention, how can the mode of exposition (of this chapter) possibly agree with that of the Elucidation of Intention? Even the Brother-Masters (Asanga and Vasubandhu) did not consider that this chapter revealed the interpretability of (the rest of) the Mother Scripture, but that this chapter is the same (as the rest of the Mother Scripture) since it teaches the ultimate non-existence and conventional existence of all things; and hence, according to the explanation of the Elucidation of Intention, it is not fit to be literally accepted.

(To understand how) this is not contradicted by the fact that (this scripture) states the relative (nature) to exist substantially, one must first know the scripture's mode of representing the three realities. To explain, the scripture identifies the imagined nature (as follows):

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Maitreya, this imaginative construction of a form-reality founded on the name, concept, designation, and convention "form" (ascribed) to the phenomena of the conditional process (is the imagined reality, including all things) from imagined "form" to imagined "Buddha-qualities.

Here, "founded on " means "apprehending in form the referent of the nominal designation." "Imaginative construction of a form-reality" indicates that the imagined is the reality which is imaginatively constructed, not (mere) imagination (itself).

The scripture goes on to identify the discriminatively constructed reality (as follows):

The discriminatively constructed (relative) reality is the articulation of those phenomena of conditional processes, utilizing mental processes inherent in the nature of mere construction; (it is) the names, concepts, designations, and conventions from "form," "sensation," "conception," "creation," and "consciousness" up to "Buddha-qualities." (It includes all things) from "discriminated form" up to "discriminated Buddha-qualities."

Here, "those phenomena" refers to the subjects of expressions, and the mode of expressing them by utilizing discriminative construction (is described by the passage from) "forms," etc. By explaining the thus expressed "names, etc." as the "discriminatively constructed (relative) reality," (we can) understand that the previously indicated subjects and mental constructions are also the discriminated (relative reality), and thus (we understand that it includes) both (the function of) discriminative construction and the ground of discriminative construction.

The scripture then defines the ultimate reality (as follows):

(The ultimate reality is) the truth-limit, Thatness, the objective selflessness and the sole realitylessness, permanent and eternal, of constructed form with respect to imagined form, (including all things) from ultimate form to ultimate Buddha-qualities,
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Here, "ultimate form" is the realitylessness of constructed form, objective selflessness, etc. And since that principle is selflessness and realitylessness of constructed form with respect to imagined form, the negated self" or reality is the imagined reality. "Permanent," etc., indicates emptiness, which is ascertained at all times.

This method (is the same as) the Centrist presentation of the three natures, given by (Chandra) in the Introduction Commentary, where (Chandra explains) that, just as a snake is a (mere) imaginative construct in a rope, not (really) existing there, yet is not (a mere) construct but is established in an actual snake, so intrinsic reality is a (mere) imaginative construct in the created relativity of the relative nature, since (Nagarjuna has defined) intrinsic reality as non-artificial and non-relational, yet such (intrinsic reality) is actual in the sphere of Buddhas, not being merely imaginatively constructed; as one is called a "Buddha" who realizes the solitary intrinsic reality, free of all contact with created things. Thus, this way of presenting the three realities elucidates the inner gist of the scriptures. And thus the meaning of the Mother Scripture should be understood as (Chandra explains) in the Introduction Commentary."0 Here, the "constructed" (reality) is taken as the relative reality of all relative things from form to omniscience; and it is emphasized as the chief (reality). And that reality explained as the imagined, (consisting of) reality-imaginings from form to omniscience, is (itself) taken as the ground, or intrinsic reality, whose existence in the relative is (merely) imagined. Nevertheless, it is perfectly established as the object of a Buddha's ultimate gnosis. Furthermore, the ultimate reality of the relative is its emptiness with respect to the imagined, which is the relative existing ultimately, and that very reality exists as the object of the Buddha's ultimate knowledge. Thus, a single reality is presented as both imagined and also perfectly established when related to different grounds. Therefore, although there is no ultimate or superficial thing which is established as an intrinsic reality endowed with intrinsic identifiability, still the ultimate reality without the superficial reality is established as that which is represented as intrinsic reality of the absolute. Thus the question of

existence and non-existence of intrinsic reality must be subtly understood.

As for the statement (that a Buddha) understands clearly "the solitary (361)

intrinsic reality free of contact with created things," it negates the (dualism of) "identified" and "identity" (inherent in) the object of the direct realization of the ultimate reality; and I have already explained the non-contradictoriness of this point.

The (subsequent) exhortation of the Introduction Commentary to think over whether the duality of subject and object is (merely) imaginatively constructed in the relative, since apart from the relative there are no subjects and objects, means that it is incorrect (to maintain) that the subject-object-duality alone is the imagined, since, there being no distinction between existence and non-existence of subjective and objective, they both constitute the relative and thus serve as the designative base of the imagined.

Therefore, the "substantiality" mentioned in the Questions of Maitreya statement of "substantial existence and non-existence" is not the "substantial" of the pair "designative-substantial" employed in other treatises (of the Idealists), nor is it the "substantial" equated by the Centrists with intrinsically identifiable status; but signifies mere existence. Thus, "substantial non-existence of the imagined" intends the impossibility of (the imagined) existing as the reality of the relative, and does not (impugn) the existence of the imagined as object of names and signs, etc. And, as for the "substantial existence of the constructed (reality)," the scripture itself states it to be substantially established through the "substantial" existence of discriminative constructs (themselves), and not through some independently arisen phenomenon. Since "independent status" is just that which is explained in the treatises of the Father and Son Masters as intrinsically identifiable status, this (statement of "substantiality") is not the same as the statements of other (interpretable) scriptures that the relative is endowed with intrinsic identifiability.

"Substantial" existence established by the substantiality of discriminative constructs is the kind of existence sustained by the existence of discriminative construction, which means that it is not an intrinsically identifiable existence. Since among things established by discriminative construction there are both those that do exist conventionally and those that do not, this (kind of mentally established existence) may not be likened to the discriminative construction of a snake in a rope. (Finally), as to the statement that the absolute reality is neither substantially existent nor non-existent, it intends the above non-existence according to the imagined and the existence as the intrinsic reality of the negation of that (imagined).

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Interpreted in this way, this chapter determines with question and answer the points liable to misinterpretation from the statements in the scripture's other chapters about the mere nominal designativeness of all

things. It thoroughly differentiates the distinctions of existence and non-existence of the three realities, and thus should be recognized as establishing the authority of the previous expositions.

This Questions of Maitreya chapter seems to be a major source of error for those scholars who are liable to suspect that within the Transcendent Wisdom Scripture, the path which is the sole avenue of all the Victors of the three times, within that very scripture is (a chapter) which is determined to be interpretable in meaning like the Elucidation of Intention. And since the great Centrists do not seem to have elucidated the meaning of this very (chapter) in great detail, I have submitted the question to a detailed examination.

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Chapter VII

THE CHIEF REASON FOR NEGATION OF ULTIMATE STATUS

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE CHIEF REASON

Which does this system take to be the chief reason negating the ultimate status of things?

(Chandrakirti) states, in the Introduction Commentary: "(Nagarjuna) did not execute the analyses in the Treatise out of a love for debate, but taught the facts in order to liberate (living beings)." All analytical reasonings in the Wisdom have as their sole aim the attainment of liberation by living beings. Living beings are chained in cyclic life by their habitual adherence to personal and objective selves. And since the chief cause of bondage is this habitual adherence to the two selves, in the person, object for the arising of the thought "I," and in the things that (constitute) his process (of existence), those two are the chief bases of rational negation of habitual selfhood. Therefore, (all) reasonings are categorized as negating the two selves.

In the passage in the Introduction Commentary where the reasonings determining reality in the Introduction are categorized as determining the two selflessnesses, (Chandra) states that the reasonings refuting four-extreme-production are demonstrations of objective selflessness. (He also) states that the Master (Nagarjuna), in beginning (the Wisdom) with "not from self, not from other ... etc.," demonstrated with reasoning only the equality of the non-production of all things, from among the ten equalities stated in the Ten Stages (to be contemplated) in entering the sixth stage, thinking that the other (nine) equalities were easier to dem-

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onstrate. Therefore, the chief reasoning proving the selflessness of things is the reasoning negating four-extreme-production.

Furthermore, this reasoning proving (selflessness) boils down to the cutter of the whole trap of false views, the royal reason of relativity itself.

For, the very fact of the inter-relative occurrence of inner things such as mental creations and outer things such as sprouts, dependent on causes and conditions such as misknowledge and seeds, (corroborates) the negations "their production is empty with reference to any intrinsically identifiable intrinsic reality" and "they are not produced from self, other, both, or neither." As (Chandra) states in the Introduction:

Things will never be produced from self, other, or both, or from a creator, or causelessly (randomly); thus, they are produced relatively. Thus, since things occur relatively these constructs cannot (withstand) analysis, and hence this reason of relativity cuts open the whole network of bad views.

As for the chief reasoning negating personal self, (Chandra) states in the Introduction:

While that (self) will never be established, either ultimately or conventionally, via seven modes, still, through social conventions without analysis, it is designated depending on its components.

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Although no chariot is found when sought in seven ways, as identical with its components, different from them, possessing them, mutually dependent in two ways (with them), the mere composite (of them), or as the structure of their composite, it still is presented as designatively existent, designated depending on its components. In the same way, the person is presented. (He also) states that very (reasoning) to be the method for the easy finding of the view of the profound, and hence those reasonings should be acknowledged as the chief reasonings negating personal self.

(Chandra) also states in the Introduction:

How could it exist, if not in these seven ways?" The yogi finds no existence of this (self), and thereby easily penetrates reality as well so here its status should thus be acknowledged.

Since this (example of the chariot) is easier to understand at first than the non-discovery of the person when seeking in seven ways, as well as its designative status dependent on its aggregates, such is the sequence in practice. And this (reasoning) also boils down to the reason of relativity, since the import of the selflessness of the person is the non-discovery of any person in those seven ways because of the fact of its (mere) designation depending on the aggregates. Such being the case, the very negation of self-production, etc., four (extremes) and of intrinsic sameness or difference, etc., in seven (ways), by the reasons of relative production and dependent designation should be upheld as the principally significant of reasonings.

2. THE PROCESS OF REFUTING INTRINSIC IDENTIFIABILITY THEREBY

Well then, since this negation of intrinsically identifiable status (of anything) even in the superficial by those reasons of relativity appears to be the distinctive specialty of this system in elucidating the intention of the Holy Ones, how do they execute such an exceptional negation?

As this is extremely crucial, let us explain it. This (exceptional negation) is executed in the Central Way Introduction by three reasonings given in the basic verses and one given in the commentary.

The first of these (is called) "the consequence that the holy equipoise would destroy phenomena," (and it runs as follows): if things had an
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intrinsically identifiable reality, when the yogi realized directly the unreality of all things, his intuitive knowledge would annihilate things such as forms and sensations, since they should be apprehended (if they were real), yet they are not. A thing that formerly exists and later does not is called "destroyed," and (in this case) the cause of its destruction would be taken to be that intuitive knowledge. Since it is irrational for that (wisdom) to be a cause of destruction, intrinsically identifiable production is inadmissible at all times. (Chandra states) in the Introduction: "If things stood on intrinsic identifiability, its repudiation would be their destruction and emptiness would be the destructive cause. Such being irrational, things do not exist (identifiably)."

Here one (Dogmaticist) might object that mere intrinsically identifiable existence does not entail that intuitive wisdom apprehend things, and, although ultimate existence does entail such apprehension, he does not assert such (existence of things), since intrinsically identifiable status is only conventional.

Although this is a direct rebuttal, it cannot evade (Chandra's consequence), as we will explain in the context of the next reasoning.

(The second of the four exceptional reasonings is called) the "consequence that conventional reality could withstand analysis," (and it runs as follows): if things were intrinsically identifiable, then if, for example, one were to analyze the objective referent of the conventional designation production-"Is this 'produced' sprout really the same as the seed? Or really different?"--it is necessary that the analytic (cognition) find (those things). Otherwise, they would become established merely on the strength of conventions since there would be no intrinsically identifiable objective referents.

However, when one analyzes (things) by investigating them in such a way, one does not find any such thing as production apart from that the nature of which is ultimate reality, where there is no production and no cessation. Therefore, superficial things (should) not be asserted to be objects discovered by such analysis. (Chandra formulates this consequence) in the Introduction (as follows):

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When one analyzes these (mundane) things, they are not found to stand anywhere short of that with ultimate nature. Therefore, social conventional reality should not be analyzed.

Here, as explained above, a certain (Dogmaticist) claims (that this consequence does him) no damage, the essence of his disagreement being his drawing a line between reasoning analytic of ultimacy and non-ultimacy and the method of analysis merely (seeking referents of designations) explained above, since, although (conventional reality) does withstand analysis by the (latter) type of analysis, he never claimed that it withstands analysis by reasoning analytic of the ultimacy or non-ultimacy (of things). This rebuttal is the fundamental one, and is essentially **(368)**

the same (in thrust) as the previous rebuttal (given to the first consequence).

As for the reason why they cannot evade the damage of those (consequences), it is-as repeatedly explained above, and as given in Chandrabha's statements in this context and in many others that superficial existence is (equivalent to) social conventional existence-the very statement that whatever persons and things are established by social conventions are only established without the slightest analysis as to the mode of existence of the referents of the conventions; and thus that which, on the contrary, is analytically established to exist is ultimately existent. Therefore, if (something) is intrinsically identifiably existent, it must of necessity withstand analysis by rational cognition and must of necessity be apprehended by the intuitive wisdom that directly encounters the ultimate.

(Again the Dogmaticist) objects that ultimate existence of something is its existence on the strength of its own actual condition, not merely established on the strength of its appearance in non-defective cognitions such as sense-cognitions, and hence social conventional existence is not that established on the strength of verbal conventions, but is existence on the strength of appearance in non-defective cognition, while still not being existence established on the strength of a thing's own objective condition.

(We answer that) if such were the case, it would contradict the (scriptural) statement that all things are mere names, signs, and designations, and the statement that "(things) exist by social conventions and usages, and not in the ultimate sense." (For,) if there were some object found by analysis of the mode of existence of the referents of conventional designations, what would the word "merely" (in the former statement) exclude? And how could it be correct to say (in the latter statement) "it exists by social conventions," etc.? (And here finally,) while being completely out of touch with the way in which a common person accepts the referents of conventional designations, if one nevertheless says "(such **(369)**

and such) exists as a social convention," this is no more than (empty)

talk, since one does not (in fact) accept the meaning.

The sevenfold analysis, (which proves) the impossibility of establishing as person any object found by analysis seeking the referent of the convention "person," and the reasonings such as the negation of production from other even conventionally, (which prove) the impossibility of establishing as production, etc., any objects found by analysis seeking the referents of conventions for things such as "production"-these should be understood from the detailed examinations (have given them) elsewhere.

Thus, there is no difference between the conventions for persons and things, such as "I saw" and "the sprout grows," and the conventions (of philosophy) such as "my substantial self saw" and "the sprout grows from a substantially different seed," in the sense that investigation of the mode of existence of the referents of (both-types of) conventions finds nothing (ultimately). Nevertheless, there is an extremely great difference (between them) with regard to whether or not their existence corresponding to their designations is faulted by other (conventional) validating cognitions; the former pair (of conventional objects) being conventionally existent, the latter pair not being existent even conventionally. And further, this (point) depends on the thorough discrimination of the difference between (a thing's) being faulted by rational cognition and its being unable to withstand analysis, as well as the extremely great difference between rational cognition's not finding the existence (of something) and its seeing the non-existence (of something). But I have already explained these extensively elsewhere.

Here, someone, who has not accomplished the analysis of fine discrimination between the above (apparently similar types of conventions) yet negates ultimate status by a few likely reasons and maintains the existence of superficial things by means of a few erroneous cognitions, might think that (those conventions) can be established merely by their existence according to erroneous cognition, since their referents merely exist according to error. This (kind of attitude) ends up (as the position that) if (the propositions that) "happiness and suffering arise from the creator and from nature, etc." and "happiness and suffering arise from good and evil actions" are right, they are both equally right, and if wrong, are both equally wrong; since analytic cognition will not find (the referent of) even the latter when analyzing it as above, and even the former exists (370)

according to erroneous (cognition). Therefore, (such a person holds that Chandra's statements) in the Introduction: "This (self) is irrational even as the ground of the I-process, nor do we assent even to its superficial existence"; and also, "What the fundamentalists, disturbed by sleep of ignorance, imagine respectively (as real) each in their own (theory), and what (people) imagine in illusions and mirages-these are just what do not exist, even conventionally"; (that is, to the effect that) the imaginative constructions of the special theories of our own and others' schools and the objects such as horses and elephants apprehended in illusions or water apprehended in mirages are non-existent even superficially; both

become incorrect. For, (unless they exist superficially) not even erroneous cognitions could apprehend them; since they do exist according to erroneous cognitions, they should become conventionally existent; and otherwise the rational negations such as "production from self or other is not established even conventionally" would become incapable of refuting anything at all.

Here, (the above holder of the confused attitude about the status of conventions) cannot claim immunity (from the unacceptable consequences of his position) by asserting that he establishes superficial existence, not as those errors which belong to unreflective living beings from beginningless time, but merely as existence according to the error derived from the beginningless continuum of failure to analyze (the nature of reality). For, if such were the case (that is, that superficial existence is constituted by the specific error of lack of analysis), then even the conceptual objects of notions of permanence that hold prior and posterior as identical, (as well as the objects) of unconscious self-habits that adhere to the intrinsic identifiability of persons and things, would become conventionally existent.

Therefore, granting that (something's) conventional existence precludes its discovery by rational cognition investigating its mode of ex-
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istence, still it is definitely necessary that it not be refuted by validating rational cognition, and it is also necessary that it not be faulted by any other conventional validating cognition, because it is necessary that (a thing's) conventional existence be established by validating cognition. Here, if one objects that such (a position) contradicts (the doctrine that) conventionally existent things are merely established on the strength of verbal conventions, (we respond that) this does not fault (our position). The word "merely" in the expression "superficially existent things such as persons are merely established on the strength of verbal conventions" excludes (the possibility that) the person is not established on the strength of verbal conventions, and does not exclude (the possibility that) the person is also established by validating cognition; nor does it give any indication that everything established on the strength of verbal conventions is (in fact) superficially existent.

If you wonder what sort of non-conventional status of (things) is excluded (by the above expression, we can explain that) if the referent designated by the convention "person" were to have intrinsically identifiable status, this would entail its having an existence by virtue of its own intrinsic reality and would not allow it to have existence (merely) by virtue of the subjective convention ("person"). (Thus,) this is the kind of (non-conventional status, that is, intrinsically identifiable status) that is ruled out (by ""merely"). Although such a kind (of non-conventional status) is negated by rational cognition, the (conventional) existence of the referents of conventional expressions such as "Yajña sees" is (nonetheless) established, since, If a conventional expression had no referent (at all), it would be faulted (even) by conventional validating cognition. And, in the context of a verbal convention and its referent, when a referent

is found not to exist by its own intrinsic reality, its existence on the strength of convention is automatically established. Therefore, if one analyzes the mode of existence of the ultimate reality, it finally ends up as just the same. And so we assert that its existence is also established on the strength of convention, although we do not assert that the ultimate reality is established by conventional validating cognition. Furthermore, we say that the ultimate reality exists according to conventional cognition because of the fact that the notion of the existence of the ultimate is absent from the habit-pattern of rational cognition, which is not the same (372)

as saying that (ultimate reality) is established by that (conventional validating cognition).

Buddhapalita also explains that the Victor spoke of production, etc., on the strength of conventions and that "production," etc., were established as mere expressions. Whereas the Dogmaticists assert that the non-defective cognition that establishes conventional existence is non-erroneous with regard to the intrinsically identifiable thing that is its perceptual or conceptual object, in this (Dialecticist system) there are a great many things that can be established as objective by (cognitions) erroneous about their apparent objects. Hence there is a great difference in (the determination of what is) defective and non-defective in the non-defective cognitions of these two (systems).

Although (Chandra) calls this sort of existence on strength of convention "designative existence," it is definitely not the sort of designative existence where something is designated in the absence of any phenomenon. Thus, all (things) such as Buddhas and living beings as defined, and bondage and liberation as defined, are viable in this (interpretation of conventional existence), and are not at all viable in any other system. (Finally), in the face of the elucidation of this very fact by the two masters (Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti) as the ultimate intention of the Holy Father and Son, if one can see no ground for establishing (all empirical) systems with (all their) attributes, it is the result of the predominance of the ingrained habit of associating all normal causalities, etc., with intrinsically identifiable status. And since it (means that) still the import of relativity has not yet dawned as the import of emptiness by intrinsic reality, you should realize that you are standing at the point of greatest resistance to this system.

(The third of the four exceptional reasonings is called) "the consequence of the non-negation of ultimate production," (and it runs as follows): if things' intrinsically identifiable status is not negated by the negation through analysis of whether production is from self or other, (373)

then negation of ultimate status also will not be accomplished through such analysis. Since that is irrational, intrinsically identifiable status can also be negated conventionally. By the essential point that intrinsic identifiability necessarily entails ultimacy, the reasonings negating ultimate production also negate conventional intrinsic identifiability. Therefore,

intrinsically identifiable production does not exist in either of the two realities, as (Chandra) states in the Introduction:

The very reasons (proving) the irrationality of self- and other-production in the ultimate sense also (prove) their irrationality in the conventional reality-so whereby will your production come to pass?

(The fourth of the four exceptional reasonings is called the consequence of) "the wrongness of the (scriptural) statement that things are empty by intrinsic reality." (Chandra) in comment on the first (exceptional) reasoning in the Introduction cites the Kashyapa Chapter to prove emptiness with respect to intrinsic identifiability:

Kashyapa, furthermore, the central way is the genuine insight into things; it does not make things empty by means of emptiness, but (realizes that) the very things themselves are emptiness... likewise it does not make things signless, wishless, performanceless, non-produced, and non-occurrent by means of signlessness... and non-occurrence, (but realizes that) the very things themselves are signlessness ... the very things themselves are non-occurrence...

(Chandra) also explains that this scriptural reference teaches the incorrectness of the (interpretation of) emptiness by the Idealist system. (Thus,) if things had an intrinsically identifiable reality, they would not be empty in their own nature, and "the very things themselves are emp-
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teness" would be wrong. And if existence by a thing's own intrinsic reality were not refuted, then it would be necessary to demonstrate emptiness through an emptiness with respect to something else, which contradicts "it does not makes things empty because of emptiness." In short, (intrinsic identifiability of things) would mean that there is no self-emptiness which is emptiness by a thing's own nature. Therefore, if one does not assent to the emptiness of things with respect to the intrinsic reality which is intrinsic identifiability, though one may call it "self-emptiness," it does not get beyond "other-emptiness," and (Chandra means that) the Idealist doctrine that the relative is free of substantial subject-object-dichotomy does not negate (intrinsic identifiability) by taking the import of the relative to be intrinsic realitylessness.

Although (the various positions on the subtle objective selflessness) are similar insofar as they are modes of emptiness where the negation-ground does not exist as actuality of the negatee, and where that ground is empty with respect to the negatee, (only) the emptiness (of things) with respect to intrinsic identifiability means (their) emptiness in (their) own right, all other modes of emptiness not being emptiness (of things) in themselves. The reason is that, with the former type of emptiness, as long as there is no loss of concentration on the previously attained establishment by validating cognition, it is impossible for reifications to occur which, under the influence of theories, hold that ground as truly existent or existent

in a way tantamount to that. Whereas, even when the latter (Idealist and Dogmaticist systems) do not lose the establishment by validating cognition of their objectives, this does not prevent reifications (holding) theoretically to (existence in) truth or (in something with) the meaning of truth.

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3. CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER THERE IS A PROBANDUM IN THE NEGATION "INTRINSIC REALITYLESSNESS"

Here, one may wonder, does the reason merely negate intrinsic reality in persons and things, when one asserts that (it is) "not established"? Or does the reason (actually) prove intrinsic realitylessness?

In this regard, since it is first of all necessary to understand the definitions of the two kinds of negation, let us explain them. When a negation is verbally expressed, it either excludes its negatee explicitly in words or else may be understood as functioning effectively to negate its negatee when it dawns in the cognition (through its implications). An example of the first mode is "selflessness," and of the second is "ultimate reality," which, although its excluding of negatee is not verbally explicit, functions effectively to exclude mental fabrications when its import dawns (in the mind). Thus (negation) is what is understood when a negatee is directly excluded.

Now the first of the two (kinds of either implicit or explicit negation) is choice negation, which commits itself to something else when it directly excludes its negatee. As (Bhavaviveka) states in the Blaze of Argument, "choice negation negates the reality of something and thereby establishes the reality of something else similar to it. For example, the negation 'this (man) is not a brahmin' establishes that (the man) is of a lower class than the brahmin class, yet is similar to a brahmin by virtue of his learning, ascetic achievements, and so forth." Exclusion negation, (the second kind), does not imply anything else when it directly excludes its negatee. As (Bhavaviveka) explains in the Blaze of Argument, "Exclusion negation does no more than negate just the reality of something, not establishing anything other but similar. For example, the expression 'A

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brahmin should not drink beer!" only negates just that, and does not indicate that he does or does not drink any other kind of drink. In these passages, (Bhavaviveka) uses "establishes" and "does not establish" interchangeably with "implies" and "does not imply," or else (exclusion negation would be presented as) not even negating its negatee.

Here, the difference between these two (types) is not that they negate using the words "is not" and "exists not," respectively; because both Chandra and Bhavya explain "it is not from self" as an exclusion negation, and one must understand "Boundless Life" (Amitāyuh) as a choice negation. Thus, for negation (to take place), it is not sufficient to exclude a negatee with regard to something by negating all other things (in gen-

eral) as being it, but it is necessary that (the negation) take effect with the mode of exclusion (of the negatee) by one's verbal expression or with the mode of direct exclusion of the negatee in one's conceptual cognition.

(In this regard) there are some who maintain that, while such expressions as "selflessness" are exclusion negations (in general), they are no longer such when put together with an object, as in "selflessness in persons," etc., and others assert that there is no exclusion negation together with an object, since then it implies something else as well. These are quite wrong, because although the particulars of the two types of negation are set forth in other treatises just as explained above, such expressions as "brahmins should not drink beer!" retain the character of exclusion negation even though they are conjoined with an object, and because (in such as that same expression) the object such as "brahmin" is the basis for judging whether or not something else is implied by the exclusion of the negatee, and is not (itself) the other thing implied.

There are four modes of implying something else (in a negation), implicitly, explicitly, both together, and by context, as (Avalokitavrata) cites in the Wisdom Lamp Commentary: "Choice negation (implies) other things showing them implicitly, explicitly establishing them, through both modes, and not by its own expression; the other (type of negation) is different." Here, an example of implicit (choice negation) is "Yajña is fat and does not eat by day." An example of explicit establishment of something else is "it exists without being produced from itself," since (377)

exclusion of the negatee and establishment of another fact are contained in the same expression. An example of (choice negation through) both modes, where explicit and implicit implications are both in the expression, is "fat Yajna does not waste away without eating by day." And an example of (choice negation) not indicated in the expression (itself) is the statement "this is not a brahmin" made in the context where one knows for certain that a person is either a brahmin or a warrior but not which of the two. If any of these four modes of implication is found, (a negation is) a choice negation, and any other (negation) which does not imply any other thing is an exclusion negation.

Now, certain former (scholars) asserted that the Centrists use reasons and syllogisms for negating intrinsic reality, but not for proving intrinsic realitylessness. This is incorrect, because genuine reasons without probanda and inferential validating cognitions without objects are impossible.

(Still) others maintain that the Dogmaticists have reasons and syllogisms for proving selflessness, but Dialecticists do not, since (Chandrakirti) explained, in the Lucid Exposition, that "we do not prove that this does not exist, but do refute the absolutistic constructions of others. Likewise, we do not prove the existence of this (conventional reality), but refute the nihilistic constructions of others, since we assert the establishment of the central way by clearing away the two extremisms." (They also maintain) that consequences merely function to negate the premises of

others, and that, as in the Introduction, "the wise exclaim that the fruit of philosophical analysis is the elimination of imaginative constructions", and that therefore (the Dialecticists) merely refute the systems of others and do not prove the non-existence of intrinsic reality.

Explanation of only that necessary for mere exclusion of the negatee is not one of the Dialecticist distinctive specialties, because even (Bhavaviveka) explains, in the Blaze of Argument, that "(this) does no more than merely negate, as earth, etc., are not actually elements ultimately, and does not prove that they are actually anything else or that they are (378)

actually non-existent." Therefore, the word "merely" in the statements that negation of intrinsic identifiability merely excludes the negatee and merely gets rid of false constructions indicates that (these statements) are exclusion negations, refuting the possibility of their being choice negations by ruling out their implying anything else, not merely negating their negatees within their logical scope; because, as explained above (exclusion negation) merely excludes its negatee without establishing anything else.

An example (of exclusion negation) is the expression "there is no smoke in the lake," which merely excludes the presence of smoke in the lake without indicating (the existence of) anything else. However, it does not (thereby) fail to show that the lake is free of smoke, nor does the corresponding cognition fail to ascertain the smokelessness of the lake. Likewise, the expression "there is no intrinsic reality in the sprout" merely rules out any intrinsic reality in the sprout, but why should that preclude the expression's expressing and the cognition's ascertaining the intrinsic realitylessness of the sprout? Therefore, the words express the absence of the smoke in the lake in their very exclusion (of it) and the cognition ascertains the absence of the smoke in its very exclusion (of it from the lake); because the exclusion of the negatee and the determination of the negation are (mutually indispensable), the lack of either one entailing the lack of the other. In the same way, the scriptural references teaching intrinsic realitylessness express intrinsic realitylessness in their actual negation of intrinsic reality; the rational cognition negative of intrinsic reality cognizes intrinsic realitylessness in its actual negation of intrinsic reality, and the reason negative of intrinsic reality proves intrinsic realitylessness in its actual negation of intrinsic reality. These (facts) must be accepted, and one must not assert that the scriptural references have no subject, the cognition has no object, and the reason has no probandum. Therefore, it does not seem to be correct to assert, with regard either to the Centrist, or even to the Logician, that reason merely negates intrinsic reality and does not prove intrinsic realitylessness. When it is said that the statement "earth is not ultimately the actuality of the element" merely accomplishes the negation of its being the actuality of the element ultimately, it means that that exclusion negation proves that probandum, and the statement "it does not prove that it is actually non-existent" does not mean that (the statement) does not prove that it does not exist as an element ultimately, but means that it does not prove there to be any

reality of non-existence other than a pure negation. Therefore, granted
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that it is valid to inquire whether something else is established other than mere exclusion of a negatee, how can it be cogent to inquire, having assented to the exclusion of a negatee, whether reason, word, and cognition have taken the negation as their object?

Here one might object that if the reason that rules out intrinsically real existence also proves intrinsic realitylessness, how is this reconciled with the Holy (Nagarjuna's) statement? "This negates existence itself, and does not embrace non-existence itself; just like saying 'it is not black' is not to say 'it is white.'

This means that just as, for example, to say "this is not black" when you want to show the mere absence of black, is a mere negation of black and is not an indication of something else such as "this is white," so when you assert that such as sprouts are ultimately intrinsically realityless, you are proving merely the negation of their ultimate, intrinsically real existence; and are not proving the existence of any truthlessness apart from that. (Bhavaviveka) in the Wisdom Lamp and (Avalokitavrata) in the commentary explain (this verse of Nagarjuna's) as meaning that the proof (of realitylessness) is not a choice negation, but is an exclusion negation, as (Avalokitavrata) states that "this can be understood from the example, since he does not say that 'it is not black' fails to show that the thing is not black, but that it does not show that it is white." (Incidentally,) Avalokitavrata states that "this reference comes from the Investigation of the World."

The way in which confusion arises here may be expressed as follows: "that ultimate non-production of the sprout must be proven to be the case by rational cognition; hence, when the sprout is proven to be without ultimate production, the existence of ultimate non-production becomes the probandum, since the inference proves that fact." I am going to explain how rational cognition does not prove the existence of intrinsic realitylessness in my commentary on the Wisdom.

If we realize that the probandum is the exclusion negation (itself), what we prove is the mere exclusion of ultimate production, and we understand that we do not prove anything else such as the existence of ultimate non-production.

(380)

In regard to (Chandra's) statement in the Lucid Exposition, "we refute what others imagine exists, and do not prove any non-existence," an example of a notion to refute is (that of) utter non-existence, and it is refuted as follows: "Ultimate productionlessness is not to be held as truly existent;" and an example of not proving any absolute existence is (simply) not to prove the existence of ultimate production. Therefore, one can negate both the truth-status of the sprout and the truth-status of the truthlessness, since it is not the case that the exclusion of one determines the other, but one cannot negate both the truth-status of the sprout and the truthlessness of the sprout, since necessarily the exclusion of the one

is the determination of the other. (Nagarjuna) clearly states in the Rebuttal of Objections: "If it were the case that the realityless (words) themselves were to eliminate some realitylessness, when intrinsic realitylessness was done away with, intrinsic reality would actually be established

Thus, if realityless words were to negate the intrinsic realitylessness of things, then things would become in fact intrinsically really existent. Similarly, ultimate existence and ultimate non-existence cannot both be negated. However, ultimate existence and ultimate existence of non-existence can both be negated.

In this regard, the (Buddhist) Realists cannot negate truth-status in both (negation and negatee), since they assert that if the negatee is untrue its negation is true, and if the negation is untrue its negatee is true. (On the other hand), the Centrists, having solidly established with scripture and reason the definitive meaning, the inconceivable, profound central path of abandonment of both those extremes (of absolutism and nihilism), succeed in spreading out in all directions the essence of the Doctrine of the Victor!

Now, the following question may be (fairly) put: "Since there seems to be a multitude of approaches by which the two Great Champions of Philosophy proceeded to differentiate between the interpretable meaning and the definitive meaning of the scriptures and by which the lordly sages specifically elucidated the intimate intention (of those Champions), which master of elucidation of the intimate intentions of those two (Champions) do you (Dialecticists) follow? You must (at last) proclaim which interpretation of definitive meaning you profess to be the conclusive ultimate."

I revere from the depths of my heart
All the excellent elucidations of these,
(381)

The Ornaments of the Sages of this world.
Yet when one's eye of intellect is opened wide,
As a night-lily garden bursts in blooms,
By the white light shining from Chandra's moon,
And Buddhapalita's appointed path is seen
Who is there who would not hold supreme
The most excellent system of Nagarjuna?

Such is my answer!

This way (I have explained above) should be understood to be the path of the determination of the ultimate reality (revealed) in all the scriptures, esoteric as well as exoteric, since there is a grave mistake (in thinking) that, while the systems of the two (philosophical) Champions for determining the ultimate reality by distinguishing the interpretable and the definitive among scriptures are evidently prevalent in the context of the Transcendence Vehicle, the great Siddhas and the Pandits who elucidated the scriptures of the Tantric Vehicle had a third alternative (system) for

determining ultimate reality.

And it is for this reason that I saw that seeking reality without relying on the way of the Champions with their two systems is like a blind man's running guideless through a wilderness and that the previous accounts of ultimate reality by the mere dogmatists, who stand on a few scriptural phrases distinguishing interpretable and definitive, do not investigate thoroughly the treatises, and do not, in particular, understand the subtle points of (the Champions') reasonings; their accounts are essentially mere verbiage. I then became dissatisfied with having only a rough idea of many of the (deeper) points of meaning, and so made a comprehensive inquiry into the precise and general keys of those reasonings which the Champions have given us as eyes for looking upon the scriptures. Having done so, I composed this account of the Essence of Eloquence for the sake of those of subtle philosophical discernment who, unleashing mighty waves of efforts to determine the magnificence, the profundity, and that more profound than the profundity of the scriptures, have taken to heart the practical attainment of what they know, and earnestly desire that the Doctrine of the Victor may long be with us!

(382)

He embodies the essence of the Teaching,
The profound intention of the Victor,
Revealed by the Scripture of the Profound,

With vast learning in the many treatises
Of the two methodologies supreme
Of Buddha's philosophical traditions;

His precise discernment of their import
Contemplates aright the path of reason
Compelling to the hearts of subtle intellects;

Renowned as melodious Manjughosha,
The garland of his fame spreads all around;
Ah, the foot of that Universal Lord!

Reverent, I adored it on the lotus of my heart,
My faith unwavering and powerfully intense,
And that most sweet reason of philosophers,
Who sees the real Thatness of the Holy Discourse,
Authored this book on the miraculous message.

What other treatise thus elucidates
The import of that Discourse of the Buddha,
That great treasury of true eloquence,
So fitting the Champions' practical systems
Elaborated by the deep Nagarjuna
And the irresistible Asanga,
The two prize bulls of all philosophers?

Already expert in all the sciences
Of Bodhisattvas, veterans of heroes' deeds,
I still inquired ever more penetratingly
Into every further exact realization
Of those Places, so difficult to measure,
Of the profound and the magnificent;
And my heart became buoyantly delighted
With the splendid banquet of totally pure
Samadhis, brilliant wisdoms, and active ethics.

One minute one swells with joy of faith in the Victors,
The next, one remembers the kindness of the Champions;
Time again, reverence for the wise spiritual teacher,
(383)

Heartfelt compassion for the suffering living beings,
The wish for the long endurance of the Precious Teaching-
These feelings increase as if in mutual competition.
These times, when one feels the magic of the path
Of that Philosophy which bestows the discovery
Of That Place, so long desired, so hard to realize-
"Kyea-mah! How wonderful!"
Though all alone, the shout of joy bursts forth!

The Moon of philosophers shines on such a one,
Honoring him with garlands of brilliant praise;
"Contemplator of the highest wisdom!"
"Leader of those pure in ethical achievement!"
"Discoverer of the definitive meaning!"
"Principal heir of the Victorious Buddha!"
The intelligent who wish to win such Buddha-honors,
Should immerse themselves in this clear exposition,
And purify the eyes of their intellects
With the path of philosophical reason.

By whatever merit I may have gained
Through this effort in the pioneering
Champions' Ways of the two great systems,
May the Victor's Holy Dharma be long upheld,
Just as it was by Nagarjuna and Asanga!

As the wise Heroes of Enlightenment,
Samantabhadra and Manjughosha,
Work constantly to delight the Victors,
So also may all my activities
Be ocean waves of wisdom's goodness!
(384)

རྗེ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་སློབ་བཟང་གྲགས་པའི་དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྟོང་པོ་

COLOPHON

This Essence of True Eloquence, which clarifies the distinctions between the interpretable meaning and the definitive meaning of the scriptures, by differentiating the two systems of the Champions of Philosophy, the system of "Mind-Only" of the Great Saint Asanga, and the system of realitylessness of the Savior Nagarjuna, was composed (in 1407) by the illustrious Easterner Tsong Khapa bLo-bzang Grags-pa, a Bhikshu of the Shakya Order, a scholar, and a philosopher. The scribe was the Shramanera sDom-brtson bSod-nams bLo-gros.

OM! All is well!

(385)